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The food and grocery retail industry is of great importance for its significant
contribution to a country’s GDP, the key role it plays in the supply chain, and the
complex structure in which it has evolved: few differentiated great scale multiproduct
retail chains that concentrate a big share of domestic retail sales, sophisticated
logistics and distribution systems, and a multiplicity of store formats ranging from
downtown convenience to big-box stores. In addition, this industry is characterized
by the promotion of private labels and other non-price strategies to induce customer
loyalty. The emergence and consolidation of hard-discount stores is as well an
important characteristic of the modern retail sector. Retail chains are no longer
simple intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers as they used to be
in the past, they can be rivals of upstream firms as well. Even though markets
are dominated by such large retailers, smaller competitors such as independent
convenience stores, specialized stores, among others, still survive with a lesser share
generally offering either narrower product lines of higher quality or by specializing
in the supply of a specific category of products.
For all these reasons, the food and grocery retail industry has been of central
attention for policy makers and economic research. A vast literature has covered a
wide variety of topics from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Yet, many
interesting questions remain to be addressed. This dissertation aims at studying
three topics concerning the grocery retailing industry using empirical methods. In
particular, the emphasis has been put on three questions that have special relevance
in the context of powerful retailers. Each of which is the subject of one of the three
chapters of this thesis.
The first chapter focuses on supermarket loyalty programs and the impact on
the demand for private labels. It is motivated is motivated by the observation
that supermarkets often link loyalty rewards to private label purchases. Why
supermarkets would do such thing? is the question this paper addresses
using structural methods of demand estimation and data on french households’
supermarket purchases. Loyalty programs (LPs) are by now a predominant short-
run nonprice strategy in retailing markets. In France, for instance, supermarkets
give loyalty rewards almost exclusively on private labels which are cheaper than
their branded counterparts. Why do profit-maximizing retailers give rebates on
their lower-price own brands? This paper empirically examines the link between
supermarket LPs and private labels. Using scanner data on grocery purchases
of French households and discrete-choice methods, I estimate brand-level demand
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Abstract
accounting for household membership to loyalty programs. Results are consistent
with the general wisdom: private labels are less valued products by all consumers
relative to quality-equivalent national brands. However, members of loyalty
programs have a larger valuation of private labels than non-members. Moreover,
the more prone to subscribe to LPs a customer is, the larger her sensitivity to a
price increase and the weaker the expected effects on the demand for private labels.
The second chapter, joint with Daniel Herrera Araujo, is inspired by a number
of theory papers showing that when shopping costs, that rationalize the observed
heterogeneity in consumer shopping patterns, are introduced in economic analysis,
policy conclusions might change dramatically. We structurally identify consumer
shopping costs —real or perceived costs of dealing with a store— using scanner
data on grocery purchases of French households. We present a model of demand
for multiple stores and products consisting of an optimal stopping problem in terms
of individual shopping costs. This rule determines whether to visit one or multiple
stores at a shopping period. We then estimate the parameters of the model and
recover the distribution of shopping costs. We quantify the total shopping cost
in 18.7 e per store sourced on average. This cost has two components, namely,
the mean fixed shopping cost, 1.53 e and mean total transport cost of 17.1 e per
trip. We show that consumers able to source three or more grocery stores have zero
shopping costs, which rationalizes the low proportion of three-stop shoppers observed
in our data. Theory predicts that when shopping costs are taken into account in
economic analysis, some seemingly pro-competitive practices can be welfare reducing
and motivate policy intervention. Such striking findings remain empirically untested.
This paper is a first step towards filling this gap.
The third chapter, I empirically examine the role of nonlinear contracts between
manufacturers and retail stores, and Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) on nominal
price stability. It is widely accepted in the literature that the incomplete transmission
of costs shocks into retail prices is explained by the existence of markup adjustment
and price adjustment costs. The vertical conduct of the industry and the existence of
vertical restraints such as RPM might introduce further price stickiness or reinforce
it. I present a structural model of vertical relations between manufacturers and
retailers allowing for nonlinear contracts and vertical restraints, and accounting
explicitly for retail price rigidity by including fixed costs of price adjustment in
retailer’s profit function. Using micro data on sales of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals
from a large supermarket chain in Chicago, I estimate demand, retrieve upstream and
downstream markups, and compute bounds of retail price adjustment costs. Results
show that the total costs the retailer bears for adjusting prices of its products in a
year lie between 1.6% and 3% of its total revenue, on average.
x
Résumé
La grande distribution alimentaire est actuellement d’une telle importance, et cela
grâce à sa contribution au PIB d’un pays, son rôle essentiel au sein de la structure
verticale, et l’organisation assez complexe dont elle est devenue au cours des dernières
décennies: peut de détaillants différenciés offrant un grand assortiment de produits
disponibles à grande échelle et qui concentrent une partie considerable du marché
domestique, des systèmes de distribution et de logistique bien complexe, ainsi qu’une
variété de formats de magasin dont les magasins à proximité, les supermarchés et les
hypermarchés sont les plus fréquents. De plus, le développement et promotion des
marques de distributeur (MDD) ainsi que la mise en place des strategies visant la
fidélisation des consommateurs sont devenues des caractéristiques marquantes dans
cette industrie. Par ailleurs, l’émergence et consolidation des magasins hard-discount
est également l’une des caractéristiques remarquables de la grande distribution à ce
jour. Les détaillants ne sont plus des simples intermédiaires entre producteurs et
consommateurs. Aujourd’hui, par contre, avec les MDD les détaillants sont devenus
concurrents de ses fournisseurs. Même si les marchés sont dominés par des si grands
détaillants, des petits concurrents, tels que des magasins à proximité independents
et des magasins spécialisés (boulangeries, boucherie, etc.), sont toujours présents
avec une petite part de marché mais avec un assortiment des produits de qualité
supérieure en général.
C’est pourquoi la grande distribution est de ce fait l’objet de nombreuses
interventions de politique et de la recherche économique. En effet, une importante
littérature aussi bien théorique qu’empirique a abordé une grande variété des sujets.
Cependant, il reste un nombre considerable des questions à être l’objet de recherche.
Cette thèse vise à étudier trois questions concernant la grande distribution et le
comportement d’achat des consommateurs, dans le cadre de détaillants avec pouvoir
de marché, en utilisant des méthodes empiriques.
Le premier chapitre est dedié à l’étude des programmes de fidélité des
supermarchés et leur impact sur la demande de marques de distributeur (MDD).
Souvent les supermarchés lient les avantages fidélité à l’achat en marques de
distributeurs, quelles sont les motivations des supermarchés à faire cela? C’est la
question que cet étude cherche à répondre d’un point de vue empirique. Je travail
sur des donnés extraites d’un panel représentatif des consommateurs concernant les
achats des ménages français, et l’utilisation d’une méthode structurelle d’estimation
de demande. Les résultats sont conformes aux faits: les MDD sont des produits
moins préférés vis-à-vis les marques nationales (MN) de même qualité. Cependant,
xi
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la carte fidélité a, en effet, un impact positive sur le choix du consommateur: ceux qui
portent une carte fidélité ont une probabilité supérieur de choisir des MDD que ceux
qui ne l’ont pas. Par ailleurs, l’impact d’un programme de fidélité sur la demande
des MDD est moins importants chez les détenteurs de plusieurs cartes.
Le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Daniel Herrera Araujo, vise à mesurer les
coûts d’achat des consommateurs à partir des données de panel concernant les
achats des ménages en France. Quand l’analyse économique tient compte des
coûts d’achat, que rationalisent l’hétérogénéité observée en nombre des enseignes
visitées par les consommateurs, les conclusions de politique publique peuvent changer
remarquablement. Nous identifions les coûts d’achat du consommateur dans le
cadre d’un modèle structurel de demande en plusieurs enseignes ainsi qu’en plusieurs
produits, qui lie le choix optimale du nombre de supermarchés à visiter (un seule ou
plusieurs) aux coûts d’achat. Nous estimons les paramètres du modèle et mesurons
le coût d’achat total moyen en 18,7 e par enseigne visitée. Deux quantités y sot
compris: le coût fixe moyen, 1,53 e et le coût de transport moyen 17,1 e par visite.
Le troisième chapitre porte sur l’analyse empirique du rôle des tarifs binômes et
la fixation du prix de vente (RPM, d’après l’expression anglo-saxonne Resale Price
Maintenance) dans la stabilité des prix de vente. Il est largement reconnu dans la
littérature économique que la transmission incomplète des chocs de coûts aux prix de
vente est expliquée par l’ajustement des marges ainsi que les coûts d’ajustement des
prix. Les relations entre fournisseurs et distributeurs et le RPM peuvent renforcer
la rigidité des prix. Je présente un modèle structurel de relations verticales dont des
tarifs binômes peuvent être adoptées ainsi que le RPM. Ce modèle tient compte de
la rigidité des prix de vente à travers des coûts fixes d’ajustement des prix qui sont
ajoutés au profit du détaillant. En utilisant des données concernant les ventes de
marques de céréales pour le petit déjeuner dans une grande châıne des supermarchés
au Chicago, j’estime la demande, récupère les marges et calcule les limites supérieure
et inférieure de l’intervalle que contienne les vrais coûts d’ajustement. Les résultats
obtenus montrent que ces coûts représentent en moyenne entre 1.6% et 3% des
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General Introduction
The food and grocery retail industry is of great importance for its significant
contribution to a country’s GDP, the key role it plays in the supply chain, and
the complex structure in which it has evolved. In a world in which vertical relations
are often more complex than simple linear pricing contracts, in the last decades
retailing chains have shown to be very interested in increasing their market power
and bargaining position vis-à-vis manufacturers. In line with this, in most modern
economies we can list as main characteristics of retail sectors, the following: high
concentration of domestic retail sales by a few differentiated great scale multiproduct
retail chains; sophisticated logistics and distribution systems; the proliferation of
great scale superstores, that can cover a sales area of 20,000 square meters or more
and carry more than 200,000 different brands at the same time, offering parallel
services such as shopping malls, beauty salons, restaurants, car wash, gas stations,
and recreation grounds for kids, as an attempt to attract customers through one-
stop shopping; and the promotion of private labels and other non-price strategies to
induce customer loyalty. The emergence and consolidation of hard-discount stores,
that provide an alternative for all those consumers looking for lower prices mostly
on basic products, is as well an important characteristic of the modern retail sector.
In the European Union, for instance, the retail sector accounts for 4.3% of the
Gross Value Added in the EU economy, around 8% of employment and the retail
sales represent 54% of the edible grocery sales (European Commission, 2014). In the
United Kingdom, the grocery sales account for 51.3% of UK’s retail sales, 14% of all
UK employment (IDG, 2015). On the other hand, the share of household expenditure
on food and non-alcoholic beverages in the EU including the UK was on average
13% of total expenditure in 2012. In 13 countries of the European Union (among
which we have France, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands),
the leading 5 retailers of each country concentrated a market share greater than
60% (European Commission, 2014). Such phenomenon has been possible due to
the following reasons: i) zoning regulations limiting internal growth and favoring
mergers, acquisitions and organization of retailers in alliances and corporations of
international scope (Chen and Rey, 2012; European Commission, 2014). ii) the
increase in the constitution of buying groups, which are groups of retailers that get
together to improve their bargaining power and get better purchasing conditions
through higher volumes, to reduce purchasing costs of NBs and PLs. Finally, iii)
consumer habits have been that depending on their time availability, transportation
costs and taste for shopping tend to favor one-stop shopping for a broad range
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of products (European Commission, 2014). By carrying a large range of different
products and brands, stores make the shopping experience less costly to consumers.
In the last decade, larger store formats experienced a remarkable proliferation.
According to the European Commission (2014), Hypermarkets increased the number
of outlets in 72% between 2000 and 2011 and the sales area in 46% in the same
period. The number of supermarket outlets increased by 10% and the sales area of
this format raised by 26%. On the other hand, discounters experienced the greatest
growth in sales area in the same period with 81% while the number of outlets of this
retail form increased by 47% (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Increase of number of outlets and sales area by store format (in
percentage), 2000-2011
Source: European Commission, 2014.
Retail chains are no longer simple intermediaries between manufacturers and
consumers as they used to be in the past, but act as rivals of upstream firms as well.
Private labels (PL), i.e. products distributed exclusively by a retail chain under its
own brand, have evolved from low-quality generic products that captured demand
from low willingness-to-pay consumers to more attractive products of comparable
quality to that of manufacturer branded (known as National Brands, NB) and of
lower price. In EU countries, in particular, PLs have steadily increased their market
share and European consumers are changing their perception of PLs from rough
substitutes of NBs provided they are a similar-quality alternative with lower prices.1
In fact, penetration of private labels exceeds 40% in some European countries such as
1 Evidence shows that PLs are supplied at a 20% lower price on average relative to NBs (Berges-
Sennou et al., 2009).
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Switzerland and the UK and in general is high in the region (European Commission,
2014). A traditional motive claimed by retailers to promote private labels is that they
are more profitable than reselling NBs. Other important motives are: they are key
to increase customer loyalty, because they are exclusive products. And though there
are other supermarkets with private labels on the same products that can be seen
as close substitutes, the significant differentiation across retailers is enough to make
those products considerably differentiated. By building customer loyalty through
private labels and loyalty programs, retailers may be increasing their market power
to be used against upstream as well as downstream markets.
Yet, smaller competitors such as independent convenience stores, specialized
stores, among others, still survive in a market dominated by large chains with a
lesser share generally offering either narrower product lines of higher quality or by
specializing in the supply of a specific category of products (such as wine shops,
vegetables markets, butcheries, etc.).
For all these reasons, the food and grocery retail industry has been of central
attention for policy makers and economic research. A vast literature has covered
a wide variety of topics (such as retailer competition, vertical relations, consumer
product and supermarket choice, consumer behavior in the presence of switching,
search or shopping costs, the effects of new product introduction, the economics of
private labels, etc.) from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by Marketing
and Economics literature. Yet, many interesting questions remain to be addressed.
This dissertation aims at studying three topics concerning the grocery retailing
industry using empirical methods. In particular, the emphasis has been put on
three questions that have special relevance in the context of powerful retailers: one
is related to supermarkets nonprice strategies to make customers loyal and the effects
on private labels; a second is concerns consumer choice between one- or multi-stop
shopping in the presence of shipping costs; and a third relates to the problem of
retail price rigidity in the presence of price adjustment costs in a context of vertical
restraints. I do this in three chapters that I describe in the following.
In the first chapter I focus on the effects of loyalty programs on the demand for
PLs. This products have become a key element of supermarkets strategic interaction
with rivals at the horizontal dimension and suppliers (also rivals in some sense)
at the vertical dimension. There are a number of nonprice competition strategies
that have been used by supermarkets presumably to promote PLs. This is the
case of supermarket loyalty programs that have become a predominant strategy for
supermarkets. In fact, there are cases in which retail chains give loyalty rewards
almost exclusively on PLs purchases, as in France for instance. Why do profit-
maximizing retailers give rebates on their lower-price own-brands? One might think
of many reasons as to why retailers might be putting extra efforts on PLs promotion:
they are more profitable than NBs, along with loyalty programs PLs may help
increase customers’ feelings of store as well as brand loyalty; as a consequence,
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the share of one-stop shoppers may as well increase as LPs raise artificial switching
costs, reducing customers’ incentives to patronize other stores. LPs may even induce
what Armstrong and Vickers (2010) call excessive loyalty, which makes customers
make less preferred choices so as to enjoy rewards. Last, retailers might be using
loyalty programs on PLs as a way to strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis
manufacturers.2
Yet, key questions remain to be answered: Why do LPs put emphasis on
private labels rather than on the full product range of the store? Are those
LPs an effective nonprice strategy to boost PL demand? The objective of this
paper is to empirically examine the effects of loyalty programs on the demand for
PLs. My empirical strategy consists of using discrete-choice methods to estimate
brand-level demand accounting for household membership to supermarket loyalty
programs. In particular, I estimate a random coefficients Logit model following
the standard literature (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (BLP), 1995; and
Nevo,2000a, 2001). I use a three-dimensional panel of quantities and prices for up
to 13 brands of plain yogurt, purchased from the 6 largest supermarket chains in
up to 94 departments of France, weekly in 2006. Household membership to loyalty
programs is given by a household-supermarket specific indicator variable taking on 1
if the household is a member of a given supermarket LP. I deal with the correlation
between membership to LPs indicator and the unobserved supermarket attributes
using loyalty program characteristics.
Results confirm that private labels are, on average, less valued products relative
to national brands. However, I find that the marginal valuation of PL products
increases with subscription to the supermarket LP, which supports the believe that
LPs might be used as a way to boost store-brands demand. Moreover, when
customers hold simultaneously subscriptions to LPs of competing retailers, the
expected effects become weaker, i.e. the marginal valuation of PLs decreases with the
number of subscriptions and customers are more sensitive to price changes. Demand-
side counterfactuals suggest that loyal customers benefit from when the market is
not fully covered, as supermarkets might make efforts to improve loyalty rewards so
as to attract nonmembers. On the other hand, making LPs prohibitively costly may
harm consumers.
In the second chapter, joint with Daniel Herrera Araujo, we focus on supermarket
and product choice in the presence of consumer shopping costs. As discussed
previously, supermarkets have been putting great effort in increasing their sales
area and number of superstores that integrate a variety of additional services to
attract customers through one-stop shopping. Yet, evidence shows that an important
proportion of consumers engage in the so-called multi-stop shopping, i.e. visit
several different retailers within a week to buy different products. This heterogeneity
might be explained by several factors such as preferences, demographics, geographic
2 See Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004), Bergès-Sennou (2006), and Meza and Sudhir (2010).
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location, information frictions, differentiated retailers, and time availability for
shopping activities. Previous literature has introduced a concept that accounts
for some (or most) determinants: shopping costs, defined as all real or perceived
costs a consumer incurs when sourcing a grocery store (Klemperer, 1992, Klemperer
and Padilla, 1997, Armstrong and Vickers, 2010, and Chen and Rey, 2012, 2013).
Economic theory shows that in a context of multiproduct retailing and consumer
shopping costs, several practices that would otherwise be considered competitive
and good from a social welfare perspective can be less competitive. Is it possible to
quantify shopping costs from observed consumer shopping behavior?
This research work provides a framework to assess the role of shopping costs in
explaining heterogeneous shopping patterns. To do so we develop a structural model
in the spirit of the main theoretical contributions on the topic. Consumer optimal
shopping behavior is given by a threshold strategy where the choice between one-
or multistop shopping depends on the size of individual shopping costs. We are
able to take the model to data through parametric specifications of consumer utility
and shopping cost along with some distributional assumptions on the unobserved
shocks. We use scanner data on household grocery purchases in France in 2005,
which is representative of French households and contains information on a wide
product range and household demographics. As for grocery stores, an additional
data set allows us to observe store characteristics and location.
By solving the implied optimal stopping problem of a consumer who needs to
decide how many stores to source, we are able to recover the distribution of shopping
costs. We quantify the total shopping cost in 18.7 e per store sourced on average.
This cost has two components, namely, the mean fixed shopping cost, 1.53 d and
the total transport cost of 17.1 eper trip to a given store. Moreover, we are able
to compute the transport and total costs of shopping by store format. Transport
and total costs of shopping are decreasing in the size of the stores, on average, as
smaller formats are closer to downtowns. The largest total shopping cost, 24.7 e,
are incurred by consumers who source big-box stores, because they are farther away
from downtown. Sourcing a supermarket or a hard-discounter implies total costs of
shopping of 14.3 e and 13.4 e per trip, respectively. Finally, the costs of sourcing
a convenience store, 4.8 e per trip, are the lowest provided that they are located
in downtown. We find that individuals who source three or more stores in a week
have zero shopping costs. This might be an indicator that those households actually
visiting more than two separate stores a week should have a strong preference for
shopping. Finally, the predicted proportions of shoppers by number of stops are
90.1% of one-stop shoppers, 9.7% of two-stop shoppers and only 0.26% do three-
stop shopping.
Finally, the third chapter addresses the question of nominal price rigidity and
its determinants. We are mainly used to hear that price stickiness is a concern
of Macroeconomics. However, a widely held view is that aggregate price inertia
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is determined by individual goods prices rigidity (Midrigan, 2011; Kehoe and
Midrigan, 2012), and there is a lot microeconomic analysis can contribute to the
understanding of the determinants of such phenomenon. The low degree of retail
price responsiveness to costs shocks is best known as incomplete pass-through. Does
the structure of the industry matters when it comes to explain individual goods price
stickiness? Engel (2002) points out three sources of such incomplete transmission
that are related to the industry structure and firms’ strategic behavior: the existence
of local costs, markup adjustment either by retailers or manufacturers or both, and
nominal price rigidity. A growing empirical Industrial Organization (IO) literature
has made important advances in understanding incomplete pass-through by looking
at how vertical relations and vertical restraints such as Resale Price Maintenance
(RPM), a practice through which manufacturers determine prices retailers charge to
consumers, shape markup adjustment. Less attention has been put on price rigidity.
We know from microeconomic theory that RPM makes prices less responsive to
costs shocks (Jullien and Rey, 2007). In this chapter I empirically examine the role
of nonlinear contracts between manufacturers and retail stores, and RPM on nominal
price stability. My focus is, however, on a totally different sector: the ready-to-eat
(RTE) breakfast cereal industry.
The empirical IO literature has study the main sources of price rigidity. I set out a
modeling framework that closely relates to two of those contributions. Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2013) address the question of the incomplete transmission of exchange
rate shocks to local currency prices of imported beer in the U.S. They set out a
structural model in which linear tariffs characterize the industry’s vertical conduct.
Unless previous research, they control explicitly for price rigidity by including fixed
costs of price adjustment in the profit functions of both manufacturers and retailer
in a static framework. On the other hand, Bonnet et al. (2013) are the first to
empirically investigate the role of nonlinear pricing and RPM on incomplete pass-
through of costs into retail prices, focusing on how the vertical structure of the
industry affects strategic markup adjustment.
My empirical strategy relies on the consistent estimation of demand, Using data
from Dominik’s Finer Foods, a large supermarket chain in Chicago, that contains
among other things information on weekly prices and quantities sold at the universal
product code (UPC) level for 224 weeks. I set out three structural models of
supply (linear pricing, simple two-part tariffs, and two-part tariffs with RPM) in
a context of static Nash-Bertrand oligopolistic competition with several competing
manufacturers and a single retailer that carries all products. The retailer faces fixed
costs of repricing whenever it decides to adjust the price of a product. At each
period, the retailer weighs the costs and the benefits of changing the price of each
product and makes one of two decisions: if benefits exceed costs, it sets a new
price that maximizes current period profit; otherwise, it keeps the same price from
previous period which implies a deviation from first order conditions of the static
profit maximization problem.
xxvi
I find that the linear pricing specification of the supply side gives biased results
for price adjustment costs relative to two-part tariffs with RPM. In fact, under linear
pricing I obtain that the retail chain is willing to change the price of a product if
it obtains, on average, an extra profit of at least US $109, whereas under two-part
tariffs with RPM this amount is US $98.84. On the other hand, I obtain that
adjustment costs are bounded above by US $447 on average under either supply
conduct. Simple two-part tariffs (i.e. without RPM) give similar results to those
of linear pricing. To have an idea of the relative importance of these magnitudes, I
compute the share of the sum of each lower and upper bounds of adjustment costs on
retailer’s total revenue for the entire period considered here (224 weeks). I find that
the share of adjustment costs on total revenue is 7.27% for lower bounds and 10.12%
for upper bounds in the linear tariffs case, and to 6.5% and 10.14% respectively, in
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Abstract: Loyalty programs (LPs) are by now a predominant short-
run nonprice strategy in retailing markets. In some countries, such as
France, supermarkets give loyalty rewards almost exclusively on private
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Store brands, also known as private labels (hereafter, PLs),1 have become a key
element of supermarkets strategic interaction with rivals at the horizontal dimension
and suppliers (also rivals in some sense) at the vertical dimension. Originally
perceived as rough substitutes of national brands (NBs), they are in most cases
as attractive for consumers as NBs, provided they are a similar-quality alternative
with lower prices.2 In fact, PLs market share has been increasing steadily in the
last decade, attaining important levels in European countries such as the United
Kingdom (46%), Germany (35%) and Spain (33%) –Steenkamp and Geyskens (2013),
as well as in the United States (19.1%) –Turcic et al., 2013.
Economics and marketing literature have widely studied and empirically
supported the positives and the negatives of PLs.3 However, less attention has been
put on nonprice competition strategies and their interaction with private labels.
This is the case of supermarket loyalty programs that have become a predominant
strategy for supermarkets and a way to promote PLs. In fact, there are cases in
which retail chains give loyalty rewards almost exclusively on PLs purchases, as in
France for instance.4 Why do profit-maximizing retailers give rebates on their lower-
price own-brands? One might think of many reasons as to why retailers might be
putting extra efforts on PLs promotion: they are more profitable than NBs, along
with loyalty programs PLs may help increase customers’ feelings of store as well as
brand loyalty; as a consequence, the share of one-stop shoppers may as well increase
as LPs raise artificial switching costs, reducing customers’ incentives to patronize
other stores. LPs may even induce what Armstrong and Vickers (2010) call excessive
loyalty, which makes customers make less preferred choices so as to enjoy rewards.
Last, retailers might be using loyalty programs on PLs as a way to strengthen their
bargaining position vis-à-vis manufacturers.5
1 They are retailers’ own-branded products supplied exclusively in their stores as opposed to
national brands, which are the regular highly advertised and generally everywhere-available
products.
2 Evidence shows that PLs are supplied at a 20% lower price on average relative to a quality-
equivalent NBs (Bergès-Sennou, 2009).
3 They increase the range of products available for consumers, intensify intra-brand competition
and may stimulate upstream competition, among others. On the other hand, they may help
retailers increase market and buyer power.
4 Most retailing chains give lagged rebates based on current purchases of selected PL products,
conditional on the previous subscription to the program. Rebates are accumulated in customer’s
account and after a given time/money threshold is crossed, the acquired amount of money is
given back to customers as a purchase coupons to be spent in any of the retailer’s stores. Some
programs, such as that of Casino’s, work slightly different as they give “miles” to customers
according to a predetermined exchange rate, and have a catalog where members can pick a gift
according to the accumulated number of miles.
5 See Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004), Bergès-Sennou (2006), and Meza and Sudhir (2010).
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Yet, key questions remain to be answered: Why do LPs put emphasis on private
labels rather than on the full product range of the store? Are those LPs an effective
nonprice strategy to boost PL demand? The objective of this paper is to empirically
examine the effects of loyalty programs on the demand for PLs.
Previous research has provided several explanations as to why retailers offer such
costly programs, instead of just competing on prices. They can be summarized in
two categories, namely, consumer retention and the exercise of market power. On
the former, LPs allow retailers to retain customers and induce repurchase, as it is
a way to impose artificial switching costs on customers and they are more likely
to come back when there is a promised price reduction. Cremer (1984) finds that,
as long as consumers have elastic participation, the monopolist optimal strategy
is to charge a lower price to repeat buyers instead of precommitting to a second-
period price. Klemperer (1987a, 1987b) lists repeat-purchase coupons and“frequent-
flyer” programs (FPPs) as examples of artificial or contractual switching costs that
make rational customers prone to display brand loyalty as demand becomes more
inelastic and firm’s market power increases. Caminal and Matutes (1990) provide
the rational behind the advantages of loyalty discounts relative to price reductions.
Using a similar framework as Klemperer (1987b), they endogenize switching costs
to show that coupons valid for next period purchases perform better than price
precommitment as they allow firms to get higher overall profits and reduce the
intensity of competition. In line with these results, Chen and Pearcy (2010) find
that for those markets in which customers do not have a strong preference for a
particular brand (because good substitutes are available or preferences are likely to
change for future choices), firms tend to enroll them in loyalty programs to reward
repeat purchases and discourage brand switching.
Concerning price discrimination, LPs can be thought of as an explicit
discriminatory device as only those customers who join the program and present
a card at each purchase occasion are able to enjoy the benefits. When firms reward
repeat buying, they are at the same time setting a differentiated future price schedule
that charges new customers the full tariff whereas repeat buyers get a lower one if
they redeem the coupon they have got in a previous period. A similar conclusion
can be obtained from behavior-based price discrimination (see, for example, Caillaud
and De Nijs, 2011).6 Although most contributions on this topic conclude that firms
should offer lower prices to new customers, Caillaud and De Nijs (2011) get the
opposite result under the assumption that some firms cannot distinguish between
old and new customers. Hence, they reward loyalty by offering lower tariffs to
previous customers and charge full prices to the new ones.
My empirical strategy consists of using discrete-choice methods to estimate
brand-level demand accounting for household membership to supermarket loyalty
programs. In particular, I estimate a random coefficients Logit model following
6 It consists of offering different prices to different consumers depending on their past purchases.
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the standard literature (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (BLP), 1995; and
Nevo,2000a, 2001). I use a three-dimensional panel of quantities and prices for up
to 13 brands of plain yogurt, purchased from the 6 largest supermarket chains in up
to 94 departments of France, weekly in 2006. I also observe demographics and other
household characteristics. Household membership to loyalty programs is given by a
household-supermarket specific indicator variable taking on 1 if the household is a
member of a given supermarket LP. In addition to the well documented challenges
faced when estimating demand, I deal with the correlation between membership to
LPs indicator and the unobserved supermarket attributes. In a first stage of the
estimation, I try some standard sets of instruments (BLP, 1995 and Nevo, 2001) to
treat the endogeneity of prices and LP membership. Yet, due to a poor performance
of those sets I circumvent endogeneity issues by computing optimal instruments
based on Chamberlain (1987), using empirical methods developed by BLP (1999)
and Reynaert and Verboven (2014).
Results confirm that private labels are, on average, less valued products relative
to national brands. However, I find that the marginal valuation of PL products
increases with subscription to the supermarket LP, which supports the believe that
LPs might be used as a way to boost store-brands demand. Moreover, when
customers hold simultaneously subscriptions to LPs of competing retailers, the
expected effects become weaker, i.e. the marginal valuation of PLs decreases with the
number of subscriptions and customers are more sensitive to price changes. Demand-
side counterfactuals suggest that loyal customers benefit from when the market is
not fully covered, as supermarkets might make efforts to improve loyalty rewards so
as to attract nonmembers. On the other hand, making LPs prohibitively costly may
harm consumers.
Related literature
There is vast literature on topics related to private labels, brand- and store-loyalty
and loyalty programs. However, to my knowledge this is the first paper to provide
empirical evidence on the link between supermarket loyalty programs and private
label demand. Table 1.1 presents some contributions by topic.7
This article relates to Lewis (2004), who makes an evaluation of the effects of
loyalty programs based on the idea that they are addressed to “enhance [customer]
retention”. Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) study the effects of the introduction of
PL on retailers’ profits taking into account that consumers can be store- and brand-
loyals. They propose measures for store- and brand-loyalty based on the number
of trips to the same store and the average “share of wallet” of a brand relative to
the total expenditure on that category of goods. They find a significant negative
7 For a complete survey about the theoretical and empirical literature on this theme, see Berges-
Sennou et al. (2009).
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Table 1.1: Contributions to the literature on Loyalty programs and PLs
Topic Theory Empirics
Introduction of PLs Raju et al. (1995) Bonfrer & Chintagunta (2004)
Chintagunta et al. (2002)
PLs demand determinants Berges et al. (2009)
Competition & vertical Soberman & Parker (2006) Bonnet & Dubois (2010)
relationships Bonnet & Dubois (2010)
Store & brand loyalty Berges (2006)
Loyalty programs Lal & Bell (2003) Bolton et al. (2000)
Lal & Bell (2003)
Lewis (2004)
Lederman (2007)
Coupons Caminal & Matutes (1989) Nevo & Wolfram (2002)
Cremer(1989)
correlation between both types of loyalty. Bolton, Kannan and Bramlett (2000)
argue that loyalty programs members are more likely to do repeat buying, as they
weigh less than others the best outside alternative. They conclude that LPs members
are less sensitive to both quality changes and lower prices offered by competitors. Lal
and Bell (2003) claim that there are two reasons explaining the “success” of loyalty
programs: (i) reduced price competition and therefore higher profits due to switching
costs, and (ii) reduced marketing expenses by focusing attention on retaining loyal
(and known) customers. This is in line with the marketing idea that promotions
should be addressed to customers that are more likely to stay. All these papers
share a common basic question: What are the determinants of customer retention
and repeat buying? This article asks a rather different question, as the interest is
focused on the effects of loyalty programs on private label demand.
In particular, this paper closely relates to Nevo and Wolfram (2002). They
provide empirical support on coupons issuing strategies by manufactures. Their
objective is to describe manufacturers’ motivations for issuing coupons. They
evaluate some hypotheses such as price discrimination, dynamic demand effects
and retailers’ pricing strategies using data on breakfast cereal. The key difference
with my article is that I focus on retailers’ rather than manufactures’ case with
the particularity that the former give customers personalized “checks” that can be
expended in any set of products in stock in the supermarket.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the
data and a preliminary analysis. Section 1.3 describes the empirical framework,
the estimation procedure and the identification strategy. Section 2.1 presents and
discusses the results. Section 1.5 presents the results of two simulated experiments on
how demand responds to changes in LP membership. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes
and discusses directions for further research.
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1.2 Preliminary analysis: customer profile and
the grocery retailing industry
This Section aims at giving an overview of the supermarket industry in France
and the customer profiles, through an exploratory analysis of the data. As loyalty
programs are a supermarket-level rather than a product-level marketing strategy,
I analyze a wide range of products (about 350 different food products) purchased
by the households in the sample during 2006 to provide some descriptive evidence
on customers behavior in the presence of loyalty programs offered by competing
supermarkets. In Section 4 I will focus on a single product to assess the effects of
LPs on product choice.
1.2.1 The data
This study uses the TNSWorldpanel data base provided by the TNS-Sofres Institute.
It is homescan data on grocery purchases made by 14,529 households in France
during 2006. Household members collect the data with the help of scanning devices
provided by TNS. The sample is representative of the french population. It was
originally randomly selected in 1998 and keeps most households over the years. Those
households rarely reporting data are dropped from the original sample and replaced
by new randomly selected participants. Furthermore, increases the sample size every
year.
The database contains information on 352 different grocery products from around
90 retailers including hyper- and supermarkets, convenience stores, hard-discounters
and specialized stores. The data is reported at the purchase level, so we observe
product characteristics such as total quantity, total expenditure, the retailer where
it was purchased from, brand, etc. In addition, the data include household
characteristics such as household size, number of children, location, income, number
of cars, internet access, storage capacity etc. The 2006 database contains as well
information on household membership to retailers’ LPs. It is an indicator variable
taking on 1 if the household is member of the retailer’s LP and zero otherwise.
Unfortunately, no further information such as loyalty coupons issuing or redemption
rates is available.
1.2.2 Customer profile
Table 1.2 displays summary statistics on household demographics, purchases, and
information on store loyalty. The survey includes people aged between 19 and 75
years old. On average, a household consists of two to three members and has an
income of around 2300 e per month. 75% of the households included in the data
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set lives in urban areas of France. 34% of products purchased by a household are
PLs, which corresponds to 24.75% of its total expenditure. Moreover, the average
French household members are one-stop shoppers, as they only visit one store a
week. Finally, 85% of households are members to at least one supermarket loyalty
program and, on average, they are subscribed to two separate programs.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics on household characteristics and purchases
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max
Demographics
Size of household 2.63 2.00 1.39 1 9
Live in city 0.75 1 0.43 0 1
Income (e/month) 2337 2100 1175 150 7000
No. of cars 1.47 1.00 0.82 0.00 9.00
Purchases
Private label purchases 0.34 0.32 0.17 0 1
Total expenditure (e /day) 39.10 28.56 35.40 0.01 2,221
PL share (% total exp.) 24.75 15.40 38.6 0 63.63
NB share (% total exp.) 75.24 72.49 83.17 0 100
Store-related information
No. different stores visited the same day 1.13 1.00 0.38 1.00 7.00
Duration (days) between visits 8.10 6.63 6.17 1 126
LP membership 0.85 1.00 0.36 0 1
No. of different memberships 2.60 2 1.48 1 12
In a month households visit, on average, two different retailers and only 16.65%
of the times they go to the store owning the LP to which the household is a member.
Using this information along with the average duration of 1.89 months a household
takes to return to the same retailer, we get seven weeks as the average duration a LP
member takes to go back to its “patronized” supermarket, which is not so frequent
taking into account that household members go shopping at least once a week on
average (see Table 1.3).
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of monthly visits to stores
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max
# different stores visited 2.27 2.08 0.98 1 9.25
# visited if loyalty subscription 0.36 0 0.50 0 3
Loyalty ratio∗ 16.83 0 25.40 0 100
Duration (months) between visits 1.89 1.33 1.48 1 12
∗Computed as the number of visits to stores where customer is subscribed over the total of stores
visited.
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“Loyal” vs. “non loyal” customers
A simple exploratory analysis of the data by subgroup of population gives no evidence
to support the hypothesis of loyalty programs as a discriminatory device. In effect,
some descriptive statistics (see Table 1.4) suggest there are no important differences
between subscribers to a LP relative to non subscribers.
One can say that the fact of being a member of a LP does not say much about
customer types as long as LPs are available to everybody and subscription costs
might be negligible.8 Table 1.4 shows that these two groups not only have similar
characteristics, but also similar consumption patterns. In fact, the portion of PL
products purchased is similar on average (34%) as well as the total expenditure per
trip to the supermarket, the allocation of this expenditure between PLs and NBs,
and the average duration in days between trips to a supermarket (around eight days).
Table 1.4: Loyals and non-loyals average characteristics
Variable LP members Non-members
% on total 85 15
Size of household 2.63 2.62
Income 2333 2361
# of cars 1.47 1.48
Private label purchases 0.34 0.35
Total expenditure (e/day) 39.09 39.19
PL share (% total exp.) 25.87 26.36
NB share (% total exp.) 74.13 73.64
# different stores visited the same day 1.12 1.12
Duration (in days) between visits 8.04 8.41
I regressed consumer weekly expenditure per retailer on the LP membership
dummy and household and supermarket characteristics. Table 2.4 displays the
results. The coefficient for membership is positive and significant indicating that
a customer tends to spend a larger share of his income in those supermarkets where
he is a LP member than in those where he is not. Estimates for the number of LP
subscriptions and number of stores visited are both significant and negative, which
indicates that multi-homing as well as multi-stop shopping affect negatively the total
expenditure on each supermarket.
8 Although it is argued that subscription to a LP is free and thus subscription should be the
rational behavior, loyalty programs can actually be costly as members must invest time an effort
to subscribe, get a clear idea about how the program works and how discounts are given to
them, in addition to give detailed personal information, bear larger amounts of advertising (even
personalized), e-mail spam, etc. It is actually an empirical fact that not all consumers subscribe to
LPs: 15% of French households who frequent supermarkets do not have any LP card whatsoever.
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Table 1.5: Results for HH weekly expenditure per supermarket
Log of total expenditure per store
Variable OLS Fixed effects
LP member 0.372 0.499
(0.003) (0.004)
# of LP subscriptions -0.0477 -0.0578
(0.001) (0.001)
# visits to -0.123 -0.112
different stores (0.001) (0.001)
Log of Income 0.202 0.205
(0.003) (0.003)
Log of age 0.109 0.104
(0.004) (0.004)










adj. R2 0.145 0.179
Notes: Regressions are based on 658,866 observations. The two regressions
include time dummy variables. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in
parenthesis.
1.2.3 The grocery retailing industry
The preferred store format by french households is the supermarket: the average
market share of supermarkets in terms of total consumer expenditure per day is
51.16% against 44.83% of hypermarkets and 4% of convenience stores.9 In terms
of daily number of visitors, supermarkets also appear leading: 55.61% of the total
number of customers went to supermarkets whereas 37.85% went to hypermarkets
and 6.57% to convenience stores (see Figure 1.1). As compared to regular stores,
9 According to the French law, a grocery retailing store is considered a Hypermarket when, among
other characteristics, its surface is greater or equal to 2, 500m2, a Supermarket if the surface is in
the interval [400, 2500) m2 and a convenience store if the surface is in [120, 400) m2. Hard-discount
stores are also included in these three categories as they also have shops of all sizes.
9
Hard discounters have a share of 14% on total daily household expenditure in
groceries and 16% share on total visits per day.
Figure 1.1: Daily market share indicators by store format, 2006
In terms of LPs subscribers, the largest market share is 21% suggesting that
the market is not very concentrated.10 Still, around 75% of LPs subscribers are
concentrated by the five leading retailers (see Figure 1.2). Moreover, around 62% of
the households have multiple LPs subscriptions (in some cases 8 in total), reason why
it is necessary to look for other indicators such as the percentage of members visiting
the store in a day. Finally, the proportion of “loyal” customers visiting the store
owning the LP is 20.6%, a very low proportion considering the high concentration
of the sector in both market shares and LP members.11
1.3 Empirical framework and estimation
In the empirical analysis I follow the discrete-choice literature and estimate two
models: a multinomial Logit and a random-coefficients Logit (I use random-
coefficients Logit, mixed Logit and the full model exchangeably). The reason for
conducting these two estimations is that the Logit model is useful as a diagnostic
tool as it is easy to estimate and gives important preliminary information about
the explanatory power of the variables of interest. However, as it is well known,
10There are cases of retailers that have several cards that serve to the same end like, for example,
Carrefour that has both “Carte fidelité” and “Carte Pass”. In such cases, I aggregate up
subscribers under the same label, e.g., Carrefour loyalty program.
11The actual names of the retailers are hidden at the request of the TNS-Sofres, the institution
providing the data.
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Figure 1.2: Share of subscribers to LPs by retailer (left) and Average percentage of
’loyal’ visitors on the total visitors per day, 2006
this model has some limitations due to its restrictive assumptions, in particular, it
gives unrealistic substitution patterns. The random coefficients model provides more
reliable results.
1.3.1 The empirical framework
Assume we observe t = 1, 2, . . . , T markets and i = 1, 2, . . . , It consumers per
market. I define a market as a week-Department12 combination where consumer
purchases are observed. Every time a consumer goes shopping to a given supermarket
s = 1, 2, ..., S, he faces a multiple-choice decision among J brands. The conditional
indirect utility of consumer i from choosing product j at supermarket s in market t
writes as
uijst = xjβi +xsλ−αipjst +ϕiMis +ηiMis ×PLjs +ξj +ξs +∆ξjt +∆ξst + ǫijst (1.1)
where xj and xs are K- and R-dimensional (row) vectors of observable product j
and supermarket s characteristics, respectively;13 pjst is the unit price of product
j in supermarket s, Mis is a dummy taking on 1 if individual i is a member of
supermarket s’s loyalty program and zero otherwise, and PLjs is a dummy taking
on 1 if j is a private label of retailer s. ξj and ξs are mean (across individuals
and markets) valuations of the unobserved (by the econometrician) product and
supermarket characteristics and ∆ξjt = ξjt−ξj and ∆ξst = ξst−ξs are market-specific
deviations from the respective means under the assumption that in each market
12In France, a Department (or Departement in French) makes part of the administrative division
of the national territory being the second level of the government at the local area, after
Administrative Regions which group departments.
13Unlike product characteristics, I do not allow supermarket characteristics to interact with
household characteristics, i.e. λ is a fixed coefficient.
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people value differently those characteristics. Finally, individual heterogeneity enters
the model through the set of K + 3 individual-specific parameters (αi, βi, ϕi, ηi) and
an additive separable mean-zero random shock ǫijst.
Following Nevo (2000a, 2001), I model consumer taste parameters as a function



























+ ΠDi + Σvi, vi ∼ N(0, IK+3)
where Di is a d × 1 vector of demographic and household characteristics, Π is
a (K + 3) × d matrix of coefficients measuring the change in tastes with household
characteristics, Σ is a (K + 3) × (K + 3) scaling matrix and vi captures all those
unobserved demographic characteristics that influence consumer choice but that are
generally not included in surveys.
Define the “outside good” as any other brand or type of yogurt or any other
product that is an alternative to those considered in this analysis. It too accounts
for the no purchase option. Normalizing the mean utility to zero, the indirect utility
derived from the outside option writes as ui0t = ǫi0t.
Let θ = (θ1, θ2) be a vector containing all the parameters of the model (θ1 =
(α, β, ϕ, η, λ) contains the linear parameters and θ2 = (Π, Σ) the nonlinear ones).
We can rewrite the indirect utility that consumer i derives from purchasing brand j
at supermarket s in market t as the sum of two components: a mean utility common
to all consumers of the same type (defined here by the subscript m = {0, 1} of
“loyals” and “nonloyals”, respectively)
δmjst = xjβ + xsλ − αpjst + ϕMms + ηMms × PLjs + ξj + ξs + ∆ξjt + ∆ξst, (1.2)
and a mean-zero heteroscedastic deviation, µijst + ǫijst with
µijst = [pjst, xj, xs, Mms, Mms × PLjs]
′ ∗ (ΠDi + Σvi) ,
The utility can then be written as
uijst = δmjst(·; θ1) + µijst(·; θ2) + ǫijst
A key assumption of this model is that consumers choose at most one unit of
the brand that gives the highest utility. Let the following be the set of observed and
unobserved variables determining the preference for brand j at store s
Amjst(x, p.t, δ.t; θ2) = {(Di, vi, ǫijst)|uijst ≥ uilkt, ∀ l = 0, 1, . . . , J ; k = 0, 1, . . . , S}
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where x are the characteristics of all products and supermarkets, and p.t and δ.t are
J × S matrices of prices and mean utilities of the J products available in the S
supermarkets, respectively. Assuming ties occur with zero probability, the market
share of the jth brand purchased from supermarket s in market t as a function of
the mean utility levels of all the J + 1 products, given the parameters, by group of
population m is
smjst(x, p.t, δ.t; θ2) =
∫
Amjst
dP (D, v, ǫ) =
∫
Amsjt
dP (ǫ)dP (v)dP (D) (1.3)
where P (·) denotes population distribution function. The last equality is a result
of the independence assumption of D, v and ǫ. Market shares in (3.3.23) can be
computed by making assumptions on the distribution of each of the individual
variables (Di, vi, ǫi.t).
1.3.2 The yogurt data
Among all the products in the data described in Section 3.2, yogurt seems to be
suitable to estimate the effects of LPs subscription on the demand for PLs, as it
matches pretty well the assumptions of the Logit setup. First, it is a product
of regular consumption by French households. In fact, according to the National
Statistics Institute of France (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques —INSEE), in 2006 yogurt consumption was, on average, 415.4g per
week, which assuming a serving of 125g (the size most frequently consumed), is
equivalent to 3.3 servings a week. Second, although it can be stored in the fridge
for about a week, its regular consumption indicates that it does not last very long
in customers’ fridges, i.e. stockpiling is not a concern in practice. Finally, it can
be considered a good of unit demand in the sense that individuals do not generally
consume more than one serving at a time,14 which is key for the empirical framework
I use.
To avoid dimensionality problems due to the large availability of yogurt varieties,
I use purchases of plain yogurt, which is the best consumed variety of yogurt in France
with a 33% of the national market share in 2006.15 I include flavored yogurts in the
14It is true that people can buy several varieties of yogurt in the same shopping trip in order to
have multiple choices at home (different flavors, fruit contents, thickness, etc.). However, I claim
that in general, an individual consumes one serving at a time, so that the choice is discrete in
this sense. Of course there could be cases in which some people consume more than one brand of
yogurt at a time. In such cases, the assumption should be seen as an approximation to the real
demand problem.
15The original database of yogurt contains purchases of 174 varieties of yogurt sold by an average of
20 separate retailers in the 94 metropolitan departments of France. In addition, different flavors
are branded under the same label, which increases the dimension of brand varieties. In the French
market there are around 144 different flavors available, being 5 the average number of flavors by
brand.
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outside good. Second, I keep only the 6 leading grocery retailing chains with a loyalty
program. Third, I select the 13 leading brands based on the national market shares
on total sales in 2006. The aggregate market share of the selected brands is of 66.5%,
six of them being PLs, which guarantees the representativeness of the subsample and
still keeps a reasonable variation in the data. Summary statistics on price and market
shares of the selected brands are displayed in Table 1.6. Moreover, I consider the
supermarket as an additional brand characteristic, i.e. I define each brand variety as
a supermarket-brand combination. This exercise results in more than 120 varieties,
most with a very low market share. Based on this, I keep a final sample with the
leading 31 varieties of brands with market shares varying between 0.9% to 5.8% and
an aggregate share of 72.9%, purchased from the largest 6 supermarket chains in
France in 2006.16
Table 1.6: Summary statistics for price and market shares of brands in sample
Variable Mean Median sd Min Max
Total
Price (e/125g) 0.229 0.187 0.091 0.151 0.463
Market share (% on total sales) 5.113 4.092 4.386 1.816 17.960
Private labels
Price (e/125g) 0.174 0.170 0.019 0.151 0.203
Market share (% on total sales) 3.750 4.077 1.120 2.200 4.788
National brands
Price (e/125g) 0.277 0.246 0.103 0.165 0.463
Market share (% on total sales) 6.282 4.092 5.828 1.816 17.960
1.3.3 Variables description
The data used for the estimation of the models previously described were aggregated
to the brand level and contain information on total sales, unit price (per 125g
serving), product and store characteristics and the distribution of the household
characteristics. In particular, the following variables were constructed:
– Brand market share (Smjst): It was computed per subgroup of population of
LPs members (m = 1) and non LPs members (m = 0), as the percentage of
125g servings sold in a market (in this paper a Department-week combination)
on the total potential number of 125g portions that could have been consumed
16The lack of randomness of the final sample considered in this paper does not lead to inconsistent
estimates of the parameter as long as I include brand-supermarket dummy variables in the
estimation. See Manski and Lerman (1977) and Bierlaire, Bolduc and McFadden (2008) for
a detailed discussion on consistent estimation of choice probabilities from choice-based samples.
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in that market.17 The serving was determined by converting volume sales
originally in kg into a 125g unit which is the size best sold in France. The
potential volume sales per market was computed by multiplying the average
national plain yogurt consumption of 1.14 125g servings per person per week
in 2006, that I obtained from the database of yogurt purchases, and the total
population in a department.18
– Market share of the outside good (S0t): It was defined as the difference between
one and the sum of the inside products market shares.
– Price e/125g (pjst): It was generated by dividing the total expenditure on
yogurt products over the total number of servings purchased.
– LP membership × PL dummy (Mms × PLjs): It is an interaction variable
between the LP membership indicator and a dummy variable taking on the
value 1 if the brand variety is a private label and zero otherwise. It aims at
capturing the marginal effect of LP membership on private label demand.
– Other interactions of interest: the regressions include other interactions
between household and product characteristics such as: #Subscriptions × PL
dummy, which combines information on the number of separate LP cards held
by a household and a dummy for private label, and Price × #Subscriptions
which will be useful to see the marginal effects of a price change on loyalty
programs’ members.
1.3.4 Estimation
The estimation of the model described previously was conducted following the
standard methods —Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2000a, 2001). I
exploit the panel structure of my data to control for brand and supermarket fixed-
effects. This implies guarantees that demand is identified without the need to put
structure on the supply side.19
Estimation relies on the population moment conditions given by E[h(z)′ρ(x, θo)] =
0, where z1, ..., zM are a set of exogenous variables to be used as instruments; ρ is
17I computed the market shares by subgroup of people in order to preserve the meaning of the
membership indicator in a context of aggregate data.
18The data on average consumption on food products from the National Accounts by Institut
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE, Comptes nacionaux, base 2000)
confirms this is a good measure of potential market. The reported average quantity consumption
of 125g servings of yogurt per person per week was 3.32, and provided that around 34% of that
number is plain yogurt, the average consumption of this variety per person per week is of 1.29
servings, which is similar to the one reported in my database.
19For a detailed discussion of the estimation algorithm and the differences with BLP(1995)
procedure, see Nevo (2000a, 2001).
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a function of the parameters of the model and θo is the vector containing the true
value of the parameters (see subsection 1.3.5 for a discussion on the instruments





where Λ̂ is a consistent estimator of E[h(z)′ρρ′h(z)] and plays the role of the optimal
weighting matrix in expression (3.4.1).
According to the empirical framework described before, once supermarket-brand
dummy variables are included, the error term of the model is ∆ξjt + ∆ξst which can
be computed as a function of the mean utilities δ.t, the data and the parameters.
Following Berry (1994), this computation requires solving first for δ.t from the system
of equations resulting from the match of predicted and observed market shares:
s.t(x, M, p.t, δ.t; θ2) = S.t, where s.t(·) is the predicted market share function defined
in (3.3.23). From the inversion of this system we can express δ.t as an explicit
function of the observed market shares which allows us to write the error term in
(3.4.1) as
ρjst = δmjst(x, M, p.t, S.t; θ2) − (xjβ + xsλ − αpjst + ϕMms + ηPLjs × Mms + ξj + ξs)
To solve for δ.t, BLP (1995) proposed a contraction mapping which uses starting
values for δ and θ2 and iterates up until it converges to some value of δ determined
by a stopping rule provided by the econometrician. For a detailed exposition of the
the contraction mapping and estimation procedure, see BLP (1995), Nevo (2000a,
2001) and Knittel and Metaxoglou (2012) .
1.3.5 Optimal Instruments
As previously stated, the inclusion of brand-supermarket fixed-effects captures the
unobserved brand-supermarket characteristics and then the error term of the model
becomes ρjst(θ) = ∆ξjt + ∆ξst, which are the group-market deviations from the
mean valuation of product and supermarket unobserved characteristics, respectively.
Under the assumption that both firms and customers observe those characteristics
and, consequently, their decisions account for these local deviations, we have then
two sources of correlation with explanatory variables.
Prices are correlated with the local deviation of the mean valuation of product
unobserved characteristics, ∆ξjt. According to Nevo (2000a), differentiated products
pricing models assume that firms know the unobserved (by the econometrician)
characteristics of the good and use them to set prices, which are a function of
marginal cost and a markup depending on demographics. On the other hand,
M.s appears to be correlated with the local deviation from the mean valuation
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of supermarket unobserved characteristics, ∆ξst. Given that they are firm-level
programs20 and under the assumption that the choice of a LP is driven, among
other things, by supermarket choice, i.e. it depends on consumer’s valuation of
supermarket characteristics, there is some information about households subscription
decisions contained in the error term.
Properties for efficient estimation of models based on conditional moment
restrictions using optimal instruments dates back to late 70’s with main contributions
by Amemiya (1977), Chamberlain (1987) and Newey (1990).21 However, the lack
of an algorithm for the computation of those instruments in empirical studies, led
empirical IO literature to use inefficient rather than optimal sets of instruments to
treat the endogeneity of prices. BLP (1999) were the first to use an approximated
version of optimal instruments in the evaluation of export restraints on automobiles.
Reynaert and Verboven (2014) propose an altenative method to empirically compute
Chamberlain’s instruments for random coefficient models.
Following Newey’s (1990) notation, consider an econometric model with the
following moment restriction22
E[ρ(xi, θo)|zi] = 0 (1.5)
where ρ(x, θ) is a Q × 1 residual vector, z are instrumental variables, θ is a 2 × 1
vector of parameters, and θo stands for the true value of this set of parameters,
and x1, ..., xn are i.i.d. observations on the data vector xi, zi making part of its
components. Assuming homoscedasticity, the variance-covariance matrix conditional
on the instrumental variables is E[ρ(x, θo)ρ(x, θo)
′|zi] = Ω, with Ω constant. Using
appropriate functions of the data (and the parameters), denoted h(zi), we can express
the system in (1.5) as unconditional moment restrictions
E[h(zi)ρ(xi, θo)] = 0
20A customer joining a program benefits from rewards no matter what store of the chain he
purchases from.
21Instrumental variables estimation for problems with conditional moment restrictions and i.i.d
observations were introduced, among others, by Kalejian (1971), Amemiya (1974, 1977),
and Jorgenson and Laffont (1974). Amemiya (1977) proposed the computation of optimal
instruments. This developments assumed parametric forms for the error terms. It was
Chamberlain (1987) who studied the asymptotic properties of the IV estimator for nonparametric
models, where all that we know is that the distribution function of the data satisfies the equality
of the expected value of the residual to zero when multiplied by appropriate functions of the
exogenous variables, and that efficiency bounds are attained when these functions are replaced
by the optimal instruments. Finally, Newey (1990) proposed nonparametric estimation methods
of optimal instruments for nonlinear simultaneous equations models.
22For the sake of exposition, in the general formulation of optimal instruments I replace panel
subscripts by a single subscript i indicating a particular observation of the data. I will go back
to the usual notation when I derive the particular optimal IVs for the model in this paper.
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The optimal instruments are a particular function h(·) that allows us to
consistently estimate the parameters of the model and attain the efficiency bound
of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. This is23
h(zi) = D(z)












According to Newey (1990), for the particular case of a single equation system
where the residual is a scalar (as is the case of the demand model described in
subsection 3.4.2) the optimal instruments become h(z) = D(z)′.24 The number of
instruments is equal to the number of parameters to be estimated in the model
θ = (θ1, θ2).
The optimal instruments for the linear parameters are easy to compute as they
















































= E[Mms × PLjs|zt]
= E[Mms|zt] × PLjs = (xsτ1 + lsτ2) × PLjs (1.10)
The instruments resulting for the identification of β are product observed
characteristics which are assumed to be exogenously set by producers and
supermarkets, i.e. those attributes do not vary in response to department-specific
demand shocks. As for the parameters of the endogenous variables α, ϕ and η, the
instruments are the corresponding predicted values from first-stage OLS regressions
for p.t and M.s.
To compute, first, the predicted price in (1.8), I follow Reynaert and Verboven
(2014) and assume for simplicity that marginal costs are linear and depend on
23For a complete discussion about IV estimation methods of nonlinear models, optimal instruments
and efficiency bounds for nonlinear models and other models of interest, see Newey (1990).
24The error term denoted ρ(x, θo) corresponds to a general formulation of a model with simultaneous
equations. As the model to be estimated here consists of a single equation, the ρ(·) function equals
the error term of the demand model ∆ξjt + ∆ξst. For BLP models, for instance, where demand
and supply equations are estimated simultaneously, the residual is a vector containing both the
demand- and the supply-side error terms, ρ = (ξ, ω)′.
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product and store characteristics, and cost shifters w.t, and that markets are
competitive so that firms set prices at marginal cost.25 However, as I do not
observe any cost shifters in my data set, I use average regional prices of the same
product in all the 21 French administrative regions (excluding the department to be
instrumented for from the average price of the region it is located in) as proxies for
marginal costs information. Following Nevo (2001), I claim that after controlling
for brand-specific means, regional-specific valuations are independent of product
valuations of people from other regions. This implies that in case a demand shock
happens in one region, only the local price will be affected. This guarantees the
exogeneity condition of prices. Now, prices of two departments in a country are
linked by common marginal costs as long as they are produced (supplied) by the
same manufacturer (retailer) or under a standardized process.26 Table 1.B.1 in the
Appendix displays first-stage results of price regressed on average regional prices.
As for the predicted value of the subscription decision, it is assumed to be a
linear function of supermarket and loyalty program characteristics.27 Therefore, the
solution is more challenging than that of prices for the following reasons. First,
in the data I use I do not observe neither household consumption patterns before
subscription nor any other additional information on the intensity of purchases
motivated by loyalty rewards, the effective amount of rewards obtained by households
or the rate of coupon redemption. Second, I do not address the causality relationship
between supermarket choice (and PL consumption) and subscription decisions to
LPs.28.
To deal with this issues, I collected information on the characteristics of each
loyalty program and use them to have a very rough approximation to the predicted
subscription decision indicator M̂.s. As in previous literature that uses product
characteristics as valid instruments for price (see Berry, 1994 and BLP, 1995), I
assume that as long as supermarket LPs are the same over the whole country, most
LP characteristics are not set in response to market specific deviations of the mean
valuation of the program. Hence, they can be used as exogenous instruments for
25Reynaert and Verboven (2014) examine both perfect and imperfect competition cases and obtain
similar results.
26Although the independence assumption seems reasonable, there may be cases where it might
not hold as, for example, a national demand shock as pointed out by Nevo (2001). However, in
France prices are set at the local market level and due to some regulations that introduce rigidity
(such as Galland Act), local prices might not be very responsive to national shocks.
27Demographics are definitely key factors determining the decision to join a given LP. However,
in order to have valid instruments I exclude any variable correlated with the error term of the
model.
28The causality issue implies answering the question: do consumers source more frequently a
particular supermarket after they have joined its LP or do they subscribe to this LP because they
are already loyal to that supermarket? Answering this question implies a structural model of
store choice in the presence of loyalty programs, which will require to disentangle its determinants
and a detailed data set on LPs characteristics, use and rewards. This is out of the scope of this
paper and I leave it for future research.
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a first-stage estimation of the model. Table 1.B.2 in Appendix displays estimation
results for the regression of Mis on collected LP characteristics and demographics.
Although the information collected is not enough to fully account for the variation
in Mis, the results are quite appealing showing that the exogenous structure of the
programs have some explanatory power.
Finally, the instruments for the nonlinear parameters in (1.11) are more difficult
to compute as they are nonlinear functions of product characteristics and the
expectation in (1.11) is a function of the true parameters of the demand function,
























This means that the instruments for the nonlinear parameters of the model
cannot be directly computed from the data and require a first-stage estimation of
the model. Following BLP (1999) I approximate the population moment in (1.11)











Table 1.7 displays the results for the estimation of a Logit demand model for yogurt
by regressing the log of the observed market share of each product minus the log
of the share of the outside option ln(Smjst) − ln(S0t) on the variables described
in subsection 4.3 as main covariates. Additionally, depending on the estimation
method I control for product characteristics (columns (1) and (4)), brand fixed
effects (all columns but (1) and (4)), and household characteristics (columns (3),
(6) and (7)). Columns (4)-(7) in Table 1.7 display the results of 2SLS regressions
using instrumental variables to treat the endogeneity of prices. As the purpose of this
subsection is purely descriptive, I deal just with the endogeneity of prices using sets
of inefficient instruments: in column (4) I use brand dummy variables, which play a
29Reynaert and Verboven (2014) provide an alternative version of BLP (1999) approximation
to optimal instruments and compare the performance of the two methods using Monte Carlo
simulations. They conclude that the gains in efficiency are small when using their method whereas
the computational burden increases. For this reason, I stick to the BLP (1999) approximate
version of the optimal instruments because its computation is easier.
20
similar role as BLP (1995) instruments, and in columns (5) through (7) I use the set
of average regional prices as in Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2000a, 2001). Column (4)
includes brand characteristics, whereas columns (5) through (7) include brand fixed-
effects, and that is why it is no longer possible to use brand dummies as instruments.
I use characteristics of each supermarket LP as controls in all regressions.
For every IV regression I conducted a Hausman test of over identifying
restrictions, which always rejects the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of instruments,
even in column (7) where demographics were replaced by department dummies which
are supposed to capture local demand shocks in a better way. An explanation
could be that given that the test is distributed as a chi-square, the large number of
observations will cause any model to be rejected (Nevo, 2001). However, the IVs are
individually and jointly significant at 1% level and the high first-stage R-squareds
and F -statistics suggest that they have some power (Nevo, 2001).
A result of special interest is the estimate for the interaction between the
membership and the private label indicators (LPmember × PLdummy). In all
regressions, the coefficient is positive and significant, and the magnitudes do not
vary importantly when adding demographic controls, further interaction variables
or when prices are instrumented. The coefficient means that the marginal valuation
of PLs increases with the subscription to the program of the supermarket owning the
brand. This finding provides evidence for the hypothesis that supermarket chains
use LPs as a way to increase demand for PLs.
Additionally, regressions (3) and (6) include the interaction of price with the
number of separate cards (Price × #Subscriptions ), and the number of cards with
a private label dummy (#Subscriptions × PLdummy). The former has a negative
and significant coefficient, which will be positive in the full model with optimal
instruments, suggesting there is a downward bias in the estimate maybe coming from
the use of inefficient instruments for price. On the other hand, the latter interaction
has a negative coefficient indicating that the marginal valuation of PL products
decreases with the number of LPs subscriptions. This means that multisubscription
weakens the effects of LPs on the demand for PLs.
1.4.2 Results from the Mixed Logit model
Table 1.8 displays the results of the full model with “optimal” instruments. A
first-stage version of the random coefficients model with the same specification
was estimated with inefficient instruments for price (average regional prices) and
loyalty membership (LP characteristics) in order to be able to compute the set of 20
“optimal” instruments (see Table 1.B.3 in Appendix).
The first column contains the estimated means of the distributions of the
individual marginal utilities. They are all significant and most preserve the same
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Table 1.7: Results from a Logit for the demand for palin yogurt a
OLS IV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Price(e/125g) -4.345 -6.216 -4.502 -11.18 -7.335 -5.965 -6.386
(0.094) (0.114) (0.159) (1.181) (0.280) (0.463) (0.196)
LP membership -0.298 -0.282 -0.252 -0.438 -0.300 -0.281 -0.268
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011)
PL dummy -0.405 -0.140 -0.504 -1.149 -0.460 -0.637 -2.049
(0.025) (0.052) (0.062) (0.131) (0.088) (0.074) (0.066)
LP membership×PL dummy 0.255 0.236 0.210 0.366 0.249 0.235 0.151











Average hh size 0.181 0.167
(0.009) (0.010)




# stores visited the 0.110 0.105
same week (0.038) (0.038)
# of trips to the same 0.0357 0.0412
store within a month (0.010) (0.010)
Constant -12.28 -35.37 -17.45 -5.888 -34.78 -16.91 10.54
(0.284) (0.560) (0.680) (1.128) (0.576) (0.698) (0.801)
Fit/Test of over 0.142 0.235 0.297 5,337 138.2 131.4 79.9
Identificationb (1.145) (10.851) (10.851) (10.851)
1st Stage R2 0.749 0.841 0.909 0.843
1st Stage F -test 1,676 1,896 3,351 1,019
Instruments Brand Prices Prices Prices
dummies
aDependent variable ln(Smjst) − ln(S0t). Based on 37,662 observations. All parameters are significant at 5%
level. All regressions include week dummy variables and with the exception of columns (1) and (4) all regressions
include brand dummy variables. The regression in (7) includes department dummy variables. Asymptotically
robust s.e. are reported in parentheses. All regressions include characteristics of each supermarkets loyalty
program as controls.
b Adjusted R2 for the OLS regressions, and a Hausman test of over identification for the IV regressions with the
0.95 critical values in parentheses.
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sign as in the descriptive Logit model. The interaction between LP membership and
the PL dummy is positive, supporting the previous result of a positive impact of
loyalty programs on private label demand. Provided that loyalty rewards are mainly
addressed to store brands, customers are more willing to consume them as members
of a LP as compared to non members. By contrast, the coefficients for the variables
in levels, namely PL dummy and LP membership dummy, are both negative, which
reflects the fact that people in general value less store branded products with respect
to NBs and that being member of a loyalty program implies some costs, respectively.
The second column displays the estimated standard deviations of the mean
coefficients referred above. These estimates are the coefficients of the interactions of
the right-hand side variables of the model with the unobserved demographics. All
but two are significant (those for Plastic and Sugar), meaning that the unobserved
demographics v have some explanatory power for the heterogeneity in consumer
tastes. As for Plastic and Sugar, the non significance of the estimates mean that
included household characteristics are enough to explain the variation in consumer
tastes.
Most included household characteristics have significant estimates. One
interesting result is the negative coefficient of the interaction between PL dummy
and income, confirming the intuition that higher income households value less PL
products relative to lower income ones. The interactions with the total number of
loyalty cards held by households (#Subscriptions) provide interesting evidence as
well. They are all negative, meaning in the first case (interaction with the constant)
that the more memberships a household holds, the higher the costs it faces, this
is consistent with the estimate of the indicator for LP membership. In the second
case, the interaction with price shows that multi-subscribers are more price sensitive
as a marginal increase in price would have a larger impact for those holding more
cards. The intuition behind this result is that the retention effect of a LP is weaken
by the fact that a consumer holding several cards have lower costs of switching
supermarkets. Last, the coefficient of the interaction of the number of subscriptions
and the PL dummy is negative, which indicates that the valuation of private labels
decreases with the number of memberships to different LPs, mitigating the positive
impact that LPs have on the demand for PLs.
1.5 Demand response to changes in LP member-
ship
In this Section I show the results of two counterfactual experiments based on the
previous estimates. Under the assumptions that both prices and unobserved product
characteristics do not respond to membership decisions by consumers (at least in the
short run), and that the utility from the outside good remains the same, I consider
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Table 1.8: Results from the Mixed Logit modela
Means Std. Deviations Interactions with hh characteristics
Variable (β’s) (σ’s) hh size Income # Subscriptions
Constant -10.067b 0.478 0.131 -0.968
(0.043) (0.382) (0.236) (0.346)
Price -12.963 1.057 0.505 0.900 -0.535
(0.453) (0.485) (0.132) (0.085) (0.255)
LP member (Mms) -0.825 0.685 0.182
(0.207) (0.286) (0.536)
PL dummy -11.063b 0.916 -0.862 -0.446 -1.243
(0.025) (0.192) (0.357) (0.229) (0.255)










a Based on 37,662 observations. Except where noted, parameters were estimated using GMM. All regressions include
brand and week dummies. Asymptotically robust s.e. are given in parentheses.
b Estimated using a minimum-distance procedure.
two scenarios.30 First, all the households in the sample are members to at least
one loyalty program, i.e. I set Mms in equation (3.3.22) to one for all m = 0, 1, and
replace the variable #Subscriptions, defined in subsection 1.3.3, by one for those non
LP members in the baseline case. Intuitively, this situation may arise when either
the reward system of a LP is good enough so that those customers not having strong
preferences for such programs are better off by joining or when real and perceived
costs of subscription are zero (or even negative).
In a second scenario, I assume no household is member of a loyalty program
whatsoever, i.e. I set Mms in equation (3.3.22) to zero for all m = 0, 1. Such
a case may arise when consumers perceive either subscription as prohibitively
30Due to the data limitations referred previously, this is the best I can do to exploit my results.
The model might as well be exploited to recover retailers’ price-cost margins according to some
assumptions on the conduct of the industry, as in previous literature. However, the nature
of the grocery retailing sector in which supermarkets are not just distributors but also rivals of
upstream firms, and the implied both vertical differentiation between PLs and NBs and horizontal
differentiation between PLs, adds new dimensions to a supply model where firms’ decisions on
loyalty rebates should be accounted for. A structural model addressing all these features is
needed. This is out of the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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costly (because supermarkets set too high a membership fee31) or rewards are not
worthwhile or just unattainable.32
Table 1.9 displays the predicted annual aggregate demand in the baseline and
the two counterfactual scenarios. It also shows the percentage change of the demand
with respect to the baseline when modifying the membership variable. Interestingly,
the model predicts that when everybody is member of at least one loyalty program
(Mms = 1 ∀ m = {0, 1}) aggregate demand of former non-loyals increases in 29.7%
while it slightly drops for formerly loyal subscribers.33 Overall, aggregate demand
increases by 1.5%, a low effect which is dominated by the larger subpopulation of
‘loyals’. The intuition behind this negative reaction is that after having covered the
market for loyalty program subscriptions, supermarkets’ efforts to make attractive
programs may be reduced which affects all those customers sensitive to discounts
and loyalty rewards.34
In the second scenario (Mms = 0 ∀ m = {0, 1}) overall aggregate demand
decreases with respect to that in the baseline. As expected, demand by baseline
loyals decreases in 17.3%. Surprisingly, baseline non-loyals also reduce their total
demand. One explanation for this might be that although they are not so concerned
about discounts and loyalty rewards, there is a psychological effect stemming from
the fact that when supermarkets are active in promotional activities, all customers
may directly or indirectly benefit, even if they are not part of the loyalty program.
Therefore, when loyalty programs are not there they may find it less interesting to
keep their demand level.
Table 1.10 presents the total annual demand by product category in million
euros. Interestingly, the model predicts that when everybody is member of at least
one loyalty program (first scenario) aggregate demand for private labels increases in
75.8% for people who were non members before the change. The demand for national
brands increases also by 1.4%, which may be interpreted as an indirect effect of
loyalty programs. This result supports the initial hypothesis that LPs may be used
31In some retailing sectors in France such as clothing or department stores, loyalty programs giving
permanent and special rebates, exclusive offers, and other benefits are offered to customers for a
subscription fee either once or yearly of up to 30 e.
32Some loyalty programs require customers to pay a fraction in cash of the full price of the
reward, such as FPP. Airlines ask FPP members to do a large number of “qualifying” (generally
international) flights or to accumulate a given number of miles (which is often high) in a short
period of time so as to reach a higher status and enjoy extra benefits. Some set short deadlines
to expend the accumulated miles.
33To obtain the annual aggregate demand I compute the per brand-market (week-Department)
aggregate demand, qjst, as the predicted market share of each brand in a market sjst, times the
size of that local market (total number of consumers in a Department), Mt. Then, I sum up
local per-brand demands by brand across markets to get the yearly aggregate demand per brand,
qjs. Finally, I aggregate across brands to obtain the total annual demand for yogurt.
34Recall that I am assuming that prices and supermarket-brand unobserved characteristics remain
unchanged in the counterfactual scenarios.
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Table 1.9: Aggregate demand under three schenarios (in million euros and %
change)
Population In million euros % change
subgroup Baseline Mms = 1 Mms = 0 Mms = 1 Mms = 0
Non-loyals 8.76 11.36 7.78 29.70 -11.17
Loyals 76.30 74.97 63.10 -1.74 -17.30
Total 85.06 86.34 70.88 1.50 -16.67
Notes: Column headers indicate counterfactual scenarios: everybody is member of LP, Mms =
1 ∀ m = {0, 1}, and nobody is, Mms = 0 ∀ m = {0, 1}. Row labels stand for the two original
population subsamples according to their membership status.
as a marketing strategy to boost the demand for PLs, apart from other objectives.
As for ‘Loyals’, i.e. those who were already LP members, demand seems to not be
affected as it decreases by less than 1% with respect to the predicted demand in the
baseline scenario. This is in line with what is expected as ‘loyal’ members may not
have additional benefits but rather worse conditions as supermarket may reduce the
benefits of LPs once the market is fully covered.
In the second scenario demand for both PLs and NBs decreases for the two
groups. However, the impact is lower than that of the first scenario. Loyals’
aggregate demand for PLs decreases by 27.2% whereas non-loyals’ demand decreases
by 18.1%. This negative reaction for both subgroups might be driven by
psychological perceptions of indirect benefits from loyalty rewards as previously
stated. Similarly, the demand for NBs decreases for both groups indicating that
there might be an effect of loyalty programs on the whole product range: the idea
that some yogurt brands purchases may give you rebates and other rewards, leads
to a general increase in demand for all brands in the product category.
Figure 1.3 helps understanding what is behind people’s reactions to changes in
the membership status. It shows the percentage change of the shares of demand for
PLs and NBs on the total demand with respect to the baseline values. Under the
two scenarios, consumers seem to be substituting demand across product categories.
On the left bar chart, a fully covered market for LP subscription makes PLs share
to go up for both loyals and non-loyals. On the other hand, shares of demand
for NBs decrease. Under the second scenario (bar chart on the right) we can see
that impossibility to joint a LP leads to a decrease on the share of PLs on total
demand, whereas NBs gain in importance for consumers. Notice that in the first
case the impact is larger on the subgroup of non-loyals , as they are new to enjoy
LPs benefits, and in the second case it is so on the subgroup of loyals, as they are
more sensitive to promotional activities.
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Table 1.10: Aggregate demand under three scenarios by brand type (in million
euros)
Population Private label National brand
subgroup Baseline Mms = 1 Mms = 0 Baseline Mms = 1 Mms = 0
Non-loyals 3.34 5.86 2.73 5.43 5.50 5.05
Loyals 39.40 39.04 28.67 36.90 35.93 34.42
Total 42.73 44.91 31.41 42.33 41.43 39.47
Notes: Column headers indicate counterfactual scenarios: everybody is member of LP, Mms = 1 ∀ m = {0, 1},
and nobody is, Mms = 0 ∀ m = {0, 1}. Row labels stand for the two original population subsamples according
to their membership status.
Figure 1.3: Percentage change of the share of demand by product type on total
demand under scenario 1 (left) and scenario 2 (right)
I also compute the change in total consumer surplus (CS ) for each scenario.
Following Train (2009), the expected change in consumer surplus for individual i,
provided that the price coefficient, α̃i, do not depend on income, i.e. the coefficient


























where δmsj is defined by (1.2) and the superscripts 0 and 1 make reference to before
and after the change in loyalty membership, respectively. The total mean change
in consumer surplus is obtained by taking the average (1.12) over the whole sample
and multiplying by the size of the national market which is the total population in
France in 2006 (according to the official statistics by the INSEE, 61.1 million people)
times 52 weeks (Nevo, 2000b).
35For a complete discussion on this, see Train (2009). For the computation of consumer surplus
when the marginal utility of income varies with income, see McFadden (1999).
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Table 1.11 displays the results of the change in total consumer surplus for each
of the two simulated cases. In the first counterfactual scenario (first column of Table
1.11), where LPs market is fully covered, former non-loyals’ CS increases by about
1.5% (36 million euros a year), whereas that of former loyals slightly decreases (0.6%
). A similar trend is shown by the results of the second counterfactual scenario.
The former non-members are not affected by the fact that now no one is willing to
subscribe to a LP. However, former loyals are worse off with a reduction in total
CS by 3.1% (49.4 million euros a year). Overall, customers are better off when
everybody subscribes to at least one loyalty program, with a predicted increase of
13 million euros in CS, and worse off if nobody subscribes, with a predicted decrease
of 26 million euros in total CS.
Table 1.11: Change in Consumer Surplus as a result of changes LPs market
coverage (in millions of euros and percentage per year)
Mms = 1 Mms = 0
Group millions of euros % millions of euros %
Non-loyals 36.06 1.54 -3.48 -0.15
Loyals -9.43 -0.59 -49.44 -3.11
Total 13.31 0.68 -26.46 -1.34
Notes: Column headers indicate counterfactual scenarios: everybody is member of
LP,Mms = 1 ∀ m = {0, 1}, and nobody is, Mms = 0 ∀ m = {0, 1}. Row labels stand for
the two original population subsamples according to their membership status.
1.6 Conclusions and further research
This paper studies the effects of supermarket loyalty programs on private label
demand. Prior research has concluded, among other things, that loyalty programs
are generally used to retain customers as it induces repeat buying, and as a
discriminatory device. Evidence also suggests that retailers may be using LPs as
a way to boost the demand for PLs. An empirical fact is that PLs are on average
20% of lower price relative to quality equivalent national brands. Yet, a common
feature of supermarket loyalty programs is to reward private label purchases. This
motivates the question I hoped to address in this paper: Why do profit-maximizing
retailers give additional rebates on their lower-price own-brands?
This article adds to the literature of both private label and loyalty programs
topics by using structural methods of demand estimation, and provides empirical
support to a question that, to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been addressed.
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Using a random coefficients Logit model to estimate a brand-level demand system
for yogurt in France, I find that loyalty program members have a higher valuation
for PLs as compared with non members, despite that my results are consistent with
the general wisdom that store brands are less preferred products relative to similar
national brands. When multi subscription is present, the effects of LPs are weaker:
marginal valuation of private labels decreases with the number of subscriptions to
different supermarket LPs and customers are more price sensitive.
By conducting some counterfactuals on the demand side, assuming exogenous
changes in LPs subscription, I find evidence that unambiguously supports the
hypothesis of this paper that LPs have a direct impact on the demand for PLs.
In fact, aggregate demand for private labels of those people who formerly were not
members of any LP considerably increases when they become members. On the other
hand, in the absence of LPs (second scenario) private labels become less attractive
products for everyone. Welfare analysis shows that consumers are in general better
off when they all join at least one LP and worse off when no one is member to LPs,
as compared with the baseline scenario. Results suggest that making subscription
to LPs prohibitively costly may harm all consumers, even those non members in the
baseline scenario.
Due to very limited data on loyalty programs, this paper cannot go further
on the evaluation of LP effects on customer purchasing behavior. However, the
results can be used as a motivation for pursuing further research on these topics
in case richer data sets are available. In particular, with the help of descriptive
results this paper sheds some light on questions that are worth asking. For instance,
with the appropriate data modeling customer subscription decisions to supermarket
LPs would help understanding why, if customers can join free of any charges and
economic intuition indicates that each consumer able to subscribe should do so, not
everybody subscribes or, among those who subscribe, just a very few join more than
two programs. In fact, in France in 2006 15% of customers were not members of any
supermarket LP and, among the members, 20% were affiliated to only one. Another
interesting question to be explored is what are the effects of LPs on supermarket
choice. This paper provides some descriptive results suggesting that members of a
given supermarket loyalty program spend on average a higher portion of their income
in that supermarket compared to non member customers. If supermarket and brand
choice can be seen as an ordered choice problem in which store choice comes first,
then LPs may play a key role in attracting consumers and making them one-stop
shoppers.
Further research imply going deeper in the meaning of making customers loyal to
a store or a particular brand and understanding the role played by loyalty programs
in this context. By adopting a measure of loyalty, such as the share of wallet or
the shopping intensity, it can be explored whether LPs are making customers loyal.
A question that remains to be answered is thus: are non members more loyal than
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members?
Finally, from a policy perspective this paper may be seen as a first step for
assessing more complex and interesting questions: Are loyalty programs being used
by retailers as a strategy to increase buyer power? Moreover, taking into account the
theory result that loyalty programs allow retailers to increase PLs prices, it is worth
asking: Can loyalty programs be harmful for consumers at some point? Should policy
authorities be cautious about the implementation of such marketing strategies? In
order to answer such questions a structural model of the supply side is needed, which
should include the horizontal (competition among retailers with their own brands)
as well as the vertical dimension (competition among retailers and manufacturers,
i.e, PLs against NBs). A counterfactual experiment on the supply side would allow
to assess whether retailers are trying to exert some buyer power or not. I hope to
think further about this in the future.
Appendix
1.A A theoretical background
This is a two-period model of oligopolistic competition with horizontal differenti-
ation.36 Consider two symmetric retailers (j = 1, 2) differentiated à la Hotelling
and located at the two extremes of a line of length one. They supply the good at
a constant marginal cost c > 0 and compete for a mass of customers indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1] uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line. I assume unit demands,
i.e., each consumer buys at most one unit of the good in each period. Moreover, I
assume the good is not storable. Consumer location xt is independently and identi-
cally distributed over time. In particular, consumers cannot anticipate their second
period location in period 1.37
36Caminal and Matutes (1990), analyse the effects of alternative pricing policies on duopoly
competition with endogenous switching costs, and consider the commitment to a future rebate
through a coupon as one of the pricing policies. The results coincide with those I obtain in this
Section with the difference that they derive the main results through calibration whereas I solve
for the equilibrium tariffs analytically. In any case, the model is intended to provide intuition
that motivates the empirical analysis.
37Although this assumption is admittedly made for simplicity in order to introduce uncertainty in
location and to avoid consumers anticipating second-period results from the first period, there
are intuitive interpretations of it. We can think, for example, of a person who remembers running
out of toothpaste in the morning when going out of her workplace, and go to buy to the closest
supermarket or on the way home; another example is that of a person having a craving for pizza
after work and stops by to buy one on the way home. This can be though of as uncertainty
of tastes depending on the day or the weather: maybe in a cold-rainy day I can feel like eating
lasagna but in a sunny day I would prefer eating salad or gazpacho instead.
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At the beginning of the first period, retailers offer a loyalty program to consumers
consisting of a coupon B of a given amount of money determined by period 1
purchases and redeemable in period 2 in the same retailer’s stores. This rebate
is given to a consumer conditional on his subscription to the retailer’s LP in the first
period. I assume, for simplicity, that consumers can only subscribe to one loyalty
program and that the market is fully covered, i.e., the utility of joining a LP is large
enough so that it is better to subscribe than the outside option.38 Finally, I assume
non-strategic forward-looking consumers with rational expectations.
The structure of the model defines a two-stage game as follows:
• First stage: Retailers determine simultaneously first-period prices and loyalty
rebates to maximize their expected two-period profit function.
• Second stage: Prices, loyalty rebates and first-period market shares are
realized. Each firm then decides its second-period price to maximize second-
period profit taking into account its subscribers and the eventual “non-loyal”
customers (switchers) it could have in every period.
I am looking for subgame-perfect equilibria.











firm 2 is said to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game if
• Second stage: For any given first-period prices and loyalty rebates
{p11, B1; p12, B2}, and for any given first-period market shares {α1(p1), α2(p1)}




22 constitute a Nash equilibrium.
• First stage: Given the second-period optimal prices {p∗21, p
∗
22} and market








2} is a Nash equilibrium.
We are interested in the set of interior equilibria, therefore we impose an upper
bound on Bj, which must be small enough so that the consumers’ demands remain
interior:
0 ≤ Bj ≤ B
1.A.1 Second period
Assume {p1j,Bj}j=1,2 as given. Moreover, I assume that a mass αj ∈ (0, 1) of
consumers subscribed to firm j’s loyalty program in the first period. The remaining
38The subscription to a given LP does not imply that consumer has committed herself to repeat
purchases from the same retailer in the second period. As a consequence, consumers have always
the choice to go to the retailer with the lower price given their second period location and the
size of B, which becomes a switching cost for those who decide to go to a different retailer.
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(1−αj) ≡ αk subscribed to rival’s LP. αj and αk denote, hence, firm j, k’s first-period
market share, respectively.
The utility of a consumer i located at x2 who has joined firm j’s LP is:
u − (p2j − Bj) − τx2 if he continues buying from retailer j
u − p2k − τ(1 − x2) if he switches to retailer k, ∀k = 1, 2
where u is consumer i’s valuation of the good and τ is a transportation cost parameter
which is constant over time and symmetric across consumers.
Assuming that the consumer who is indifferent between the two retailers is located
at x2 = Dj, firm j’s market share is defined by:
p2j − Bj + τDj = p2k + τ(1 − Dj)
Solving for Dj yields firm j’s second-period market share:
Dj(p2j, p2k, Bj) =
1
2






is a parameter indicating the degree of substitutability between the two retailers.
Firm j’s profit maximization problem writes as:
max
p2j
π2j = (p2j − c)(αjDj + (1 − αj)Dk) − αjDjBj
FOC:


























p2k − (1 − αj)Bk
2
(1.A.4)
By the symmetry of the model, p2k has a similar expression to the previous equation.
Plugging it to (1.A.4) and solving for p2j we have:
p∗2j(αj) = c + τ + αjBj, ∀j = 1, 2 (1.A.5)
or
p∗21(α1) = c + τ + α1B1 and p
∗
22(α2) = c + τ + α2B2 (1.A.6)




A consumer located at x1 will have the following instantaneous utility:
u − p1j − τx1 if he goes to retailer j
u − p1k − τ(1 − x1) if he goes to retailer k
Conditional on buying from retailer j in the first period, he will buy again in the
second period to this retailer if x2 satisfies:
x2 ≤ Dj ≡
τ + p2k − p2j + Bj
2τ





(u − p2j + Bj − τx)dx +
∫ x=1
Dj
(u − p2k(αk) − τ(1 − x))dx
]
(1.A.7)
performing the integrals and rearranging, yields:
δ
{
(p2k − p2j + Bj + τ)Dj − τD
2




Hence, consumer i’s lifetime utility is:
u − p1j − τx1 + δ
{
(p2k − p2j + Bj + τ)Dj − τD
2





Similarly, conditional on buying from retailer k in the first period, the consumer
continues buying from her if:
x2 ≥ Dk ≡
τ + p2k − p2j − Bk
2τ
Then, consumer i’s expected total surplus conditional on buying from k is:
u − p1k − τx1 + δ
{
(p2k − p2j − Bk + τ)Dk − τD
2





A consumer located at x1 = αj who is indifferent between retailers makes








4τ 2 + δ(Bj + Bk)2
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is a ‘modified’ substitutability parameter that takes into account the dynamic effects
of LPs. Note that if we set Bj = Bk = 0, we obtain the standard market share in
the static Hotelling model.
Equation (1.A.10) tells us that even though the consumer does not receive an
immediate rebate, he perceives current prices lower as if the loyalty discount were
immediate. Also, that a delayed rebate does not have the same impact on the
demand as an immediate one as long as the discount factor reduces the impact of
this loyalty rebate, stimulating only a fraction of demand increase per unit of price
reduction.
Assuming that firms discount the future at the same rate δ as consumers, firm
j’s overall profit function is given by:
Πj = π1j(p1j, p1k) + δπ2j (αj(p1j, p1k, Bj, Bk)) (1.A.11)
where:
π1j = (p1j − c)αj(p1j, p1k, Bj, Bk)








π2j = (p2j − c)(αjDj + (1 − αj)Dk) − αjDjBj
=
τ 2 − αj(1 − αj)(Bj + Bk)Bj
2τ
(1.A.13)






























(−(1 − αj) + αj)
]
= 0
In a symmetric equilibrium, p1j = p1k = p
∗
1, αj = 1/2, Bj = Bk = B:



























Where σ is the standard substitutability parameter as defined in (1.A.2). Note
that if we set B = 0 we get π1 = π2 =
1
4σ
, which is the Hotelling profit in a model
with unit demands.
As shown in the previous equations, retailers’ instantaneous profits can be some
periods higher and some others lower than those they would obtain in absence of
LPs. However, overall profits are higher thanks to the rise in prices induced by
LPs. According to equation (1.A.17), overall profits increase with the loyalty rebate.
Given the transportation costs, the higher the B the better for the retailer.
1.B First-stage results
In this Section I present the regressions conducted as a first step to obtain predicted
price, membership and the deltas necessary to compute the optimal instruments.
1.B.1 Modeling prices
As pointed out previously, I assume that the price of a particular brand in a
department is a linear function of brand and supermarkets characteristics and the
average prices of the same brand in all the regions of the country (excluding the
department from the average price of the region the market is located in). These
prices are used as proxies of marginal costs under the assumption that prices contain
information on common marginal costs in all its stores across the country, and then
retail prices contain information on that common costs (see Section 4 for more
details).
Table 1.B.1 displays the results of the linear regression of the price of the brand
variety j in supermarket s at t on average prices of the same brand in the 21
administrative regions of France, and brand dummy variables and week dummy
variables as controls. The fact that all the estimates are significant at 1% level and
the high R-squared suggest that prices have important explanatory power.
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Table 1.B.1: Results from a linear regression for price























Notes: Based on 37,662 observations. Robust s.e.
in parentheses. Regressions include brand and time
dummy variables.
1.B.2 Modeling the membership decision
The information I have about loyalty programs is very limited: a dummy variable
indicating whether a given household was member of the loyalty program of the
supermarket it purchased from in 2006 is all I have. Information such as the date of
subscription coupons (and amounts) given to households and redemption rates is not
available. Due to these data limitations, I cannot fully explain the determinants of
the individual decision to subscribe to a loyalty program. Nevertheless, information
on loyalty programs characteristics is available on the web and this, along with
the household scanner data, can be used to get a clue on how loyalty program
characteristics and household characteristics are correlated with the membership
status. Further, this exercise helps me evaluate the performance of potential
instruments to treat the endogeneity of the loyalty membership indicator.
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I collected some data on the characteristics of each loyalty program that do not
vary by market, namely, a dummy variable equal to one if the program includes
both NBs and PLs in the reward system and zero otherwise, a dummy variable
equal to one if the customer can either subscribe to the program by Internet or at
least download the subscription form and zero otherwise, the average rebate in euros
per 100 e spent in the supermarket, and dummies for whether the program has an
upper bound for accumulating rebates, thresholds of points or money needed to get
a coupon and a the number of months points can be hold before expiration.39 Along
with this information, I use household characteristics and other variables such as
the number of different stores visited by the household members within a week, the
number of shopping trips to a same retailer in a month and the number of members
to the LP of a given supermarket in the rest of the country (excluding the department
where the household was located).
Table 1.B.2 displays the results of OLS and Logit regressions of the dummy
variable indicating household membership to a supermarket loyalty program on the
variables previously described. After a first specification with all the covariates, some
LP characteristics were either non significant at 5% level or had a different sign than
expected or both. Thus, I excluded them form the final specification displayed in
the table.
Although the set of covariates used do not explain the whole variation of the
dependent variable, this is confirmed by the low adjusted R2, the results are quite
appealing. On the one hand, in the Logit regression (column 2) all parameters are
significant, and on the other hand, the signs of the variables are according to the
intuition. In the first place, the probability of joining supermarket j loyalty program
increases with the number of members in the rest of the country, which means that
the more popular the program is, the more attractive it is to join, most probably
because this is a signal of the program quality. Moreover, this probability also
increases with household characteristics such as household size, age, car ownership
and living in urban areas which facilitates the access to the retailer, and the number
of trips the household members do to the retailer j, being an indicator of shopping
intensity, the more often a customer goes to the same store, the more informed
about prices and promotions she is and, consequently, the more likely to benefit
from rebates.
Second, individual characteristics such as the income and the multi-store
shopping behavior make consumers to be less interested in joining LPs because either
they are less sensitive to small price cuts or they are less likely to get rewards. In fact,
39To obtain this information, I reviewed carefully each supermarket program’s “Terms and
Conditions of use” document and identify some common categories describing the general
structure of the programs. These documents were obtained from each supermarket’s website
in 2011 and 2012. Although the information is used to instrument a decision that could have
been taken even before 2006 (the year of the database used in this article), all the programs
where launched before 2006 and I believe the structure has not changed a lot since then.
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Table 1.B.2: Results from OLS and Logit regressions for LP membership
Variable OLS Logit
LPs characteristics
Log total Sup. LP members 0.141∗∗ 0.892∗∗
excluding location depart. (0.028) (0.185)
NBs included 0.0499∗∗ 0.322∗∗
(0.020) (0.137)
Online access to inscription 0.0410∗∗ 0.261∗∗
form (0.012) (0.074)
Log of average reward per 0.0110∗∗ 0.0692∗∗
100 e spent (0.005) (0.033)
HH shopping behavior
# of different stores −0.272∗∗ −1.643∗∗
visited a week (0.044) (0.235)
# trips to the same 0.156∗∗ 1.127∗∗
retailer per month (0.011) (0.093)
Demographics
Household size 0.0288∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(0.003) (0.023)
Log income -0.0132 −0.0928∗
(0.009) (0.057)











Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗ Significant at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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one can expect that as income increases supermarket loyalty programs become less
attractive because wealthier people may be less sensitive to little price cuts and also
because loyalty rebates are generally addressed to middle quality goods rather than
to high quality branded products. Regarding the multi-store shopping behavior, it is
more difficult to accumulate points or money in a loyalty account when purchases are
not concentrated in one retailer, which makes individuals with this shopping profile
either less interested to join any loyalty program or willing to join all of them, but
not likely to use them as rewards will never be attainable.
Finally, concerning LP characteristics included in the regression, Logit results
show that the probability of joining a LP increases with the fact that both NBs and
PLs purchases give the customers points to get a future rebate compared to those
programs including only PLs, also with the possibility of joining the program online
(or at least having access to the inscription form) and the average reward in euros,
i.e, the better rewarding programs are the more likely to attract customers to their
loyalty program.
1.B.3 First-stage estimation of the full model
The results of the first-stage estimation of the full model using the set of inefficient
instruments for the endogenous variables are basically of the expected sign. However,
most estimates are statistically non significant due to the very large robust standard
errors obtained. In addition, some convergence problems were experienced as the
size of the estimates and in some cases the sign were quite sensitive to the provided
set of starting values. All this suggests that the instruments used to identify the
parameters of the full model are not performing well, even though they are similar
to the instruments used in some standard papers. This may be due to the fact that
they are just helping to identify the parameters in the linear part of the model (θ1)
and not those of the whole model (θ1, θ2). This fact empirically supports the need to
use optimal instruments as the best way to overcome endogeneity problems in this
kind of models.
1.B.4 Own- and cross-price elasticities
Table 1.B.4 presents the medians of the distribution of estimated own- and cross-
price elasticities for the leading 12 brand varieties based on their national market
shares. The columns in the table indicate the price that changes, and the rows
market shares responses, so that for instance, the entry located in row 2 column one
gives the elasticity of brand 2 with respect to a change in the price of brand 1.
One of the advantages of a random-coefficients model, as discussed previously, is
that it gives more realistic substitution patterns allowing for different brands to have
39
Table 1.B.3: First-stage results from the Mixed Logit model with inefficient
instrumentsa
Means Std. Deviations Interactions with hh characteristics
Variable (β’s) (σ’s) HH size Income # Subscriptions
Constant -3.631b 1.353 -0.967 0.922
(1.388) (1.865) (13.454) (4.787)
Price -6.399 2.301 -1.748 0.764 1.331
(5.253) (6.090) (12.456) (25.647) (14.523)
LP member (Mms) -8.338 6.223 -0.967
(6.896) (2.246) (9.011)
PL dummy -2.634b 2.755 -1.331 0.764 -7.803
(2.270) (3.569) (4.305) (4.120) (5.237)










Notes: a Based on 37,662 observations. Except where noted, parameters were estimated using GMM. All
regressions include brand and week dummies. Asymptotically robust s.e. are given in parentheses.
b Estimated using a minimum-distance procedure.
different values for the elasticity due to the change in the price of a given price, as































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multiproduct retailing and con-
sumer shopping patterns: The role
of shopping costs
Abstract: We structurally identify consumer shopping costs —real or
perceived costs of dealing with a store— using scanner data on grocery
purchases of French households. We present a model of demand for
multiple stores and products consisting of an optimal stopping problem
in terms of individual shopping costs. This rule determines whether to
visit one or multiple stores at a shopping period. We then estimate
the parameters of the model and recover the distribution of shopping
costs. We quantify the total shopping cost in 18.7 e per store sourced
on average. This cost has two components, namely, the mean fixed
shopping cost, 1.53 e and mean total transport cost of 17.1 e per
trip. We show that consumers able to source three or more grocery
stores have zero shopping costs, which rationalizes the low proportion
of three-stop shoppers observed in our data. Theory predicts that
when shopping costs are taken into account in economic analysis, some
seemingly pro-competitive practices can be welfare reducing and motivate
policy intervention. Such striking findings remain empirically untested.
This paper is a first step towards filling this gap.
JEL classification: D03, D12, L13, L22, L81.
Keywords: Grocery retailing, supermarket chains, shopping costs, one-
and multistop shopping, Method of Simulated Moments.
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2.1 Introduction
Consumers have heterogeneous shopping patterns (see Figure 2.1 below). This het-
erogeneity might be explained by several factors such as preferences, demographics,
geographic location, information frictions, differentiated retailers, and time avail-
ability for shopping activities. Previous literature has introduced a concept that
accounts for some (or most) determinants: shopping costs (Klemperer, 1992, Klem-
perer and Padilla, 1997, Armstrong and Vickers, 2010, and Chen and Rey, 2012,
2013). In line with this literature, we will call shopping costs all real or perceived
costs a consumer incurs when sourcing a grocery store. Economic theory shows that
in a context of multiproduct retailing and consumer shopping costs, several prac-
tices that would otherwise be considered competitive and good from a social welfare
perspective can be less competitive. However, there is not much empirical support
for such findings, in part because the introduction of shopping costs in a structural
model of demand is a challenging task. This motivates the following questions. First,
is it possible to quantify shopping costs from observed consumer shopping behavior?
Second, will accounting for shopping costs in a multiproduct demand model lead to
a better understanding of consumer heterogeneity in shopping patterns? Finally, to
what extent the inclusion of shopping costs would be crucial for policy analysis? In
this paper, we develop and estimate a structural model of multiproduct demand for
groceries in which shopping costs play a key role in consumer decision making. This
framework enables us to identify the distribution of consumer shopping costs from
data on grocery purchases.
We say that two consumers have heterogeneous shopping patterns when they
visit a different number of stores within the same shopping period. Therefore, a
consumer sourcing a single store within, say, a week will be a one-stop shopper and a
consumer visiting several separate suppliers within the same week will be a multistop
shopper. Consumer shopping costs, which may depend on stores’ characteristics (e.g.
transport costs depend on store location; the opportunity cost of time from shopping
depends on store size) and may as well be informative about consumers’ tastes for
shopping, account for such differences.1
The inclusion of shopping costs in the analysis of multiproduct demand and
supply may change policy conclusions dramatically. Consider, for instance, the case
of multiproduct retailers competing head-to-head by selling homogeneous products.
In the presence of shopping costs, customers will stick with a single retailer because
the benefit from visiting an additional supplier need not compensate the shopping
1 Klemperer (1992) distinguishes among consumer costs in the following way: “...consumer’s total
costs include purchase cost and utility losses from substituting products with less-preferred
characteristics for the preferred product(s) not actually purchased [transport costs of the standard
models à la Hotelling] (...) Consumers also face shopping costs that are increasing in the number
of suppliers used.” p.742.
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cost. As a consequence, competition is reduced and prices are higher. In contrast,
if product lines are differentiated, retailers may be tempted to undercut prices to
make one-stop shoppers become multistop by patronizing several separate suppliers
(Klemperer, 1992). Further, the presence of shopping costs may lead to the
introduction of too many varieties of products with respect to the social optimum.
When a retailer introduces a new product, the mass of one-stop shoppers increases
because more consumers prefer to concentrate purchases with the retailer supplying
a wider product range and save on shopping costs. As a consequence, rivals’ profits
decrease (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997).
Moreover, shopping costs in a context of multiproduct retailing may change the
way we understand below-cost pricing, commonly considered as predatory. Large
retailers can adopt loss-leading strategies when competing with smaller rivals to
price discriminate between one- and multi-stop shoppers. From this perspective, it
is more profitable to keep rivals in the market and motivate customers with low
shopping costs to source multiple stores, than pushing them out. Hence, pricing
below cost turns out to be an exploitative device rather than a predatory practice
(Chen and Rey, 2012). Finally, in a setting of competition between large retailers,
in which each has a comparative advantage on some products, cross subsidization
strategies may be competitive. Below-cost pricing is again not predatory and it can
be good for consumer welfare. Banning this practice may hurt consumers and reduce
social welfare (Chen and Rey, 2013).
From an empirical point of view, we can readily find support for the idea that
shopping patterns are heterogeneous and that this heterogeneity is explained by
differences in shopping costs. Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of the population
by the average number of different retailers visited within a week. Moreover,
we performed reduced form regressions of the number of different supermarkets
visited in a week (which constitutes an indicator of multistop shopping behavior)
on demographic variables that are proxies for shopping costs (such as income, age,
household size, number of children under 16, etc.) and control for household storage
capacity, among others. We found strong empirical evidence showing that multistop
shopping depends on how busy the household members could be, i.e. how costly it
might be to spend a lot of time in shopping activities.
This paper provides a framework to assess the role of shopping costs in explaining
heterogeneous shopping patterns. To do so we develop a structural model in
the spirit of the main theoretical contributions on the topic. Consumer optimal
shopping behavior is given by a threshold strategy where the choice between one-
or multistop shopping depends on the size of individual shopping costs. We are
able to take the model to data through parametric specifications of consumer utility
and shopping cost along with some distributional assumptions on the unobserved
shocks. We use scanner data on household grocery purchases in France in 2005,
which is representative of French households and contains information on a wide
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of household by average number of stores visited in a
week, 2005
Notes: The observed distribution has a longer tail than displayed by the graph as
we observe households visiting up to 8 separate retailers per week. However, 99.8%
of the observations are concentrated up to 5 stops.
Source: TNS Worldpanel data base.
product range and household demographics. As for grocery stores, an additional
data set allows us to observe store characteristics and location.
By solving the implied optimal stopping problem of a consumer who needs to
decide how many stores to source, we are able to recover the distribution of shopping
costs. We quantify the total shopping cost in 18.7 e per store sourced on average.
This cost has two components, namely, the mean fixed shopping cost, 1.53 d and
the total transport cost of 17.1 eper trip to a given store. Moreover, we are able
to compute the transport and total costs of shopping by store format. Transport
and total costs of shopping are decreasing in the size of the stores, on average, as
smaller formats are closer to downtowns. The largest total shopping cost, 24.7 e,
are incurred by consumers who source big-box stores, because they are farther away
from downtown. Sourcing a supermarket or a hard-discounter implies total costs of
shopping of 14.3 e and 13.4 e per trip, respectively. Finally, the costs of sourcing
a convenience store, 4.8 e per trip, are the lowest provided that they are located
in downtown. We find that individuals who source three or more stores in a week
have zero shopping costs. This might be an indicator that those households actually
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visiting more than two separate stores a week should have a strong preference for
shopping. Finally, the predicted proportions of shoppers by number of stops are
90.1% of one-stop shoppers, 9.7% of two-stop shoppers and only 0.26% do three-
stop shopping.
Related literature
The literature including or measuring explicitly consumer-related costs from an
empirical point of view, can be summarized in three categories: i) search cost
literature,2 ii) switching costs literature,3 and iii) shopping costs literature. In
recent years there has been a considerable number of contributions developing models
and empirical strategies that allow to identify search costs —these include Hong and
Shum (2006), Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2011), Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), Dubois
and Perrone (2010) and Wildenbeest (2011), and switching costs —these include
Dubé et al. (2010), Handel (2010) and Honka (2012).
Less attention has been put on shopping costs. To the best of our knowledge,
few empirical papers include explicitly shopping costs when it comes to explain time
use or supermarket choice. Brief (1967) models consumer shopping patterns in a
Hotelling framework, and estimates transportation as part of consumers’ shopping
costs.4 His identification strategy consists of using ‘the shopping costs elasticity of
demand’, as he claims these costs are not directly identifiable. Aguiar and Hurst
(2007) evaluate how households substitute time for money by optimally combining
shopping activities with home production. They argue that multistop shoppers exist
because they want to reduce the price paid for a good, which requires more time.
As opposed to them, one-stop shoppers may find it optimal to become frequent
customers of the same store and benefit from sales and discounts. All this implies
a cost in terms of the time needed to carry out the shopping activity, which is
accounted for in their modeling framework.
2 Both shopping and search costs are often referred to as the opportunity cost of time when people
go search (for search costs)/shopping (for shopping costs). The difference stems from the purpose
of the time spent, whether the consumer ends up buying a product she was looking for or not,
and the available information on prices or product characteristics in different locations (sellers).
Search costs appear whenever consumers face search frictions caused by information asymmetries.
Shopping costs account for the real and opportunity costs related to the shopping activity which
may include a previous search if needed.
3 As stated by Kemplerer and Padilla (1997), shopping costs differ from switching costs in that the
latter derives from the economies of scale from repeated purchases of a product while the former
is associated with economies of scope from buying related products.
4 Brief (1967) claims that the final price paid by a consumer has two components, namely, the“pure”
price of the good and the marginal cost of shopping for it. These shopping costs include both
explicit, such as transportation costs, and implicit, such as the opportunity costs of shopping,
which are related to the “purchaser’s valuation of time and inconvenience associated with the
shopping trip.”.
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In the analysis of store choice in the presence of shopping costs, our paper closely
relates to Shciraldi, Seiler and Smith (2011). They evaluate the effects of big-box
retailing on competition, allowing for the fact that customers may do one- or two-stop
shopping. This observed heterogeneity allows them to identify individual shopping
costs. However, our approach differs from theirs in at least one important way. In
line with previous theory literature, we adopt the view that heterogeneous shopping
patterns stem from differences in shopping costs as a modeling feature. In other
words, in our model the number of stops is endogenously determined by a stopping
rule involving the extra utility and extra costs of sourcing an additional store. This
fact enables us to empirically identify the distribution of shopping costs. In this
sense, our approach is more closely related to the empirical literature on search costs
previously mentioned. In particular, our setup relates to Hortaçsu and Syverson
(2004), and Dubois and Perrone (2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the data
and a preliminary analysis of consumers’ shopping behavior based on descriptive
statistics and reduced-form regressions. Section 3.3 outlines the structural model of
multiproduct demand and consumer shopping behavior in the presence of shopping
costs. Section 2.4 describes our empirical strategy, discusses identification and
presents the estimation procedure. Section 2.5 describes the results. We examine the
robustness of our results in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes and discusses
directions for further research.
2.2 Grocery retailing, shopping patterns and
opportunity cost of time
This Section aims at giving an overview of the data we use, and a first look at
customers’ shopping behavior.
2.2.1 The data
This paper uses two complementary data sets. Data on household purchases is
obtained from the TNS Worldpanel data base by the TNS-Sofres Institute. It
is homescan data on grocery purchases made by a representative sample of 7,490
households in France during 2005. These data are collected by household members
themselves with the help of scanning devices. Most households integrating the
panel were randomly sampled since 1998 (the TNS Worldpanel is a continuous
panel database starting from 1998). Every year, a bunch of new randomly selected
households is added to the panel either to replace other households rarely reporting
data or to increase sample size.
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The data set contains information on 352 different grocery products from around
90 grocery stores including hyper- and supermarkets, convenience stores, hard-
discounters and specialized stores. The data is reported at the purchase level, so
we observe product characteristics such as total quantity, total expenditure, the
store where it was purchased from, brand, etc. In addition, the data include a range
of household demographics such as household size, number of children, location,
income, number of cars, internet access, storage capacity, etc.
On the other hand, data on stores’ characteristics is obtained from the Atlas LSA
2005. It includes information by store category (Hyper-, supermarket, convenience
and hard-discount stores) on store location, surface, number of checkouts, parking
spots, etc. In particular, store location is key to our analysis as it will enable us to
identify transportation costs. This will become apparent in Section 2.4.1.
2.2.2 Customer profile
Table 2.1 gives summary statistics for demographic characteristics of french
households observed in the data. The average household in France consists of three
members, the household’s head age5 being 51 years old, with approximately 2,350
e of income per month and at least one car. Only half of the households in the
sample reported having internet access at home which may give a clue on why
internet purchases are not so important in our data set. As for storage capacity
and home production, 79% of the households have storage rooms at home and
69% an independent freezer, which may explain low frequency of shopping for some
households or one-stop shopping behavior. In particular, it is remarkable that about
39% reported vegetable production at home, which along with the fact that less
than 30% of the households are located at rural areas, may be an indicator lower
frequency of shopping for these households.
Table 2.2 displays details on consumer shopping patterns. On average,
households tend to favor multistop shopping. The average french household visits
two separate grocery stores in a week and tend to do a single trip per week to the
same store. The average number of days between shopping occasions is 5 days.
Notice there is some heterogeneity here, which is indicated by a standard deviation
of 4.7 days: some households go every day to a grocery store whereas for some others
it takes up to ten days to go back to a store.
Larger store formats are preferred by consumers: on average, the two most
frequently visited store formats are Supermarkets and Hypermarkets with 48.4%
and 40.5% share on total visits per week. Convenience stores, the small downtown
stores supplying a reduced product range generally at higher prices, get the lowest
share of visits, with 1.9%. Although convenience stores have the advantage of being
5 By household head we mean the person mainly in charge of the household’s grocery shopping.
49
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for household characteristics
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max
Demographics
Household size 2.96 3 1.38 1 9
Income (e/month) 2,352 2,100 1,106 150 7,000
Children under 15 (prop. of hh) 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
Household head’s age 50.6 49 14.32 22 76
Lives in city 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Car 1.55 2 0.80 0 8
Home internet access 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
Storage capacity
Independent freezer 0.69 1 0.46 0 1
Freezer capacity > 150L 0.58 1 0.49 0 1
Storage room at home 0.79 1 0.41 0 1
Vegetables production at home 0.39 0 0.49 0 1
Source: TNS Worldpanel data base.
within walking distance to households location, as opposed to hypermarket that are
located outside city centers, the preference for larger stores may be explained by
several factors such as bulk shopping, lower prices, sales and promotions (that may
be more intense in larger stores) and a larger product range.
Interestingly, households tend to concentrate purchases of particular product
categories in the same store format. Table 2.3 gives transition probabilities of visiting
a particular store format this week for dairy products conditional on the store format
sourced the previous week. The probability of keeping the same store format in
most cases is larger than the probability of switching store formats. In particular,
the lowest probabilities of switching are for those households sourcing hyper- and
supermarkets in the past, which is in line with the preference for larger store formats
reported in Table 2.2. Moreover, those households patronizing specialized and other
smaller stores (‘others’) are more likely to switch to a hyper- or a supermarket next
period.
Age can be seen as a good indicator of the opportunity cost of time. Aguiar and
Hurst (2007) find that older people often pay lower prices because their frequency
of both shop trips and retailers visited increases, presumably due to a lower cost
of time. In our data we found a similar relationship between shopping frequency
indicators and age. Figure 2.2 shows that both the number of trips per store and
the number of different stores visited a month increase with age. Older people go
shopping more frequently performing more visits to the same retailer as well as more
visits to separate retailers than their younger counterparts. This can be thought of
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for household shopping patterns
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max
No. Trips to same grocery store/week 1.37 1 0.72 1 7
No. separate grocery stores visited/week 1.65 1 0.83 1 8
Days between visits 5.09 4 4.73 1 232
Visits by format (% of total/week)
Hypermarket 40.48 32.2 34.4 0 100
Supermarket 48.38 47.6 32.6 0 100
Convenience 1.92 0.0 8.7 0 100
Hard discount 9.22 3.7 11.6 0 50
Source: TNS Worldpanel data base.
Table 2.3: Transition matrix for purchases of dairy products by store format
Purchase at t
Hyper Super Convenience Hard discount Other
Hyper 0.68 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.28
At Super 0.17 0.67 0.25 0.31 0.37
t+1 Convenience 0.01 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.02
Hard discount 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.38 0.10
Other 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.23
as older people with higher taste for shopping and quality doing more multistop
shopping in order to get the best products. It might as well be interpreted as a
way to search for the best deals, from an information friction viewpoint. However,
the low shopping costs reasoning seems to be more appealing to us because frequent
shopping allows people to be better informed about prices and promotional activities
without the need to do a search each time they want to go shopping.
2.2.3 Reduced-form results
Recall that shopping costs are the costs of dealing with a store. This implies that
multistop shopping, i.e. visiting several separate suppliers in a given shopping period,
should be negatively correlated with the consumers’ physical as well as time costs.
Such a correlation will constitute key empirical evidence of the role of shopping costs
on consumer shopping behavior.
In line with theory, we measure multistop shopping as the number of different
suppliers visited within a week by the consumer. We regress this variable on the
distance from household location to stores and a set of household demographic
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of shopping by age ranges, 2005
Notes: Both lines show the results of independent regressions of each variable (Trips per
store and Number of stores visited) on age categories and other demographic controls
(income, hh size, car dummy, storage capacity, etc.). Results are based on 5 million
observations. All estimates are significant at 1% confidence level.
characteristics which proxy opportunity cost of time, to study the correlation
between shopping costs and multistop shopping behavior. Dummy variables to
control for region fixed-effects are added in all regressions. Supermarket and time
dummies are included gradually in order to assess their effect on the estimates.
Further, we add some controls on household storage capacity that can determine
the frequency of shopping during the week, namely, type of living place (apartment,
farm), storage room, independent freezer, and the size of the largest freezer at home.
Table 2.4 gives the results. Most coefficients are of the expected sign and statistically
significant at 1% confidence level.
Results provide us with strong empirical evidence on how households’ ability
to patronize multiple stores depends on how costly it will be in terms of time and
distance. Interestingly, we find that larger households living in urban areas tend
to favor multistop shopping. On the other hand, higher income people as well
as households with babies do less stops on average due, presumably, to a larger
opportunity cost of time. Similarly, internet access reduces the number of stops as
people can shop online and use home delivery services, which might involve savings
on transport costs and time. Growing vegetables at home also reduces the number
of stops people want to make probably due to lesser needs for staples. People living
in an apartment tend to source more stores as compared to those who live in a
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house. In contrast, those who live in a larger place, such as a farm, do less stops
as compared to families living in a house. This can be explained by the fact that
in general, people living in apartments are more likely to be located at or closer to
downtown than families living in houses (that tend to be located farther away from
city centers) and farms. It might as well indicate that apartments have lower storage
capacity than houses and farms.
As expected, distance to stores is negatively correlated with the number of stores
visited in a week (see column (1) of Table 2.4). The more distant is the store
from consumer location, the larger the transport costs. Notice that distances were
excluded from specifications displayed in columns (2) and (3) due to the inclusion
of store fixed-effects that are capturing location as a store characteristic that does
not vary over time. Finally, in specification given in column (1) we find a negative
correlation with car ownership, which can be explained by the fact that people
with a car can do bulk shopping at a big-box store, generally located outside
downtown areas. However, this relationship becomes positive and non significant
in specifications (2) and (3) as we introduce store and time dummies.
2.3 Consumer shopping behavior with shopping
costs
Our general strategy is to identify all parameters of the model and retrieve shopping
costs cutoffs by setting out a model of demand for multiple grocery products. This
way, we can avoid any difficulties related to unobserved data on costs and structure
of the supply side.
Our structural model allows for consumer heterogeneity in two dimensions,
namely, in the valuation for a particular product and in shopping costs. To keep
exposition simple and without loss of generality, we present a model of three grocery
stores which will capture the basic intuition of one- and multistop shopping behavior
and the role of shopping costs.
2.3.1 General set-up
Demand for grocery products is characterized by different consumers indexed by
i = {1, . . . , I} with idiosyncratic valuations for grocery products k = 1, . . . , K.6
Although valuations and demands may vary with time, we drop the time subscript
6 Assuming all consumers have access to the same product range might appear strong. However,
this help us reducing dimensionality issues in the estimation part. An extension of the model
would relax this assumption and allow for heterogeneous choice sets.
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Table 2.4: Results for number of different stores visited per week
Variable (1) (2) (3)
HH head’s age 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log Income -0.0541∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
HH size 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Car -0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.0031
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Lives in city 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Lives in an appartment 0.0699∗∗∗ 0.0620∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Lives in a farm -0.1791∗∗∗ -0.1605∗∗∗ -0.1601∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Baby -0.1155∗∗∗ -0.0901∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Home internet access -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Grow vegetables home -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Distance to store (km) -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Constant 1.8866∗∗∗ 1.9142∗∗∗ 1.9153∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0080)
HH storage capacity controls Yes Yes Yes
Dummies per region Yes Yes Yes
Store FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
R2 0.0249 0.074 0.0764
Notes: Regressions are based on 4.72 million observations. Asymptotically robust
s.e. are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Significant at 0.1%.
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t for the sake of exposition unless it is strictly necessary. A customer i purchasing
product k from store r ∈ {0, . . . , R} derives a net utility vikr.
7
Consumers want to purchase bundles of these products. Let B = {1, . . . , RK}
be the set of all possible bundles consisting of combinations of products-stores
available in the market, i.e. our bundles account not only for which product was
purchased, but what supplier it was purchased from as well. A consumer can either
concentrate all her purchases with a single store (one-stop shopping) or buy subsets
of products from several separate suppliers (multistop shopping). At the end of the
day, each individual’s shopping behavior will be determined by her idiosyncratic cost
of shopping.
In the formulation of the model, we focus on the fixed component of the total
shopping costs that may account for consumers’ taste for shopping. From now on, we
will refer to this fixed cost as “shopping costs” and denote it si. Physical transport
costs, which are an important component of the total cost of shopping, will be
accounted for in the empirical implementation of the model by including distances
to stores in the utility specification (see Section 2.4).8 Accordingly, shopping costs
are assumed to be independent of store characteristics (size, facilities, location, etc.)
and time invariant. Furthermore, we assume si is a random draw from a continuous
distribution function G(·) and positive density g(·) everywhere.
Finally, we suppose consumers are well informed about prices and product
characteristics. Therefore, we assume away information frictions and so consumers’
need for searching activities to gather information about prices, qualities and the
like.9
A consumer i is supposed to have an optimal shopping behavior. This implies she
should optimally make a decision that involves choosing between being a one-stop or
a multistop shopper and where to go and buy each of the K products of his desired
bundle b.
Suppose there are three grocery stores in the market indexed by r ∈ {A, B, C}.
A consumer will favor multistop shopping if her shopping costs are small enough,
otherwise she will optimally concentrate all her purchases with a single store.
Roughly speaking, the choice set of consumer i will be restricted by the number
of separate stores she can source given her shopping costs, so that her choice will
7 For now, we do not specify a functional form for the utility as it is not necessary for setting out
the model. We will assume a parametric specification at the empirical implementation stage in
Section 2.4.
8 Due to some data limitations, we can only compute distances from the zip code of a given
household to the zip code of a given store. Consequently, transport costs will be the same for all
individuals living in the same zip code area. See Section 2.4.1 for further details.
9 This might seem a strong assumption, even though we believe frequent grocery shopping make
better informed households and reduce the need to engage in costly search. A more general set
up would allow for positive search costs. However, this is out of the scope of this paper and we
leave it for future research.
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consist of picking the mix of products-stores that maximize the overall value of the
desired bundle. In this sense, a three-stop shopper who can visit all three stores
will pick the best product from the three alternatives in the market within each
category. A two-stop shopper will pick the mix of two stores maximizing the utility
of the desired bundle from all the combinations of products-stores possible. Her final
bundle will consist of two sub-bundles each containing the best product out of two
alternatives in each product category. Finally, a one-stop shopper will pick the store
offering the largest overall value of the whole bundle of products.
Formally, let Dir, for all r ∈ {A, B, C} denote the distance traveled by a consumer
i from his household location to store r′s location, and γ a parameter that captures
consumer’s valuation of the physical and perceived costs of traveling that distance.
Define the utility net of transport costs, of a shopper that can only source one of the












































Notice that expressions in (2.3.1), (2.3.2), and (2.3.3) are particular cases of
a more general utility function in which, conditional on shopping costs, a n-stop
shopper is picking the subset of stores that maximize the overall utility of the desired
bundle. For a one-stop shopper, these subsets are singletons, for a two-stop shopper
they contain two elements and for a three-stop shopper each subset of stores contains
exactly the number of stores in the market, which is why she does not need to
maximize over mixes of suppliers.10
10The general expression of the utility and choice of a n-stop shopper are described in Appendix
2.A.
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Suppose v1i − si > 0 so that all consumers will go shopping at least once. To
determine the number of stops to be made, consumer i will compare the extra utility
of doing n-stop shopping with the extra costs, taking into account that the total cost
of shopping increases with the number of different stores visited. A consumer will
optimally decide to do three-stop shopping only if the net utility of visiting three
separate stores is larger than what she could obtain by doing either one- or two-stop
shopping instead. Formally,
v3i − 3si > max{v
2
i − 2si, v
1
i − si}




i be the incremental utility of visiting three stores rather than




i be the extra utility of deciding to source either one or three








A consumer will optimally decide to do two-stop shopping if and only if
v2i − 2si > max{v
1
i − si, v
3
i − 3si}




i be the incremental utility of sourcing two stores rather
than one. Hence, a consumer i will do two-stop shopping as long as
δ3i < si 6 δ
2
i (2.3.5)
Finally, a consumer will optimally decide to do one-stop shopping if and only if
v1i − si > max{v
2
i − 2si, v
3
i − 3si}








In general, the optimal shopping rule for consumer i indicates that she will choose
the mix of suppliers to maximize her utility, conditional on the extra shopping
cost being at most the extra utility obtained from sourcing additional stores.
Equations (2.3.4), (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) suggest we can derive critical cutoff points





i /2 ordered. From six possible orderings only one survives,
11 namely,





< δ2i , (2.3.7)
Under this ordering, the highest possible shopping costs of any consumer able
to do multistop shopping at either two or three stores in equilibrium are given
respectively by the following critical cutoff points:
s2it = δ
2
it, for two-stop shopping, and (2.3.8)
s3it = δ
3
it, for three-stop shopping.
Notice that these cutoff points depend on the period of purchase —the subscript
t was added— because it depends on utilities that may vary across periods. This
contrast with individual shopping costs which are assumed to be time invariant.
Cutoffs in (2.3.8) say that for given shopping costs, consumers only care about
marginal extra utility of visiting an additional store to make their final decision on
how many stores they should optimally source. Moreover, one-, two- and three-stop
shopping patterns arise and will be defined over all the support of G(·) –see Figure
2.3.12
















Let B2i, B3i ∈ Bi be subsets of bundles involving two- and three-stop shopping,
respectively. Recall our previous assumption v1it − si > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I, which
means that all consumers will do at least one shopping trip per week. This implies
that the outside option is chosen with probability zero, i.e. G(v1it) = 1. The intuition
behind this is as follows: a likely outside alternative to grocery shopping is home
production, which consists of households transforming time and market goods into
consumption products according to a given home production function (see Aguiar
and Hurst, 2007). Yet, even if the household chooses to produce at home most of its
12Notice that the kind of behavior according to which a shopper evaluates extreme choices such as
visiting all retailers against only one does not appear to be relevant here.
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preferred products, there is still a bunch of them that will be too costly to produce
compared to the retail price (e.g. toothpaste, toothbrush, cleaning products, bulbs,
medicines, etc.). Then, we can think of household members going from time to time
to a store to get the set of products they are not able to produce at home (or even
the inputs to produce at home the final products they wish to consume).13



















{b ∈ B2i | kr ∈ b}






{b ∈ B3i | kr ∈ b}
P 3it(XBi ; θ),
(2.3.9)
where P 3it is the probability that a one-stop shopper decides to stop at r, P
2
it is
the probability that a two-stop shopper chooses to source retailer r as one of the
two retailers she will optimally stop at, and P 3it is the probability that a three-stop
shopper decides to pick a bundle b including product kr. All these probabilities are
known by consumers.






, for all h ∈ {A, B, C}. It is important to note that a price change
may affect not only the market shares per type of shopper but also the shopping costs
cutoff values provided they depend on utilities. As a consequence, the distribution
of shoppers between one-, two- and multistop shopping changes. In fact, an increase
in product k’s price at retailer r reduces the indirect utility of consumer i making a
stop at r. She may therefore consider to make less stops and purchase a substitute
for this product from rival retailer, say h, as the extra gain in utility from sourcing
an additional store may not compensate the extra shopping cost.
2.4 Empirical implementation
As described in Section 3.3, consumer choice set consists of bundles of products that
can be purchased from one or several stores. Accordingly, if we consider R stores
and K products, we would have to deal with a choice set of RK alternative bundles
for each individual, which grows exponentially as R or K increases, resulting in a
dimensionality problem which will make estimation challenging and burdensome,
whereas it might not change the results in an important way. We circumvent this
problem by restricting attention to a reduced set of products and grocery stores. We
13The outside option might as well be thought of as not shopping on a weekly basis (for instance,
going once a month or every other month). However, in our data the proportion of households
not purchasing on a weekly basis corresponds to 8%.
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select pre-packaged bread, ready-to-eat breakfast cereal and yogurt as the products
to be included in our analysis, provided that they meet the following conditions.
First, they are staples and so they are frequently purchased and heavily consumed
by french households (see Table 2.1). Second, they belong to different categories of
products, which ensures we can observe enough variation in shopping patterns as
people may tend to concentrate purchases of the same category in a particular store
but might want to diversify across categories. Finally, these products are likely to
be of unit demand, i.e., consumers tend to consume one serving of the product at a
time and to not mix varieties (see Table 2.1 for details on how we define servings).
Table 2.1: Chacteristics of the selected producs
Serving Consumers (% of pop.)a Position among
Product (in grams) Kids Adults 352 productsb
Yogurt 125 90.7 83 2
Bread 28 95.2 98.5 20
Breakfast cereals 34 60.4 16.8 30
a Source: Étude Inca (Afssa) 2006-2007 by Agence Française de Securité Sanitaire des Aliments. Yogurt and pre-
packaged bread appear in the Inca study as part of broader categoires including similar products, namely, ”bread
and dried bread” and ”Ultra-fresh dairy”, respectively. Percentages of consumption correspond to consumption
of all products in the categories.
b These are the positions of the considered products in a ranking of the 352 observed products in our data set,
TNS Worldpanel 2005 by frequency of purchase.
Concerning grocery stores, we restrict attention to the two leading supermarket
chains in France selected according to national market shares in 2005. The remaining
grocery stores observed in our data are treated as part of a composite store which
sells the three products we referred to above and constitute an outside option to the
two leading chains. In other words, consumers have three alternative stores in their
choice set: two insiders and an outside option. This will be enough to describe one-
and multistop shopping behavior and to estimate shopping costs cutoffs.
Notice that a bundle can consist partially or fully of products purchased from
the outside retailer. Consider, for example, the case of three stores {A, B, O}
supplying three products k = 1, 2, 3. Let two bundles be b = {1A, 2B, 3O} and
b′ = {1O, 2O, 3O}. The former will be the choice of a three-stop shopper purchasing
product 1 from store A, product 2 from B and product 3 from the outside store O,
whereas the latter corresponds to the choice of a one-stop shopper purchasing all
products from the outside store. We call the latter bundle the outside good or the
zero bundle, b = 0.
We empirically specify the utility of consumer i from purchasing good k from




−αpkrt + Xkrβ + ξt + ǫikrt, if r = {A, B}
ǫikOt, if r = O
(2.4.1)
where, pkrt is the price of good k at store r, Xkr are product-store observed
characteristics, ξt are time fixed effects, ǫikrt is an idiosyncratic shock to utility,
which rationalizes all remaining week-to-week individual variation in choices, and α
and β are parameters common to all individuals. For simplicity, we normalize the
mean utility of the product varieties supplied by outside store to zero.
Notice that equations (2.3.1) through (2.3.3) along with equation (2.4.1) fully
specify the utilities of one and multi-stop shoppers as a function of price of the
product, product characteristics, and distance to the stores, among others. Put
it that way, our utility accounts for both vertical and horizontal dimensions of
consumers’ valuations for products. The former is captured by included product-
store characteristics. The horizontal differentiation aspect is captured by distances
which vary across postal codes.14
Further, we assume that individual shopping costs are a parametric function
of a common shopping cost across all consumers ς, which can be thought of
as the minimum cost every consumer bears due to the need of going shopping,
and an individual deviation from this mean ηi, which rationalizes the individual
heterogeneity in shopping costs, this yields
si = ς + ηi (2.4.2)
we assume ηi ∼ N (0, 1).
Remark that even though the choice set for all consumers is the same (i.e. all
products from all retailers are available for purchase), consumers with large shopping
costs visiting an inferior number of retailers than there is in the market are not able to
choose the first best option from each product category. Therefore, shopping costs
limit the set of alternatives available for one- and two-stop shoppers. Under our
setup, this can be thought of as the result of a constrained maximization processes
rather than suboptimal choices or mistakes.
2.4.1 Identification
Equation (2.3.8) show that we can identify critical cutoff points of the distribution
of shopping costs if we are able to both observe the optimal shopping patterns
14If several goods are purchased at the same retailer, the distance to it will only be counted once;
the distance will be divided evenly across goods purchased from the same retailer.
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of one-stop and multistop shoppers and identify the parameters of the per product
utilities involved in the computation of the nth cutoff point. In other words, for each
individual we need to identify the utility of her actual choice, say two-stop shopping,
and the utility she would have derived had she chosen one-stop shopping instead. To
do this, we exploit the panel structure of our data. For most households we observe
enough cross-section variation in choices of products and stores, which allows us
to identify the utility parameters. In particular, the price coefficient is separately
identified from the mean utility from choice data alone due to the observed variation
in prices per product. The predicted probabilities will vary due to this variation in
prices, which generates enough moments for identification.
On the other hand, (fixed) shopping costs and shopping costs cutoffs are identified
from the observed week-to-week variation in shopping patterns, i.e. a household
making one-stop shopping this week might be doing multistop shopping next week,
meaning that a given household can be more or less time constrained in different
weeks. A key point in the identification of fixed shopping costs is the inclusion
of other sources of shopping costs that may vary across retailers and periods. An
important component in this class of costs is transport costs. Following Dubois and
Jódar-Rosell (2010), we empirically identify transport costs by including distances
from households’ locations designated by postal codes. All households located at a
same postal code will have the same distance to retailers nearby.15 The inclusion of
distances to stores will be useful for two purposes: they will capture the horizontal
dimension of consumers’ preferences for product characteristics and, on the other
hand, will allow as to identify the disutility of transport. By adding this information
to the model along with the unit demand assumption, the remaining variation in
shopping costs across consumers can be interpreted as a pure idiosyncratic shopping
cost that is constant across stores, consistent with our set up.
Finally, the identification of aggregate demand requires the computation of the
mass of one-, two- and three-stop shoppers, which in equation (2.3.9) are defined as
the differences of the distribution of shopping costs G(·) evaluated at two different
cutoff values. Given our setup, we are able to compute those values from the
empirical distribution of customers between one-, two- and three-stop shopping that
we observe in our data.
There may be some endogeneity problems, in particular that of the correlation
between prices and the utility shock. In addition, the method of estimation we apply
and describe below relies on moment conditions, which requires a set of exogenous
instruments. To account for this, we follow Nevo (2001) and use average regional
prices of the product to be instrumented for as IVs. These IVs are standard in the
IO literature and are proved to work well. We provide further details on the validity
of instruments in subsection 2.4.3.
15Due to data limitations, we do not observe the exact locations of neither households nor retailers
but postal codes only. As a consequence, we are not able to compute exact distances.
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2.4.2 Estimation
In this section we present details on how we estimate the utility parameters, and
the mean and cutoff values of the distribution of shopping costs. We estimate the
parameters of the model presented in the previous section using the data described
in Section 3.2. Consistent with this reduced product set and the assumptions of the
model described in Section 3.3, the final sample we use consists of local areas where
we observe one-, two- and three-stop shopping behavior and households purchasing
at least one unit of each product considered here (see Appendix 2.C for further
details on how we define units and how we deal with these three goods in a discrete
choice context).
The key point of our estimation strategy is to exploit population moment
conditions and estimate the parameters of the model by the method of moments
for reasons that will become clear below. Therefore, we need to express our discrete
choice problem as moments and match population moments with empirical moments
in the data. Recall the choice problem we are analyzing. A consumer who wish to buy
a set of products K, faces a set B of mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives
consisting of combinations of products and retailers available in the market. She will
purchase the K products from n ∈ {1, 2, 3} stores, call it bundle b ∈ B = {1, . . . , 27},
such that she can obtain the highest utility net of shopping costs. This maximizing
behavior defines the set of unobservables leading to the choice of bundle b as
Aibt(XB; θ) = {(ǫit, ηi)|v
n
ibt − nsi > v
m
ib′t − msi ∀m ∈ {1, 2, 3}, b
′ ∈ B}
where XB is a matrix of characteristics of all alternatives including prices. The
response probability of alternative b as a function of characteristics of products and




dF (ǫ)dF (η) (2.4.3)
A natural way to estimate the parameters of the model seem to be the
maximization of the log-likelihood function
L(XB, d, θ) =
∑
i,b,t
✶ibt log PB(b|XB; θ) (2.4.4)
However, given the functional form of the utilities specified in equations (2.3.1)
through (2.3.3), maximum likelihood estimation turns out to be extremely difficult
to implement as the likelihood of the problem is very nonlinear in the utility shocks.
We overcome this problem by using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM)
introduced by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989).
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Let dibt = ✶{v
n
ibt − nsi > v
m
ib′t − msi} be an indicator function taking on 1 when
bundle b ∈ B implying n number of stops is chosen by consumer i and zero otherwise.
This information is observed in the data for each consumer i every week. The
expected value of dibt conditional on a set of measured characteristics XB writes as
E[dibt|XB, θ] = PB(dibt = 1|XB; θ) (2.4.5)
To simulate P (·), we proceed as follows:
1. We build the whole choice set consumers face independently of their shopping
costs. This is, we construct bundles as all possible combinations of three
retailers and three goods. As a whole, we obtain a choice set of 27 bundles
that account for all possible shopping patterns.
2. We assume the shock to utility ǫikrt is distributed i.i.d. type one extreme value
and take S random draws ǫsikrt∀s = 1, . . . , S per individual, product, retailer
and week. Similarly, we assume the shopping costs shock ηi is distributed i.i.d.
standard normal and take S random draws ηsi ∀s = 1, . . . , S per individual.
Consistent with our assumption of constant shopping costs, we replicate this
draws for all retailers and periods whenever we observe purchases by consumer
i.
3. Using a vector of initial parameter values, θ0 = (α0, β0, γ0, ς0) randomly drawn
from a normal distribution, along with drawn shocks (ǫsikrt, η
s
i ) we are able
to compute utilities for all product-retailer choices and consumers, as well
as shopping costs to simulate the consumer choice problem described in our
modeling framework for each s = 1, . . . , S.
4. From these simulations, we observe what bundle (stores-products combination)
maximizes the utility net of shopping costs of each individual in a given
week and form an indicator variable for the implied choices, which we denote
dsibt∀ b ∈ B, s = 1, . . . , S.
5. Finally, we approximate the choice probability as







Plugging the simulated statistics into (2.4.5), rearranging and introducing
instruments that may be functions of XB (we defer to the next subsection the























We estimate the parameters of the model by making the sum of the squares of



















di1t − P̌s(di1t = 1|XB, θ)
)
, . . . , wNi
(
di27t − P̌s(di27t = 1|XB, θ)
)]′
.
The Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator is then given by
θ̂MSM = argmin
θ
[d − P (θ)]′W ′W [d − P (θ)],
where W = [w1, ..., wI ] is a N × I matrix of instruments.
Given the way simulated probabilities are computed in (2.4.6), they are not
continuous in θ. It implies that the objective function previously described, which
is a sum of simulated probabilities, is not continuous either. As a consequence,
analytical methods cannot be used in the optimization process nor standard optimal
instruments (which are derivatives of the simulated probabilities evaluated at a
consistent estimator of the true parameters) nor the computation of standard errors
(which require the use, among other things, of the first derivative of the GMM
objective function). These discontinuities do not jeopardize the consistency of
simulation estimators. Pakes and Pollard (1989) derive asymptotic properties for a
broad class of simulation estimators (including McFadden’s MSM) that cover cases
where the objective function is discontinuous in the parameters. In practice, to
circumvent the discontinuity problem we use a numerical search (‘Pattern search’)
method in the optimization process. As for the computation of standard errors, we
apply parametric bootstrap methods.
2.4.3 Instruments
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of the model, we require
to deal with the potential correlation of prices with the error term of the model,
ǫikrt. In our framework, this error term, known by the consumer but unobserved
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to the econometrician, is interpreted as a shock to utility that affects demand. If
we assume that firms, that may observe these shocks through the observed demand
curves, will react to changes in ǫikrt by adjusting prices, it will bias the estimate of
price sensitivity, α.
To treat this endogeneity problem we assume for simplicity that marginal costs
are linear and depend on product and store characteristics and cost shifters, and that
markets are competitive so that firms set prices at marginal cost.16 However, as we
do not observe any cost shifters in our data set, we use average regional prices of the
same product in all the 21 French administrative regions (excluding the department
to be instrumented for from the average price of the region it is located in) as
proxies for marginal costs information. Following Nevo (2001), after controlling for
product-retailer-specific means, individual shocks might still be correlated within a
city but are uncorrelated with product valuations of people from other regions. This
implies that in case a demand shock happens in one region, only the local price will
be affected. This guarantees the exogeneity condition of prices. Now, what makes
average regional prices good instruments is the fact that prices from two different
locations (cities, departments, etc.) in a country are linked by common marginal
costs as long as they are produced (supplied) by the same manufacturer (retailer) or
under a standardized process.17
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 displays MSM estimates of the utility parameters, according to two
specifications. The first column corresponds to the simplest model including the
main covariates and controlling for product and time fixed-effects. The second
column shows the results of a specification including IVs. Most coefficients are
significant, and results are as expected: demands are downward sloping and the
estimate for the distance shows that the value of a product decreases as the retailer
is farther away from customer’s dwelling. The estimate for mean shopping costs is
positive (as expected) and significant in both regressions.
After introducing IVs in the model, we obtain a larger price estimate which may
indicate a downward bias in the estimate without instruments. On the other hand,
the coefficients for distance seemed to be biased upwards, as we obtained a lower
estimate. Finally, the men shopping cost estimate does not differ when we add IVs.
Table 2.2 displays the estimates for the mean shopping cost and the distance in
euros. It also shows the values in euros of the average cutoffs of the distribution
16In a discrete choice framework, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) examine both perfect and imperfect
competition cases and obtain similar results.
17Although the independence assumption seems reasonable, there may be cases were it cannot hold
as, for example, a national demand shock as pointed out by Nevo (2001).
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Table 2.1: Estimates for the utility parameters and shopping costsa
Variable (1) (2)
Price (e/basketb) −1.43∗∗ −1.91∗∗
(0.72) (0.83)
Distance (km) −9.03∗∗∗ −8.14∗∗∗
(3.18) (1.80)
Mean Utility Bread (28gr) 1.98∗∗ -0.12
(0.91) (1.29)
Mean Utility Cereal (35 gr) -0.22 -0.01
(0.59) (0.53)
Mean Utility Yogurt (125 gr) 0.20 2.21∗
(0.83) (1.25)
Mean Shopping Costs 2.92∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.31)
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes
Instrumentsc Yes
Notes: a Based on 6,192 observations consisting of purchases of the three
considered products made by 2,929 in 2005. Bootstrap standard errors
are in parenthesis.
b A basket contains a serving of each of the considered products: a slice
of bread (28g), a bowl of cereal (35g) and one yogurt (125g).
c Instruments include prices of the same good from other geographic
locations, as well as bundle dummy variables.
*,**,*** are significant at 10, 5 and 1% confidence levels.
of shopping costs in euros, calculated following equation (2.3.8) and using predicted
utilities. In order to translate these values into euros, we divided each of them by
the absolute value of the estimated price coefficient. The estimate for the distance,
obtained in principle as the disutility of transport, is reinterpreted here as a cost.
To do this, we took the absolute value of the original estimate and divide it by the
absolute value of the price coefficient.
In line with this, the average fixed cost of shopping is 1.5 e per trip. In addition,
visiting a grocery store implies a cost of 4.26 e per km, for the average consumer. The
distance between the median consumer’s dweling to a store is 4 km, which multiplied
by the transport cost per km gives a total transport cost of 17.1 e. Summing up
with the mean shopping cost per trip, gives an average total cost of shopping of 18.7
e per retailer sourced (see Table 2.3).
As for shopping costs cutoffs, our results indicate that consumers should have
almost-zero shopping costs to be able to source more than two retailers in a week.
This rationalizes the small proportion of three-stop shoppers observed in our data.
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Notice that the threshold of three-stop shopping, s3, in column (2) of Table 2.2 is
negative. As stated previously, shopping costs may account for consumer’s taste
for shopping. In line with this, a shopper having a negative shopping cost means
that she has a stronger taste for shopping, so that using multiple suppliers makes
her total cost of the shopping experience lower than it would be had she decided to
concentrate purchases with a single supplier.
One-stop shoppers are all those having shopping costs beyond 2.12 e per trip.
A former one-stop shopper will find it optimal to source an additional retailer if
her shopping costs were slightly lower than 2.12 e, yet sourcing a third retailer
may require a large decrease in shopping costs, such as having more time available
or enjoying a lot multi-stop shopping in a given week. The estimates allow us to
retrieve the predicted proportion of shoppers by number of stops: 90.1% are one-stop
shoppers, 9.7% are two-stop shoppers and only 0.26% do three-stop shopping.
Table 2.2: Mean shopping costs, mean distance and average shopping costs cutoff
(across periods and consumers) in eurosa
(1) (2)
Total shopping costs
Mean shopping cost 2.04 1.53
Mean transport cost 6.31 4.26
Average shopping costs cutoffs
One-two stops (ŝ2) 2.85 2.12
Two-three stops (ŝ3) 0.02 -0.02




Notes: a To transform estimates into euros, we divide each coefficient by the absolute value of
the price coefficient.
b To interpret the coefficient for distance as a transport cost, we take the absolute value of the
original estimate presented in Table 2.1. It is negative in principle because it enters an utility
function, expressing therefore a disutility of transportation.
Table 2.3 gives total transport costs and total cost of shopping (transport plus
fixed shopping costs) by store format. The median distance to a big-box store (or
hypermarket) is 5.4 km, which multiplied by the transport costs per km gives a total
transport cost of 23.2 e, and by adding the mean shopping cost of 1.53 eper trip
to a store, gives a total cost of shopping of 24.7 e the average consumer bears each
time he visits a large store. Transport and total costs are decreasing in the size
of the stores, on average, as smaller formats are closer to downtowns. Sourcing a
supermarket or a hard-discounter implies transport costs of 12.8 e and 11.9 e per
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trip, and total costs of shopping of 14.3 e and 13.4 e per trip, respectively. Finally,
the costs of sourcing a convenience store are the lowest provided that they are located
in downtowns: the median distance to a convenience is 0.8 km, the transport costs
are 3.2 e and the total costs of shopping are 4.8 e per trip.
Table 2.3: Transport costs and total shopping costs (fixed plus transport), by store
format (averages across periods and consumers) in eurosa
Store Median Distance Transport Total costs of
format (km)a costs (e)b shopping (e)c
Hypermarket 5.4 23.2 24.7
Supermarket 3.0 12.8 14.3
Hard discounter 2.8 11.9 13.4
Convenience 0.8 3.2 4.8
Overall average 4.0 17.1 18.7
Notes: a We use the median of the distance and not the mean, to avoid the effects of outliers.
b Computed as the mean transport cost, 4.26 e/km given in column (2) of Table 2.2, times
the median distance.
c Computed as the sum of Transport costs plus the mean shopping cost of 1.53eper trip, in
column (2) of Table 2.2.
In Table 2.4, we present own- and cross-price elasticities. Due to the discontinuity
of the predicted choice probabilities described in the estimation section, we cannot
compute the derivatives of the demand functions with respect to price analytically.
To overcome this problem, we simulated a price increase of 20% for one product at
a time, recomputed the utilities for each product and each individual, and retrieved
predicted choice probabilities again, to finally get new demands. We take the
difference between the demand after the price increase and the baseline demand,
and divide it by the price change. Following the standard formula, we then obtain
price elasticities of demand as the product of the numerical derivative and the original
price, divided by the baseline quantity.
As expected, we obtain negative own-price elasticities and positive cross-price
elasticities for the same product category across retailers. This indicates that, on
average, consumers may switch retailers when the price of the desired product
increases in their patronized retailers. Interestingly, within retailer cross-price
elasticities are negative. This means that a price increase in a particular product
causes a drop in demand for all other products the consumer intends to purchase.
This complementarity effect might be driven by the larger mass of one-stop shoppers.
For given prices of the products, a one-stop shopper should pick the retailer in which
she derives the maximum value of the desired bundle. If the price of a product
category raises in the chosen retailer, the shopper would need to source a competing
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retailer due to the impossibility of sourcing two or more.
Table 2.4: Mean elasticities (across periods and consumers)
Changing Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Outisde retailer
price Bread Cereal Yogurt Bread Cereal Yogurt Bread Cereal Yogurt
Retailer 1
Bread -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0037 0.0061 0.0053 0.0075
Cereal -0.0070 -0.0080 -0.0065 0.0054 0.0059 0.0053 0.0074 0.0084 0.0095
Yogurt -0.0087 -0.0088 -0.0098 0.0069 0.0069 0.0076 0.0072 0.0069 0.0125
Retailer 2
Bread 0.0041 0.0040 0.0038 -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0040 0.0064 0.0056 0.0079
Cereal 0.0059 0.0062 0.0057 -0.0069 -0.0080 -0.0064 0.0078 0.0090 0.0104
Yogurt 0.0074 0.0074 0.0080 -0.0089 -0.0090 -0.0100 0.0079 0.0076 0.0136





, using numerical methods
to approximate partial derivatives due to the discontinuity of predicted choice probabilities. Row titles indicate the
product which price is changing. Column headers indicate the sensitivity of the demand for a particular product to
a 20% price change.
2.6 Robustness checks
A first concern when using simulated methods is whether the results are sensitive
to changes in starting values. To be sure that our estimates were robust to changes
in the vector of initial parameters, θ0, we performed the whole estimation process
described in Subsection 3.4.2 using ten different sets of pseudorandom draws from
a normal, as starting values. We obtained similar estimates at each iteration which
may as well be interpreted as an indicator of convergence. The final results, which
are shown in Table 2.1 are those corresponding to the minimum value of the objective
function out of ten available.
We also conducted a sample selection check. The final sample used for
the estimates presented previously was selected by restricting attention to those
households purchasing the three products considered here in a given week, consistent
with our assumption of inelastic demand for a unit of each product. We therefore
dropped households not fulfilling this condition. To find out if our results are
robust, we use an alternative sample with tighter restrictions on the selection of
the households, namely, if we observed a zip code with at least one household not
purchasing the three products in a given week, we drop the entire local market. We
are left with 1,027 observations corresponding to purchases made by 541 households.
We use the same estimation method and instruments as for our final results.
However, due to the few observations in this sample, we do not include product fixed-
effects. Results are similar in the direction and statistical significance of estimates,
except for the distance that become non significant with the use of IVs (see Table
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2.1). In this sense, the results do not seem to be driven by sample selection.
However,concerning the magnitude of estimates we have a remarkable difference.
This might be driven by the fact that there is much less variation in the new sample
and the omission of product dummies (that capture consumers’ valuation for product
characteristics). In particular, the average shopping costs cutoffs, expressed in euros,
are smaller as compared to those in Table 2.1. This is due, in part, to a larger
estimate of the price coefficient. Nevertheless, their relative position remains similar
and lead to the same conclusions as those derived before.
Table 2.1: Results based on an alternative samplea
Variable (1) (2)
Price (e/basketb) -3.75*** -3.78***
(0.61) (0.25)
Distance (km) -13.48** -5.71
(5.34) (3.88)
Mean Shopping Costs 0.80*** 0.41***
(0.23) (0.08)
Time dummies Yes Yes
Instruments Yes
Av. shopping costs cutoffs (in e)
One-Two stops (ŝ2) 0.26
One-Three stops (∆̂31/2) 0.13
Two-Three stops (ŝ3) 0.01
Notes: aBased on 1,027 observations of purchases made by 541 households. Bootstrap
standard errors are in parenthesis.
b A basket contains a serving of each of the considered products: a slice of bread
(28g), a bowl of cereal (35g) and one yogurt (125g).
*,**,*** are significant at 10, 5 and 1% confidence levels.
2.7 Concluding remarks
Theory has shown that in the presence of shopping costs, i.e. real or perceived
costs of dealing with a supplier, policy conclusions might change dramatically. In
particular, some pro-competitive practices, such as head-to-head competition with
homogeneous product lines (Klemperer, 1992) or the introduction of a new product
variety (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997), can hurt consumers and motivate policy
71
intervention. On the other hand, some seemingly anti-competitive practices, such as
below-cost pricing, can be welfare enhancing and should not be banned (Chen and
Rey, 2013).
From an empirical point of view, this motivates many important questions that
remain unanswered. First, is it possible to quantify shopping costs from consumers’
observed shopping behavior? Second, will accounting for shopping costs in an
empirical model of multiproduct demand lead to a better understanding of consumer
heterogeneity in shopping patterns? Finally, to what extent the inclusion of shopping
costs would be crucial for policy analysis? This paper presents and then estimates
a model of multiproduct demand for groceries in which customers, that differ in
shopping costs, can choose between sourcing one or multiple retailers in the same
shopping period. This framework allows us to retrieve the distribution of shopping
costs.
We quantify the total shopping cost in 18.7 e per store sourced on average. This
cost has two components, namely, the mean fixed shopping cost, 1.53 e and the total
transport cost of 17.1 e per trip to a given store. Moreover, we are able to compute
the transport and total costs of shopping by store format. Transport and total costs
of shopping are increasing in the size of the stores, on average, as smaller formats
are closer to downtowns. The largest total shopping costs, 24.7 e, are incurred by
consumers who source big-box stores, because they are farther away from downtown.
Sourcing a supermarket or a hard-discounter implies total costs of shopping of 14.3 e
and 13.4 e per trip, respectively. Finally, the costs of sourcing a convenience store,
4.8 e per trip, are the lowest provided they are located in downtown. We find that
individuals who source more than two suppliers in a week have zero (even negative)
shopping costs. This rationalizes the low proportion of individuals making three and
more stops in the same week observed in the data. This might be an indicator that
those households actually visiting more than two separate stores a week should have
a strong preference for shopping. In fact, The predicted proportions of shoppers by
number of stops are 90.1% of one-stop shoppers, 9.7% of two-stop shoppers and only
0.26% do three-stop shopping.
There are several avenues for further research that can be empirically addressed
using our framework. A first avenue is related to below-cost pricing. According to
the OECD (2005), laws preventing resale below-cost (RBC) and claiming to protect
high-price, low-volume stores from large competitors who can afford lower prices
might be introducing unnecessary constraints. Evidence from countries without
RBC laws shows that smaller competitors need not be pushed out of the market
if they are not protected. Chen and Rey (2012, 2013) show that in the presence
of shopping costs, loss-leading strategies and cross subsidies are not predatory, and
the latter might even be welfare enhancing. Empirical evidence showing what would
happen if RBC laws are eliminated would help in this debate.
A second avenue concerns the implications of product delisting. In recent years,
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a considerably concentrated retail sector has brought the attention on the possible
consequences of retailer buyer power on upstream firms. A retailer can, for example,
stop carrying a product to punish a particular supplier for not agreeing on her
requests. It might as well use delisting as a threat, so that she can get better terms
of trade. How will demand react to the delisting of a product? Will consumers
substitute brands in the same store or will decide to source an alternative store?
What is the role of shopping costs in this decision? These are questions to be
addressed.
To carry out such policy analyses, a more comprehensive and flexible framework
allowing for multiple brands per category in each supermarket as well as the
possibility of elastic choices by consumers (bundles containing zero, one or multiple
products as opposed to a fixed number) is needed. Our structural model can be
readily extended to cover such changes. However, the empirical implementation
of such a flexible framework is challenging and computationally burdensome, in
particular because each product added to the problem increases the dimension of
the choice set exponentially. This and other related issues are part of our current
research efforts that we hope will allow us to come up with a solution in the near
future.
Finally, theoretical and empirical analyses should be done on retailers’
motivations to raise consumers shopping costs and the consequences of such
strategies for competition and consumer welfare. One-stop shopping make more
powerful retailers. Klemprer (1992) predicts that if consumers are not interested to
source multiple retailers, prices will tend to be higher. It might be the case that
consumers face such high shopping costs that they are not able to do multistop
shopping even if they would like to. Retailers might use their market power to
raise customers shopping costs by making the shopping experience more tiring or
complicated, so that their share of one-stop shoppers increases.
Appendix
2.A The utility function of a n-stop shopper
We can give a general expression for the optimal decision rule of a n-stop shopper,
n ∈ N = {1, · · · , Ri}, Ri 6 R, being R the total number of grocery stores
in the market, as follows. Assume a n-stop shopper compares bundles of the
desired products from all the possible combinations of n stores. Denote each of
these combinations by j ∈ {1, · · · , Jni }, where according to combinatorics theory,
the total number of combinations of R elements taken n at a time is given by









max{vikr′t}r′∈l ∀ l = 1, · · · , Ji
For instance, in a context with R = 3 stores, a one-stop shopper n = 1 will pick
the best combination of one store out of J1i = 3 possible {A},{B},{C}, and pick the
best mix such that it yields the largest overall value of the desired bundle. Similarly,
a two-stop shopper, n = 2, will compare all J2i = 3 possible combinations of two
stores ({A,B},{B,C},{A,C}) and pick the best according to the rule above. For a
three-stop shopper, n = 3, the number of combinations of three stores taken three at
a time is J3i = 1, i.e. {A,B,C} which explains why he is not maximizing over several
subsets of stores in equation (2.3.3).
2.B Cases for extra utilities ordering
As stated in Section 3.3, we can derive critical cutoff points on the shopping costs
distribution from equations (2.3.4), (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) as functions of δ2it, δ
3
it and
∆3it/2. As these numbers represent utilities for different, say, products, their ordering
can vary from a consumer to another. Therefore, we need to establish what the
cutoffs would be in a case by case analysis.
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From the six cases above, only (C1) survives, the remaining are contradictory.





it, can be written as the sum of the two marginal utilities of going from




it. Therefore, if we
assume, for instance, that
∆3it
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which after some manipulations leads to δ2it > δ
3
it, i.e. a contradiction. In a similar
fashion, the proofs for the other cases follow.
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2.C Data manipulation for structural estimation
Three products are taken into the analysis, ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, yogurt
and pre-packaged bread, which are among the most purchased products by french
households. It is often the case that people do not only buy one brand, or even
one unit of the same brand at a time but several varieties to have different choices
at home (different flavors, fruit contents, etc.). However, following Nevo (2001), we
claim that an individual normally consumes one yogurt (125 grams per portion),
one serving of cereal (35 grams per portion), and one serving of bread (28 grams per
portion) at a time, so that the choice is discrete in this sense. Of course there could
be cases in which some people consume more than one brand, or serving, at a time.
Although we believe this is not the general case, the assumption can be seen as an
approximation to the real demand problem.
In our scanner data we do not observe prices but total expenditure and
total quantity purchased for each product and store sourced by each household.
Consequently, a price variable was created in the following way: first, we compute
the sum of expenditures over local markets(defined by zip codes), month, and stores
and number of servings of each product purchased by each consumer. Second, we
divided the total expenditure on a given product-store made by all consumers living
in the same zip code in a month by the the total number of servings to obtain a
common unit price. If the information to compute a unit price is missing, we replace
it with the average across local markets within the same period. By constructing our
price variable this way, we are assuming that consumers have rational expectations.
Due to data limitations, we do not account for manufacturers’ nor stores’ promotional
activities or sales of any kind.
Last, to compute distances between the store and the household location we
follow Dubois and Jódar-Rosell (2010). Data on stores location was obtained from
LSA/Atlas de la Distribution 2005, which contains information on most french stores
involved in groceries distribution. The information was merged with the household
data using the name of the store, the zip code of the consumer’s residence and the
surface of the outlet. For each store, we find the closest outlet to the consumer
thanks to zip codes and geographical data. Only one outlet per store chain was
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tenance (RPM) on nominal price stability. It is widely accepted in the
literature that the incomplete transmission of costs shocks into retail
prices is explained by the existence of markup adjustment and price ad-
justment costs. The vertical conduct of the industry and the existence of
vertical restraints such as RPM might introduce further price stickiness
or reinforce it. I present a structural model of vertical relations between
manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear contracts and vertical
restraints, and accounting explicitly for retail price rigidity by including
fixed costs of price adjustment in retailer’s profit function. Using micro
data on sales of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals from a large supermarket
chain in Chicago, I estimate demand, retrieve upstream and downstream
markups, and compute bounds of retail price adjustment costs. Results
show that the total costs the retailer bears for adjusting prices of its prod-
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3.1 Introduction
Nominal price rigidity and its effects on monetary policy are a central concern of
Macroeconomics. A widely held view is that aggregate price inertia is determined by
how responsive individual goods prices are to cost or exchange rate shocks (Midrigan,
2011; Kehoe and Midrigan, 2012). Actually, evidence shows that retail prices are
not very responsive to changes in nominal costs and exchange rates. This is the
so-called incomplete pass-through of costs shocks to nominal retail prices. Does the
structure of the industry matters when it comes to explain individual goods price
stickiness? Engel (2002) points out three sources of such incomplete transmission
that are related to the industry structure and firms’ strategic behavior: the existence
of local costs, markup adjustment either by retailers or manufacturers or both, and
nominal price rigidity. A growing empirical Industrial Organization (IO) literature
has made important advances in understanding incomplete pass-through by looking
at how vertical relations and vertical restraints such as Resale Price Maintenance
(RPM), a practice through which manufacturers determine prices retailers charge to
consumers, shape markup adjustment. Less attention has been put on price rigidity.
We know from microeconomic theory that RPM makes prices less responsive to costs
shocks (Jullien and Rey, 2007). The objective of this paper is to empirically examine
the role of nonlinear contracts between manufacturers and retail stores, and RPM
on nominal price stability.
There is a considerable number of theoretical and empirical contributions to the
study of the incomplete transmission of costs shocks to nominal prices and aggregate
price inertia. Empirical research motivated by macroeconomic theory has mainly
focused on providing evidence on the importance of price rigidity (Midrigan, 2011;
Eichenbaum et al., 2011; Levy, et al. 2010; Kehoe and Midrigan, 2012), the frequency
of price changes and the duration of nominal prices, and the sources of such rigidities
using reduced-form methods (Levy et al., 1997; Dutta et al., 1999; Peltzman, 2000;
Chevalier et al., 2003; Goldberg and Campa, 2006; Leibtag et al., 2007; and Levy et
al., 2010).
In the empirical IO literature we find contributions covering a variety of methods,
perspectives of the incomplete transmission problem and applications to particular
industries. These contributions include papers providing evidence on how the
vertical structure of the industry affects the degree in which costs shocks pass-
through to nominal prices (Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010, Bonnet et al., 2013).
Other articles analyze the sources of this incomplete pass through. Three main
sources have been accounted for: local non-traded costs (Goldberg and Verboven,
2001; Hellerstein, 2008; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010); strategic markup adjustment
(Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000, Goldberg and Verboven, 2001, Nakamura and
Zerom, 2010, Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010, Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013, and
Bonnet et al., 2013); and price rigidity in the form of costs of price adjustment (Slade,
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1998, Nakamura and Zerom, 2010, and Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013). Most papers
use structural models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers to
show that the type of relationships between upstream and downstream firms and the
presence of vertical restraints play an important role in the degree of price responses
to costs and/or demand shocks.
I set out a modeling framework that closely relates to two of those contributions.
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) address the question of the incomplete transmission
of exchange rate shocks to local currency prices of imported beer in the U.S. They
set out a structural model in which linear tariffs characterize the industry’s vertical
conduct. Unless previous research, they control explicitly for price rigidity by
including fixed costs of price adjustment in the profit functions of both manufacturers
and retailer in a static framework. These costs capture everything that prevents a
firm from adjusting the price in a period (menu costs, opportunity costs of time and
effort to find a new optimal price, advertisement costs, etc.), which helps rationalizing
why we often observe a given retail price that remains constant for several weeks
and/or that is set again after a temporary price reduction (the so-called regular price
in Macroeconomics literature).
On the other hand, Bonnet et al. (2013) are the first to empirically investigate
the role of nonlinear pricing and RPM on incomplete pass-through of costs into retail
prices, focusing on how the vertical structure of the industry affects strategic markup
adjustment. They analyze the market for coffee in Germany in which retail prices
are positively correlated with raw coffee prices but vary significantly less. They find
that when manufacturers can implement two-part tariffs contracts with RPM, the
share of a cost shock that is passed-through to retail prices is larger than in the
presence of other types of contracts, because RPM restricts retailers’ ability to make
strategic markup adjustment.
My paper may be regarded as a combination of Bonnet et al. (2013) and Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2013). As in Bonnet et al., I specify the supply side according to
several distinct models of vertical relationships, namely, linear pricing, and two-part
tariffs contracts with and without RPM. As in Goldberg and Hellerstein, I explicitly
account for price rigidity by including price adjustment costs to the optimization
problem of the retailer and use the model and estimates to quantify bounds on retail
price adjustment costs. My focus is, however, on a totally different sector: the
ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereal industry.
This is a particularly suitable industry to study vertical relations and vertical
restraints. It is characterized by high concentration, high price-cost margins, very
intensive non-price competition through aggressive advertising campaigns, product
proliferation due to rapid introduction of new brands, and substantial coupon issuing
by manufacturers. On top of that, price competition is considerably less intense.
RTE breakfast cereals are highly consumed by U.S. households with a penetration
rate near to 100% for cold cereals and 65% for hot cereals and sales of roughly $10
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billion in each category in 2013. Furthermore, cereal prices appear to be quite rigid,
even though input prices are not (see Figure 3.1).
This work adds to the literature in several ways. First, it fills a gap by setting
out a model that allows nonlinear contracts and vertical restraints interact with the
price adjustment problem that changes the way optimal prices are set as compared to
the standard static profit maximization problem. Second, it shows how the vertical
conduct of the industry help rationalizing the observed price rigidity. Last, it adds
to the literature on the U.S. RTE cereal industry, by shedding new light on how
manufacturers and retailers relate and how pricing decisions are made in the presence
of adjustment costs.
My empirical strategy relies on the consistent estimation of demand, which I
specify as a random-coefficients Logit model. I set out three structural models of
supply (linear pricing, simple two-part tariffs, and two-part tariffs with RPM) in
a context of static Nash-Bertrand oligopolistic competition with several competing
manufacturers and a single retailer that carries all products. The retailer faces fixed
costs of repricing whenever it decides to adjust the price of a product. At each
period, the retailer weighs the costs and the benefits of changing the price of each
product and makes one of two decisions: if benefits exceed costs, it sets a new
price that maximizes current period profit; otherwise, it keeps the same price from
previous period which implies a deviation from first order conditions of the static
profit maximization problem.
Using data from Dominik’s Finer Foods, a large supermarket chain in Chicago,
that contains among other things information on weekly prices and quantities sold
at the universal product code (UPC) level for 224 weeks, I consistently estimate the
demand parameters which are identified without the need of the supply side thanks
to the panel structure of the data. Next, I recover retail as well as wholesale margins
and marginal costs according to each industry conduct specified. With all these
elements in hand, I use the structural model to compute upper and lower bounds of
adjustment costs.
I find that the linear pricing specification of the supply side gives biased results
for price adjustment costs relative to two-part tariffs with RPM. In fact, under linear
pricing I obtain that the retail chain is willing to change the price of a product if
it obtains, on average, an extra profit of at least US $109, whereas under two-part
tariffs with RPM this amount is US $98.84. On the other hand, I obtain that
adjustment costs are bounded above by US $447 on average under either supply
conduct. Simple two-part tariffs (i.e. without RPM) give similar results to those
of linear pricing. To have an idea of the relative importance of these magnitudes, I
compute the share of the sum of each lower and upper bounds of adjustment costs on
retailer’s total revenue for the entire period considered here (224 weeks). I find that
the share of adjustment costs on total revenue is 7.27% for lower bounds and 10.12%
for upper bounds in the linear tariffs case, and to 6.5% and 10.14% respectively, in
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the two-part tariffs case.
There is, however, a big caveat related to the the fact that I model the market
with a single retailer as if it was a local monopolist. When there is no downstream
competition, simple two-part tariffs are sufficient to solve the double marginalization
problem and attain monopoly profits. In such a context, if manufacturers can use
RPM they should obtain no better result than that they get with simple two-part
tariffs. RPM does make a big difference when there is competition among retailers
as simple two-part tariffs no longer suffice to maintain monopoly profits (Rey and
Vergé, 2010). With the appropriate data set containing such detailed information on
multiple retailers, I would be able to offer an empirical analysis of multiple common
agency. I expect to do this in a future version of this paper. In the meantime,
the results I present here are intuitive, consistent with theory and give an idea of
the importance of the vertical conduct of the industry in the study of an economic
problem such as price stickiness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
the data used in the paper and presents a preliminary analysis of price rigidity in
the RTE cereal industry. Section 3.3 outlines the structural demand model as well
as the supply models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers.
Section 3.4 discusses details of the empirical implementation of the model. Section
3.5 presents the results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes and discusses directions for
future research.
3.2 The market, data and reduced-form analysis
This Section aims at giving an overview of the data, the cereal industry in the United
States and some preliminary results based on descriptive statistics and reduced-form
regressions.
3.2.1 Overview
The data I use in this paper comes from Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF), the second
largest supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area. Dominick’s database
is provided by the Kitls Center for marketing at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business and is publicly available.1 It is scanner data reported by each
store in the sample at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level for 29 categories of





The database contains weekly information on retail price, quantity sold,
promotional activity and the percent gross margin the store makes on each sale
of a UPC to consumers. The latter variable can be used to compute the average
acquisition cost (AAC) of each brand, which gives information on wholesale prices.2
During the data collection period, DFF set prices according to four ‘price zones’
(high-, medium- and low-price zones, and ‘Club-fighter’ zone), which are defined by
geographic location and/or nearby competitors. However, as DFF pricing policy is
chainwide, prices across stores are highly correlated and follow a similar pattern.3
A particularly appealing industry to study vertical relations and vertical
restraints is that of the ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereal. RTE breakfast cereals
are highly consumed by U.S. households with a penetration rate near to 100%
for cold cereals and 65% for hot cereals and sales of roughly $10 billion in each
category in 2013. The particular characteristics of this industry have been widely
documented: high concentration, high price-cost margins, very intensive non-price
competition through aggressive advertising campaigns, product proliferation, due to
rapid introduction of new brands, and coupon issuing by manufacturers. On top of
that, price competition is considerably less intense.4
Interestingly, prices in this industry appear to be quite rigid, even though prices
of commodities such as wheat, corn and sugar, three main ingredients of RTE cereals,
vary quite often, which makes it also suitable to investigate the sources of incomplete
pass-through (see Figure 3.1). In fact, a first look at price series in the database
shows that one can easily identify what macroeconomics literature calls regular price,
i.e. a price that remains unchanged during several weeks or that after a temporary
change (such as a sales price), returns to the same level as before. Figure 3.1 displays
retail price and AAC series for two different brands of RTE cereals from May 1990
to September 1994 as well as nominal prices of three commodities commonly used
as inputs of RTE cereals.
The common pattern in the bottom panel is retail prices that remain at the same
regular level for several weeks, even though we observe some temporary reductions in
between, and jumps to another level that becomes the new regular price. By contrast,
the AACs do not show the same pattern, although we can observe some stability,
they vary more frequently. This may suggest that in this industry manufacturers
and retailers may be using nonlinear contracts instead of linear tariffs (double
marginalization). The presence of RPM seems plausible as well. In fact, evidence
from other industries shows that when the vertical conduct of the industry is based
2 It is a very rough proxy of wholesale prices though, as long as it does not contain information on
replacement costs or the last transaction price. For a detailed description of the database and a
discussion on the computation of average acquisition costs, see Peltzman (2000).
3 For zones 1,2 and 3 the main rival is ‘Jewel’, the largest store chain in Chicago. As for the
club-fighter price zone, the main rival is ‘Club foods’, a discount chain (see Peltzman, 2000).
4 For a detailed description of this industry, see for example Schmalensee (1978), Nevo
(2000b,2001).
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on double marginalization, changes in the wholesale price of a product generally lead
to changes in the retail price in the same direction (see Goldberg and Hellerstein,
2013). In the case of cereals, however, we observe that not only retail prices are
not responding very frequently to changes in AACs, but also in some cases they
lie below this cost. Although this is suggestive of something else might be driving
vertical relationships, we cannot conclude anything by simply looking at the data.
This is the motivation to use structural methods.
Figure 3.1: Monthly world prices of Corn and Wheat (Top-left), and Sugar (Top-right). Source:
World Bank. Weekly retail price and average acquisition cost for Corn Flakes (bottom-left), and
Cheerios (bottom-right). Prices are from an arbitrary store of the Medium price tier. Source:
Dominick’s database.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on prices, frequency of price changes and
number of weeks a given price remains constant. These numbers confirm that retail
prices are quite stable as compared to AACs, that appear to change more frequently
in the same period. In fact, a dummy variable taking on 1 if the price observed in a
particular week was different from the price of the same product in the previous week,
suggests that the retail price of a product varies 21% of times in 224 weeks, while
83
the AAC of the same product varies 57% of times in the same period. Moreover,
the average duration of a given retail price is nearly double of that of a given AAC:
15.5 weeks against 8.7 weeks.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for retail price and Avg. Acquisition cost (AAC)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Retail price (cents/serving) 10.65 10.88 2.49 2.29 16.93
AAC (cents/serving) 9.08 9.25 2.15 0 21.79
Dummy for retail price change (=1 if Yes) 0.21 0 0.41 0 1
Dummy for AAC price change (=1 if Yes) 0.57 1 0.50 0 1
Duration of given retail price (No. Weeks) 15.48 13 10.50 1 58
Duration of a givenAAC price (No. Weeks) 8.69 6 7.38 1 38
Source: Dominick’s database.
3.2.2 Reduced-form analysis
To have an idea of the magnitude of the impact of costs shocks on retail prices of
RTE cereals, I perform three linear regressions with the log of retail price as the
dependent variable on observable costs shifters. Table 3.2 displays the results. The
first regression (column 1) includes an employment cost index for total compensation
of workers in goods producing industries in the United States. The second regression
(column 2) has in addition the logs of nominal prices of key inputs for cereal
production, namely, wheat, corn and oil. Finally, a third regression (column 3)
substitutes all previous covariates by the log of the average acquisition cost of each
product reported by retail chain. All regressions include product, time and price zone
dummy variables to account for observed and unobserved product characteristics,
and time and zone fixed effects.
Interestingly, all estimated elasticities are very low indicating that only a small
proportion of costs shocks are passed-through to consumer prices. The specification
given in column 2, for instance, predicts that a 10% percent increase in employment
costs leads to a 1.3% increase in retail prices. Similarly, a 10% increase in the price
of corn leads to a 1.1% rise in cereal prices. Even lower elasticities are obtained for
the price of wheat and oil, although they are not statistically significant. Column 3
shows that the degree of retail price responses to changes in AACs, which contains
information on all input costs, is not very high either. An increase in the AAC of
a product leads to an increase in the retail price of that product in 2.0%. This
preliminary result is a clear evidence of the incomplete response of cereal prices to
upstream costs and reinforces the question this paper tries to address. Not only
retail prices are not fully responding to changes in input prices but also show to be
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rigid to changes in wholesale costs, even if these are a very important component of
total costs of distribution. In a similar analysis, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) find
that retail prices fully respond to changes in wholesale prices and that infrequent
price adjustment was driven by rigid wholesale prices. My results then suggest that
a complex vertical structure of the industry may be playing an important role in this
incomplete transmission of costs and wholesale price movements to retail prices.
Table 3.2: Results from linear regressions (variables in logs)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Labor cost index 0.084∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ —
(0.039) (0.048)
AAC — — 0.204∗∗∗
(0.044)
Wheat — 0.009 —
(0.033)
Corn — 0.114∗ —
(0.068)
Oil — 0.004 —
(0.016)
Constant -2.630∗∗∗ -3.374∗∗∗ -2.352∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.532) (0.136)
R2 0.9081 0.908 0.922
Notes: Based on 14,784 observations. All regressions include brand,
week and price zone fixed effects.
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
3.3 The model
In this Section I set out structural models of demand and supply, with a special focus
on characterizing vertical relationships between manufacturers and a single retailer
in the presence of retail costs of price adjustment. Then I derive expressions for
adjustment costs bounds under three alternative specifications for the supply side.
3.3.1 Supply Models
The approach presented here is similar to that of previous literature that investigates
the sources of price stability from a vertical relations perspective. I set out three
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alternative models of vertical relations that can potentially fit the case of the industry
under study, namely, linear tariffs, two-tariffs with RPM, and simple two-part tariffs
(i.e. without RPM). This has at least two advantages: first, I can compare results
across models and form a prior about the role of nonlinear contracts on adjustment
costs, which should be evaluated with the help of counterfactual simulations; and
second, I avoid imposing a particular structure arbitrarily to the data.5 To account
for price rigidities on retail prices, I follow closely Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)
and add a fixed cost of price adjustment to retailer’s profit function. The derivation
of lower and upper bounds for these adjustment costs follows a revealed-preferences
approach, according to which the retailer optimally decides whether or not to adjust
the price at each period by comparing profits she would obtain under each alternative
scenario.
I consider a model of single common agency, i.e. there are several competing
upstream firms, indexed by f = {1, . . . , N}, distributing their products through
a common downstream retailer, r. Accordingly, the retailer carries all products,
which are indexed by j = {1, . . . , J}. Markets are defined as a ‘price zone’-week
combination and denoted t = 1, . . . , T .
As previously stated, the structural models presented in this paper account for
retail price rigidity. The argument is rather positive and comes from what I observe
in the data: whereas retail prices for all products considered here show a similar
pattern according to which a regular price (a price remaining constant for several
weeks) can be easily identified, the AACs seem to change more often and need not
keep the same proportion with respect to retail prices. Recall that some descriptive
statistics point out that while retail prices change roughly 21% of times, the AACs
change about 57% of times in 224 weeks. In terms of modeling, this means that
unlike the retailer, each manufacturer sets prices that satisfy first order conditions
of the static profit maximization problem.6
The retail firm bears a fixed cost of repricing whenever she decides to adjust retail
prices with respect to the previous period levels. These costs are denoted Arjt in case
the retailer wishes to adjust the retail price of product j in the current period. As
it will become apparent below, these costs capture all the remaining variation that
is not accounted for by included covariates. In economic terms, this is interpreted
as all factors that make a firm refrain from adjusting the price of a product with
respect to its previous-period level and potentially deviate from the optimum implied
by static profit maximization. Consequently, these costs may include, among other
things, menu costs, management costs, time and effort costs, and price advertising
costs (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013).
5 A preferred specification can be selected using nonnested tests of model selection developed by
Rivers and Vuong (2002) and applied to vertical relations by Bonnet and Dubois (2010,2015). In
the next iteration of the paper I will use such tests.
6 This does not mean that manufacturers do not bear costs of repricing, but these should be
certainly lower than those faced by the retailer.
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3.3.1.1 Linear tariffs
In a context of linear tariffs, manufacturers set prices first and the retailer follows
by setting retail prices taking wholesale prices as given. This form of vertical
interactions leads to the well known double marginalization result. From a horizontal
perspective, manufacturers act as oligopolists competing against rivals à la Nash-
Bertrand. In the following, I first present the problem of the retailer and then the
problem of manufacturers, following a backward induction reasoning.
Retailer problem
Suppose retailer r carries all J products existing in the market. Her profit function











where pjt is the retail price of product j at t, wjt the wholesale price of product j
paid by retailer r at t, cjt is the constant marginal cost of distribution of product
j at t, sjt(pt) is the market share of product j at t that depends on the vector of
prices of all products in the market, and M is the size of the market. Notice that
the term Arjt is preceded by the indicator function ✶{pjt 6=pjt−1} which takes on one if
the current price of j is different from the previous period price, and zero otherwise.
This means that r bears this cost only if she decides to change the price of product
j at period t.
In the presence of price adjustment costs, setting a new price every period is
costly and might eventually be unprofitable as compared to the profit the retailer
would make by leaving the price unchanged. An optimal behavior by the retailer
implies weighing benefits of adjusting the price of each product in the current period
with the costs. If extra profit of setting a new price exceeds adjustment costs, it is
optimal to do so. Otherwise, it is optimal to leave the price of that product constant.
In this sense, optimal price setting with positive fixed costs of repricing need not
coincide with the standard static profit maximization behavior according to which
optimal prices must always satisfy the current period first order conditions (FOCs).
The optimal price adjustment problem leads to two possible cases: either the price
of a product changes from previous period (Case 1) or the price remains constant
from previous period (Case 2). I describe the two in detail in what follows.
Case 1: The price changes from the previous period (pjt 6= pjt−1).
Retailer r will be willing to change the price of product j at time t if the total
profit net of repricing costs exceeds the profit she would have made by leaving the
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price constant, i.e. if for all k 6= j
(pjt − wjt − cjt)sjt(pt)M +
∑
k 6=j
(pkt − wkt − ckt)skt(pt)M − A
r
jt









where sc.t(pjt−1, p−jt) denotes market shares in the counterfactual scenario. The
retailer determines the price of product j by maximizing (3.3.1). Assuming the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in retail prices and that these prices










The FOCs yield a system of equations, one for each product j in r’s product range.
To write this system in matrix notation, define Sp as a J × J matrix containing




j, i ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Further, let γt denote the vector of price-cost margins which from
the FOCs is given by7
γt ≡ pt − wt − ct = −S
−1
p s(pt) (3.3.4)
Using (3.3.2) and rearranging terms, an upper bound for the adjustment costs of
















Case 2: The price does not change from the previous period (pjt =
pjt−1). Retailer r may find it optimal to leave the price of product j unchanged from
previous period, if the adjustment costs are high enough so that it is more profitable
to not change the price, even if this may imply that the price does not satisfy the
7 In a context of multiple retailers carrying differentiated products, retail margins write Irγt =
−(IrSpIr)
−1Irs(pt) for all r = 1, . . . , R, with Ir being retailer r’s ownership matrix, i.e. a
diagonal matrix of order J with jth entry equal to 1 if product j is in r’s product range and zero
otherwise. With a single retailer carrying all products in the market, the ownership matrix is the
identity of order J .
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current period FOCs, i.e. if for all k 6= j
(pjt−1 − wjt − cjt)sjt(pjt−1, p−jt)M +
∑
k 6=j
(pkt − wkt − ckt)skt(pt)M



















jt, p−jt) denote price and market shares in the counterfactual
scenario of a price adjustment. Using inequality (3.3.6) and rearranging terms, a





























(wjt − µjt)sjt(pt(wt))M (3.3.8)
where Gf denotes manufacturer f ’s product range, and µjt its constant marginal
cost of production of product j.
Assuming the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices,












= 0, for all j ∈ Gf
The FOCs yield a system of equations, one for each product j in manufacturer
f ’s product line. In order to write this system in matrix notation, define Pw as a
J × J matrix containing retail prices responses to changes in wholesale prices, with
entry Pw(j, i) =
∂pj
∂wi
for j, i ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Moreover, let manufacturer f ’s ownership
matrix If be a diagonal matrix of dimension J with jth entry equal to 1 if product
j is in her product range and zero otherwise. Finally, denote Γt ≡ wt − µt the vector
of wholesale margins. FOCs imply that for all f = 1, . . . , N are given by
IfΓt = −(IfPwSpIf )
−1Ifs(pt) (3.3.9)
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For wholesale margins to be identified, I need to be able to compute the matrix
Pw. I follow Bonnet and Dubois (2015) and obtain an expression for this matrix by
differentiating retailer’s FOCs, under the assumption that retailers act as Stackelberg
followers of manufacturers and set retail prices given wholesale prices. Formally, for




































The expression of the system of equations defined by (3.3.10) requires the
computation of matrices of second price derivatives of market shares with respect
to retail prices of all products. I compute those matrices by taking the vector of
first derivatives of the J market shares with respect to the price of product j and
differentiate each entry of this vector with respect to each price p1, . . . , pJ . This
results in a matrix of second derivatives per product j. Let the jth matrix of second


























p γt| . . . |S
pJ
p γt) − Sp = 0,
where notation (a|b) means horizontal concatenation of vectors a and b. Rearranging













Suppose now that manufacturers and retailers sign nonlinear contracts in the form
of two-part tariffs. RPM may take place. I follow the literature (Bernheim and
Whiston, 1985; Rey and Vergé, 2010; Bonnet and Dubois, 2010,2015; and Bonnet
et al., 2013) and characterize subgame perfect equilibria of the following game.
Manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it offers of contracts to retailers consisting of
a fixed franchise fee Fjt and a price per unit of product j, wjt. The offer will consist
also of a retail price pjt whenever manufacturers can use RPM. Each manufacturer
announces contracts to retailers. These offers are private information. Then the
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retailer announces which contracts she is willing to accept. These announcements
are public information. If all offers are accepted, retailers (manufacturers if RPM)
set retail prices and contracts are implemented. On the other hand, if one offer is
rejected firms earn zero profits and the game ends.











Manufacturer f sets wholesale prices wkt and franchise fees Fkt by maximizing




[(wkt − µkt)skt(pt)M + Fkt] (3.3.13)






t is retailer’s reservation value capturing what he would have got from the
best outside alternative had he chosen to reject an offer. Participation constraints
must be binding, otherwise there will still be room for increases in fixed fees, Fjt
(Rey and Vergé, 2010). I normalize the reservation value to zero and use binding














Provided that the retailer carries brands of all manufacturers, we can decompose








Fjt. Plugging this in




















(pkt − µkt − ckt)skt(pt)M +
∑
k /∈Gf
















8 See Bonnet and Dubois (2010) for details on how to find the final expression of manufacturer’s
profit.
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This equation shows that manufacturer f bears retailer’s adjustment costs on
both her products and rivals’ products.
Two-part tariffs with RPM
Suppose manufacturers are able to use RPM. Then, in addition to wholesale prices
and fixed fees they will set retail prices as long as by doing so they can always
replicate retail prices and profits that would result in a context of no RPM,
independently of the strategies of rivals, i.e. whenever possible, the use of RPM
is a dominant strategy for manufacturers (Rey and Vergé, 2010).
In this context, wholesale prices do not play a direct role on manufacturer f ’s own
profit, but rather a strategic role at the horizontal dimension. In fact, in addition
to controlling retail prices, manufacturers use franchise fees to extract profits from
the retailer, which makes them indifferent to the level of wholesale prices of their
own products. On the other hand, manufacturer f ’s wholesale prices can affect
rivals in two ways: through market shares that are functions of the vector of prices,
and through retail prices provided they are decreasing functions of the vector of
wholesale prices w∗. There is thus more instruments than targets in this problem,
and consequently a continuum of equilibria, one for each vector of wholesale prices.
Empirically, this implies a problem of identification that needs to be accounted for.
See subsection 3.4.3 below for details on how I circumvent this problem.
As previously described, the presence of adjustment costs shapes optimal price
setting behavior implying that for some periods retail prices may not satisfy first
order conditions, as it is more profitable to leave the price constant. In the context
of RPM, is the manufacturer who weighs benefits and costs of changing the retail
price of its own products. Again, two cases arise.
Case 1: The retail price changes from the previous period (pjt 6= pjt−1).
Manufacturer f is willing to adjust the retail price of product j at period t if
(pjt − µjt − cjt)sjt(pt)M+
∑
k∈Gf






kt − ckt)skt(pt)M − A
r
jt















kt(pjt−1, p−jt)M, k 6= j
(3.3.15)







(pkt − µkt − ckt)skt(pt) +
∑
k /∈Gf
(pkt − wkt − ckt)skt(pt),
















In matrix notation, the FOCs write as follows
Ifs(pt) + IfSpIf (γt + Γt) − IfSp(I − If )Γt = 0
Rearranging for total margins yields, for all f = 1, . . . , N
If (γt + Γt) = −(IfSpIf )
−1 [Ifs(pt) − IfSp(I − If )Γt] (3.3.17)
Notice that the system of equations depend on both retail margins γt and
wholesale margins Γt. This entails a problem of identification as long as there are
more unknowns than equations. It emerges as a consequence of the use of RPM by
manufacturers, as discussed previously. Further restrictions should be imposed for
identification (see subsection 3.4.3 for details).
By rearranging terms in (3.3.15), we obtain an upper bound for the adjustment























M, k 6= j.
(3.3.18)
Case 2: The retail price does not change from the previous period
(pjt = pjt−1). Manufacturer f chooses not to change the price of product j at period
9 For simplicity, I omit fixed fees and adjustment costs from the profit as they are constant at t.
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t if
(pjt−1 − µjt − cjt)sjt(pjt−1, p−jt)M +
∑
k∈Gf




























jt, p−jt)M − A
r
jt, k 6= j.
(3.3.19)
By rearranging terms, we obtain the following lower bound for the adjustment



























jt, p−jt) − skt(pjt−1, p−jt))
]
M, k 6= j.
(3.3.20)
Two-part tariffs without RPM
Suppose manufacturers are not allowed to use RPM. Therefore, they make offers to
the retailer consisting of a wholesale price and a fixed fee per product. They delegate
the task of optimally setting retail prices to the retailer and, as a consequence, is
the retailer who should solve the optimal repricing problem and bear the costs of
adjustment in case she decides to do so.
@ Retailer problem










Provided that franchise fees and adjustment costs are constant at t, the first order
conditions with respect to retail prices are the same as those under linear pricing
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and are given by (3.3.3). On the other hand, adjustment costs are not contractible
and repricing decisions are not observable at the moment manufacturers make offers
to the retailer. As a consequence, franchise fees are not contingent, i.e. they do
not vary depending on whether prices are adjusted or not. This implies that fixed
fees cancel out from the expression that compares actual and counterfactual profits
in the optimal repricing problem. Hence, bounds in a context of simple two-part
tariffs are exactly the same as in linear pricing and are given by equations (3.3.5)
and (3.3.7).
@ Manufacturer problem
The problem of manufacturer f in a context of no RPM is to optimally set wholesale
prices and franchise fees. She does this by maximizing (3.3.14) with respect to
wholesale prices, given those of other manufacturers. The FOCs of this program, for

































In matrix notation, f ’s FOCs are given by:
IfPws(pt) + IfPwSpIf (γt + Γt) + IfPwSp(I − If )γt = 0
From this equation, I can derive an expression for the total margins of
manufacturer f ∈ {1, . . . , N}
If (γt + Γt) = −(IfPwSpIf )
−1 [IfPws(pt) + IfPwSp(I − If )γt] ,
plugging the expressions of both retail margins given by (3.3.4) and matrix Pw given
by (3.3.11) into the previous equation yields an expression that is identified from
data and estimates of the demand parameters.
3.3.2 Demand
I index consumers by i = 1, 2, . . . , I. The conditional indirect utility consumer i
derives from purchasing product j in market t writes as
uijt = xjβi − αipjt + ξj + ηt + ∆ξjt + ǫijt (3.3.21)
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where xj is a row vector containing K observable characteristics of product j that
do not vary across markets, pjt is the unit price of product j in market t, ξj
captures the mean (across individuals and time) valuation of the unobserved (by the
econometrician) product characteristics, ηt denotes time fixed effects that account
for both unobserved determinants that vary with time, and time trends, and ∆ξjt =
ξjt − ξj captures market-specific deviations from this mean under the assumption
that in each market people value differently product characteristics. Finally, I allow
individual heterogeneity enter the model through the standard additive separable
mean-zero random shock ǫijt and K + 1 individual-specific parameters (αi, βi).
These coefficients aim at capturing individual marginal valuations of price and











+ πincomei + Σvi, vi ∼ N(0, IK+1)
where α and β are K + 1 mean taste coefficients common to all individuals, π
is a (K + 1) × 1 vector of coefficients that measure how valuations of product
characteristics vary with individual income and Σ is a (K + 1) × (K + 1) scaling
matrix to be estimated.
I define the“outside good”as any alternative brand or type of breakfast cereal, or
any other product not included in the choice set; it too accounts for the no purchase
option. Normalizing the mean utility to zero, the indirect utility derived from the
outside option writes as ui0t = ǫi0t.
Following Nevo (2000), the utility in (3.3.21) can be expressed as the sum of
a mean utility common to all consumers and an idiosyncratic deviation from this
mean:
uijt = δjt(pjt, ξj, ηt, ∆ξjt; α, β) + µijt(pjt, incomei, vi; π, σ) + ǫijt (3.3.22)
with δjt = xjβ−αpjt+ξj +ηt+∆ξjt and [pjt, xj]
′∗(πincomei+Σvi). A key assumption
of this model is that consumers choose at most one unit of the brand that gives the
highest utility. Suppose that ǫijt is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value, then the
aggregate market share of product j at period t as a function of mean utility levels






k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)
dF (µ) (3.3.23)
where F (·) denotes population distribution function.
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3.4 Empirical implementation
The estimation of the model described in Subsection 3.3.2 is conducted following
standard discrete choice methods —Berry, 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),
Nevo (2000, 2001). In this Section, I give details on the data used for estimation,
the estimation method and I discuss identification issues and how I deal with them.
3.4.1 The final data set
The model presented in the previous Section relies on tracking price changes on a
week-to-week basis (recall that DFF sets prices on a weekly basis). Even though
prices were reported with quite good regularity, information on some weeks for most
stores is missing. In particular, there are three main interruptions: in May 1990
(4 weeks), in September-October 1994 (4 weeks) and between February and August
1995 (25 weeks). To circumvent this problem, I restrict the sample to stores with the
largest number of price observations in the period comprised between 24 May 1990
and 14 September 1994, which gives 224 weeks. In this period, I observe the least
number of consecutive weeks with missing price data for each store. The final sample
includes, thus, 71 stores that represent the 85.5% of the total number of stores in the
chain. Further, I aggregate prices and quantities across stores into three price zones:
high-price (24 stores), medium-price (30 stores) and low-price (17 stores including
‘Club-fighter’ stores).
From 490 UPC observed in Dominick’s database I keep the 22 leading based
on the overall market share in the last quarter of the sample period. I define a
product as one serving of a UPC of RTE cereal, according to the weight suggested by
manufacturers which I assume is a good approximation to the true serving consumers
have. Notice that the same brand can enter the database with different UPCs
depending on specific characteristics. For example, different box sizes of Special K
are coded as separate UPCs and may have different price schedules and promotional
activity. Due to this, I treat different UPCs of the same cereal brand as separate
products.
I define a market as a zone-week combination, which gives 672 markets. Product
market shares are computed as the number of servings sold of each product in a
market divided by the potential number of servings that can be sold in the Chicago
area in a week. Following Nevo (2001), this potential is assumed to be one serving
per capita per day. The market share of the outside alternative corresponds then
to one minus the sum of market shares across products. Retail and wholesale prices
per serving were computed as total dollar sales divided by the number of servings
sold in a market.
Finally, I complement Dominick’s database with data on brand characteristics
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of brands in the sample
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Serving weight (g) 32.73 29.5 8.84 27 58
Amounts per serving
Calories 123.18 110 31.39 100 210
Caories from Fat 8.41 10 6.29 0 25
Sugar (g) 6.95 8 3.78 0 12
Fiber (g) 2.55 3 1.70 0 7
Protein (g) 3.05 2 2.70 1 10
Brands by segment (%)
All family segment 31.82 — — — —
Kids segment 31.82 — — — —
Adult segment 36.36 — — — —
Notes: Based on 14,784 observations. Source: Cereal boxes.
such as calories from fat, sugar, fiber and protein contents taken from cereal boxes
and segment indicators (Kids, All-family and Adults).10
I exploit the panel structure of my data to control for product fixed-
effects by including product dummy variables, which captures brand unobserved
characteristics. Thanks to this, demand is identified without the need to characterize
the supply side.11
3.4.2 Estimation
Estimation relies on the population moment conditions given by E[h(z)′ρ(x, θo)] = 0,
where z1, ..., zM are a set of instrumental variables, ρ is a function of the parameters
of the model and θo is the true value of the parameters (see subsection 3.4.3 below
for a discussion on the instruments used for identification). A generalized method




10I classify cereals by segments following Nevo (2001) and categories available on manufacturers web
sites. Kids segment: (Kellogg) Froot Loops, Frosted Flakes, Corn Pops, Apple Jacks; (General
Mills) Golden Grahams, Honey Nut Cheerios; and (Quaker Oats) CapN’ Crunch. Adults segment:
(Kellogg) Special K; (General Mills) Total, Whole Grain Total; (Quaker Oats) Oat Squares;
(Post) Grape-Nuts; and (Nabisco) Spoon Size Shredded Wheat. All-family segment: (Kellogg)
Cocoa Krispies, Corn Flakes; (General Mills) Cheerios, Rice Chex; and (Post) Honey Comb.
11For a detailed discussion of the differences with BLP’s procedure, see Nevo (2000a, 2001).
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where Λ̂ is a consistent estimator of E[h(z)′ρρ′h(z)] and plays the role of the optimal
weighting matrix in expression (3.4.1).
Now, according to the empirical framework described before, once product
dummy variables are included, the error term of the model is ∆ξjt which can be
computed as a function of the mean utilities δjt, the data and the parameters.
Following Berry (1994), this computation requires solving first for δjt from the system
of equations resulting from the match of observed and predicted market shares
sjt(x, pt, δt; π, σ) = Sjt (3.4.2)
where sjt(·) is the predicted market share function defined in (3.3.23) and Sjt denotes
the market share of product j observed in the data. As the system in (3.4.2) does
not have a closed-form solution for the the mixed Logit case, it should be solved
numerically. After inverting (3.4.2) in order to express δjt as an explicit function of
the observed market shares, the error term in (3.4.1) writes as
ρjt = δjt(x, pt, St; π, σ) − (xjβ − αpjt + ξj + ηt)
The estimation of the parameters is performed using a non-linear search. To do
this, I use the standard estimation algorithm proposed by BLP (1995) and improved
by Nevo (2000) and Knittel and Metaxoglou (2012).12
3.4.3 Identification
There are two identification issues. One concerns the supply side and, in particular,
the multiplicity of equilibria arising in the model of two-part tariffs with RPM. The
other one is related to the demand specification and the endogeneity of prices.
As described in subsection 3.3.1.2, in the model of two-part tariffs with RPM
there is a coordination problem due to there are more instruments –retail price that
helps coordinate joint profits and wholesale price and fixed fees that help extract
profit from the retailer (Rey and Vergé, 2010)– than targets. Empirically, this
implies that we do not have enough equations to separately identify wholesale and
retail markups. More importantly, if we were interested in estimating total margins,
we still would not know which equilibrium of the infinitely many we are estimating.
A particular equilibrium must be selected by imposing further restrictions on the
problem. To deal with this, I assume that manufacturers set wholesale prices equal
to marginal costs (w∗ = µ), which corresponds to a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium where retail prices are at the monopoly level, retailers earn zero profit
and upstream firms share equally the monopoly profit (Rey and Vergé, 2010). With
12For a detailed description and discussion of the estimation method, and the algorithm, see Knittel
and Metaxoglou (2012).
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this assumption, total markups (Γ + γ) in equation (3.3.17) will be equal to retail
markups as upstream margins are zero (Γ = 0).
There are several important reasons to choose this equilibrium. First, Rey and
Vergé (2010) show that there always exist such an equilibrium even if retail price
responses are not ‘well defined’. Second, because this is the only equilibrium in which
manufacturers attain maximum profits. Last, because this is the only equilibrium
which is robust to the introduction of solutions to the coordination problem.
A second identification problem stems from the correlation of retail prices with
the local deviation of the mean valuation of product unobserved characteristics
∆ξjt ≡ ρjt(θ), under the assumption that both firms and customers observe those
characteristics and, consequently, their decisions account for these local deviations.
This endogeneity issue requires finding a set of exogenous variables z1, ..., zM that
are correlated with the price but uncorrelated with the error term to be used as
instrumental variables so that the mean independence assumption, on which the
estimation of the model relies, is satisfied.
Different sets of instruments have been used in the IO literature of incomplete
pass-through, namely, nominal prices of inputs (Bonnet et al., 2013; Hellerstein,
2008; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013) and nominal exchange rates in the case of a
local market with imported products (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013). I try both
types of instruments separately and altogether and select the one giving the best
estimates.
The first set of IVs I use is monthly nominal prices of commodities used as
inputs in the production of RTE cereals, namely, oil, wheat, corn, and sugar, and
an employment cost index for total compensation of workers of the goods-producing
industries in the U.S. Prices of inputs are valid instruments as they are correlated
with retail prices since they make part of manufacturers’ costs, which is reflected
in wholesale prices which are, at the same time, components of retailer’s marginal
costs. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that input prices respond to local
demand shocks for RTE cereals or retailer’s promotional activities.
The second set of IVs is monthly nominal exchange rates. Even though the
RTE breakfast cereals consumed by U.S. citizens are all domestic-produced goods
and the U.S. has been historically a net exporter of agricultural products related
to cereals production (excepting sugar and cocoa),13 I claim that shocks affecting
bilateral trade between the U.S. and its main international markets for agricultural
products, such as corn and wheat, may affect domestic prices of goods using such
products as inputs. Under this argument I use bilateral nominal exchange rates of
India, South Korea, Colombia and Mexico, which have larger correlations with RTE
cereals’ retail prices as compared to those of commodities. The exogeneity of these
13According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. agricultural exports have been larger than
imports ever since 1960. See: http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-
agricultural-trade.aspx.
100
IVs follows the same argument as that of input prices: from the point of view of a
specific local market, exchange rates seem to be randomly determined.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Results from Logit regressions
As a first step, I perform Logit regressions both without IVs and with different sets
of IVs, to get a preliminary idea on how prices are responding to controls and IVs.
Results, given in Table 3.1, show that all estimates are significant and most are of
the expected sign. The estimated marginal utility of price becomes more elastic as
controls for brand and households characteristics are added to the model. This is also
the case when IVs are included. Columns (4) and (6) show results of 2SLS regressions
using commodity prices (‘cost’) as IVs, and columns (5) and (7) give results using
exchange rates as IVs. Overall, both sets of instruments seem to have a similar power
as in all cases first-stage R-squared and F -tests are large and of similar magnitudes.
Last column in Table 3.1 uses both exchange rates and commodity prices as IVs,
and as expected, the price coefficient increases but continues to be significant as well
as all other estimates. First- and second-stage R-squared as well as F -test do not
vary in an important way though, as compared to regressions with either set of IVs.
3.5.2 Results from the mixed-Logit model
Table 3.2 displays the results of a full random-coefficients Logit model with exchange
rates IVs. Given that the regression includes brand dummy variables that capture
both observed and unobserved product characteristics, mean coefficients of brand
attributes are backed out using a minimum distance procedure (see Nevo, 2001).
Results show that, on average, consumers value negatively product characteristics
such as calories from fat and sugar contents, which is somewhat expected and
coincides with Logit predictions. However, the utility decreases with higher
contents of healthy ingredients such as fiber and protein. Cereals in the Kids and
Adults segments are preferred to those in the All-family segment. The estimated
standard deviations (σ’s) of price and Adults segment coefficients are not significant,
suggesting that most of the heterogeneity is explained by income. All other estimated
standard deviations are significant, although just that of Kids segment and Calories
from fat are larger than one. This may indicate that, with the exception of
these two, unobserved demographics have lower explanatory power than included
demographics.
The estimate of log of Income (interacted with the constant), the only observed
































































































































































































































































































































































































































indicates that larger income households prefer to have other alternatives at breakfast
than the included RTE cereals (other brands, or totally different products). On the
other hand, the estimate of the interaction of income with price is not significant,
although the coefficient is positive suggesting that above-average income individuals
are less price sensitive, which is in line with findings of previous literature (Nevo,
2001).
Table 3.2: Results from the Mixed Logit modela
Means Std. Deviations Interactions with
Variable (β’s) (σ’s) Log of Income
Price -45.251∗∗∗ 0.024 0.135
(0.031) (0.026) (0.117)
Constantb 2.052∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.050) (0.014)
Cal from Fatb -1.615∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ —
(0.004) (0.005)
Sugarb -0.175∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ —
(0.005) (0.010)
Fiberb -3.171∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ —
(0.021) (0.017)
Proteinb -1.492∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ —
(0.011) (0.011)
Kidsb 6.131∗∗∗ 2.739∗∗∗ —
(0.062) (0.040)




Notes: a Based on 14,784 observations. Except where noted, parameters were estimated
using GMM. All regressions include brand and week dummies. Asymptotically robust
s.e. are given in parentheses.
b Means estimated using a minimum-distance procedure.
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level.
Table 3.3 presents the medians of the distribution of derived own- and cross-
price elasticities, and standard deviations. Results show that demand is considerably
elastic to changes in price: overall the median elasticity across brands and markets
is -8.16, consumers are less elastic to changes in prices of Kellogg’s cereals, whereas
a huge median elasticity is obtained for Quaker’s products. A similar pattern is
observed with cross-price elasticities.
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Table 3.3: Median own- and cross-price elasticities of RTE cereal brands by
manufacturera
Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Manufacturer Medianb Std. deviation Medianc Std. deviation
General Mills -9.047 16.627 0.139 0.341
Kellogg -1.321 33.476 0.017 0.471
Nabisco -14.084 22.527 0.421 0.687
Post -5.468 14.885 0.142 0.562
Quaker -44.531 144.507 1.029 7.868
All -8.155 61.764 0.136 3.084
Notes: aBased on 14,784 observations.
bEach entry corresponds to the median of the elasticities across the 672 markets.
cEach entry was obtained as the mean of cross-price elasticities of each product with respect to all
other prices, and then the median across the 672 markets by brand.
3.5.3 Implied margins and retail marginal costs
Once demand coefficients have been estimated, I can compute retail and wholesale
margins from FOCs under each supply specification. According to the structural
model, FOCs only hold for prices that adjusted at t. This has two implications:
first, the system of FOCs can only be used to compute margins of products for
which prices adjusted in the current period. Second, the calculation of margins
from FOCs includes reaction matrices Sp and Pw which, as previously described,
contain derivatives of market shares with respect to retail prices and retail prices
with respect to wholesale prices, respectively. In a static framework it is assumed
that firms set prices to satisfy static FOCs and, consequently, all prices vary from
period to period. This implies that all entries of Sp and Pw are generally different
from zero, ignoring the fact that some prices remain constant from previous period
and that the derivatives measuring the effects of such prices on market shares as well
as their reactions to changes in wholesale prices should be zero.
I follow Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) and compute margins for each model
of supply in a two-step procedure as follows. In a first step, I calculate markups
using FOCs for those products for which prices changed at t only, setting entries of
reaction matrices Sp and Pw to zero for prices that remained constant. Table 3.4
displays the results.
Under the linear pricing model, predicted retail markups range on average
between 11% and 39% of the retail price, whereas wholesale markups range between
7% and nearly 20%. In all cases but one, average retail margins are larger than
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average wholesale margins. The largest average retail and total markups predicted
by the model are those of Kellog’s with a considerable gap between the retail margin
and the wholesale margin. Quaker products show similar downstream and upstream
margins on average. The average retail markup across all products, 29.22%, is not
far from Nevo (2001)’s estimate of 35.8%, although the difference between these
two numbers is not negligible. It may be explained by the fact that here I account
for price rigidity by setting some marginal effects to zero as discussed previously,
whereas Nevo (2001) takes prices as varying all the time.14
As for the two-part tariff with RPM supply model, recall that I estimate the
equilibrium in which manufacturers set wholesale prices equal to marginal costs
(w = µ), implying that retail markups equal total markups and producers capture
all profit from the retailer through fixed fees. The predicted markups under this
supply model are slightly lower on average to retail markups computed under
linear pricing. Overall, the average markup is 28.16% and the relative positions
of manufactures in the ranking remains the same: Kellogg’s markup is the largest
with 38.7% and Quaker is the lowest with 8.1%. As compared to total margins
under linear tariffs, RPM markups are remarkably lower with differences ranging
between 7% to 21%. This is consistent with theory according to which two-part
tariff contracts help solve the double marginalization problem emerging under linear
pricing schemes and characterized by larger total margins and lower quantity as
compared to the monopoly levels. This is so because manufacturers’ profit do not
depend on wholesale margins as they are able to extract it from retailer through
fixed fees. As a consequence, lower total margins are expected.
Finally, the model of two-part tariffs without RPM predicts zero wholesale
margins and, consequently, total markups of the industry are exactly equal to
retail markups. These coincide with retail margins under linear pricing because
the absence of RPM enables the retailer to set prices that maximize own profit.
Formally speaking, retailer’s FOCs under the two models are exactly the same.
This result is consistent with the theory of single common agency with competing
manufacturers, which is the case this paper considers given that the data set used
contains information on a single retail chain only (DFF).15 In fact, according to Rey
and Vergé (2010) in the presence of a retail monopolist, simple two-part tariffs suffice
for manufacturers to attain monopoly prices and profits. By supplying at cost, a
manufacturer makes its rivals become residual claimants on the sales of all brands
in the market, which turns out to be an incentive for them to supply at cost as well
so as to keep retail prices at the monopoly level. As a result, upstream markups are
14The mean retail margin retrieved using all FOCs equals 32.6% which is closer to that presented
by Nevo (2001).
15Recall that the data comes from DFF and contains information only on DFF’s stores.
Consequently, the restriction of a single retailer in the market is imposed by the data and not as
an assumption of the structural model. A model of multiple common agency would be possible
with a data base containing information on several competing retailers.
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zero and manufacturers earn monopoly profits thanks to franchise fees.16
Table 3.4: Mean implied markups by manufacturer for several supply models (% of
retail price)
Two-part tariffs
Linear tariffs with RPM without RPM
Producer Retail Wholesale Total Total Retail Wholesale Total
General Mills 30.74 10.70 38.14 29.69 30.74 0.00 30.74
Kellogg 38.98 6.93 45.81 38.74 38.98 0.00 38.98
Nabisco 10.99 14.80 29.11 9.05 10.99 0.00 10.99
Post 24.34 19.42 43.24 22.57 24.34 0.00 24.34
Quaker 10.55 9.27 22.02 8.06 10.55 0.00 10.55
All 29.22 10.68 38.51 28.16 29.22 0.00 29.22
Notes: Each entry corresponds to the average markup across periods and products of the same manufacturer.
With the retail markups in hand, I compute retailer’s total marginal costs as the
difference between observed retail prices and retrieved markups for periods in which
price changes are observed only. In a second step, I am able to predict the whole




j + λhdz + φhAACjt + η
h
jt
where Chjt is the retrieved marginal cost using supply model h’s FOCs in a first step,
ςhj is an unknown product-specific parameter, dz are price zone dummy variables, and
AACjt is the average acquisition cost of product j at t reported by the retailer. Recall
that AAC is a proxy of the wholesale price Dominick’s pays to the manufacturer of
each product, so it accounts for an important part of retailer’s costs. Finally, ηhjt
is an unobservable (to the econometrician) random shock to costs. Assuming that
E[ηhjt | ς
h
j , AACjt] = 0, the parameters of the model (ς
h
j , λh, φh)
′ can be consistently
estimated. Table 3.5 reports the results of regressions for linear tariffs and Two-part
tariffs with RPM supply models. As expected, the AAC’s coefficient is positive and
significant in both regressions. Moreover, the large R−squared and F−statistic for
the two regressions indicate that included covariates have considerable explanatory
power.
Table 3.6 gives mean prices across products of each manufacturer as well as results
on retrieved and fitted marginal costs. On average, costs range from 40 cents to 85
16Given these markups, the remaining of the paper presents results on two supply models: linear
pricing and Two-part tariffs with RPM. I omit the third specification as it would give exactly
the same results as the linear pricing model.
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Table 3.5: Results from OLS regression of structurally retrieved marginal costs on
determinants
Variable Linear tariffs Two-part tariffs (RPM)
Average acquisition cost 0.604∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043)
Product FE Yes Yes
Price zone FE Yes Yes




Notes: Dependent variable is total retail costs retrieved from the structural model. Asymptotically robust s.e. are
reported in parentheses. Results for the supply model of Two-part tariffs without RPM are the same as those
from linear tariffs since the retailer’s problem is identical.
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level.
cents per serving for both linear tariffs and two-part tariffs with RPM. The largest
costs are those of Quaker’s products, followed by General Mills’s products which
have at the same time the highest average price per serving. By contrast, Kellogg’s
cereals have an average price similar to General Mills’s but the lowest marginal costs
(both retrieved and fitted) below 50 cents per serving on average.
3.5.4 Bounds for retail price adjustment costs
To derive bounds of retail price adjustment costs I use expressions (3.3.5) for upper
bounds and (3.3.7) for lower bounds in the linear pricing case, and (3.3.18) for upper
bounds and (3.3.20) for lower bounds in the two-part tariff with RPM case. Such
expressions require observing some components and estimating other, of both actual
and counterfactual profits with the exception of fixed fees in the two-part tariffs case
as they cancel each other out. The method I will describe below is similar for all the
supply specifications I consider, what makes the difference is the terms entering the
respective expression.
The computation of upper bounds is the simplest of the two. Recall that
expressions for these bounds are obtained by comparing current profits of products
for which prices changed in the current period with the counterfactual profit the
retailer would have got had she left the price of that product unchanged (Case 1).
The vector of counterfactual prices obtains directly by replacing current prices at t
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Table 3.6: Mean retireved and fitted retailer total marginal costs according to
distinct supply models (averages accross products and markets, in US dollar cents
per serving)
Mean Total marginal costsa
retail Linear tariffs Two-part tariffs with RPM
Manufacturer price Retrievedb Fittedc Retrievedb Fittedc
General Mills 11.07 6.97 7.17 7.09 7.28
Kellogg 11.01 4.42 4.80 4.47 4.83
Nabisco 6.67 5.97 6.11 6.10 6.24
Post 8.15 5.61 5.56 5.75 5.70
Quaker 8.94 8.12 7.18 8.28 7.37
All 10.39 5.82 5.90 5.92 5.98
Notes: aTotal marginal cost includes the wholesale price per product plus the retailer’s marginal cost of
distribution.
bBased on 3,766 observations.
cBased on 14,784 observations.
by prices at t − 1 for those products for which prices changed at t. Counterfactual
market shares are then computed using equation (3.3.23), the counterfactual price
vector and estimated coefficients of the demand model.
The expression for lower bounds comes from the comparison of actual profits of
products for which prices remained equal from previous period with counterfactual
profits the retailer would have got had she decided to adjust the price of that product
at t and bear the repricing costs. These prices should be optimal, i.e. they should
satisfy current FOCs. I compute the vector of counterfactual prices using equations
(3.3.4) for the linear pricing case, and (3.3.17) for the two-part tariffs case. Once
prices have been computed, counterfactual market shares are obtained in the same
way as for upper bounds, using the expression of the predicted market shares (3.3.23),
counterfactual prices and demand estimates.
Table 3.7 gives results of implied upper and lower bounds of retail adjustment
costs averaged across products of the same manufacturer and markets (‘price zone’-
week). By manufacturer, average lower bounds range from US $18.22 to US $156.95
in the linear tariffs case and from US $16.43 and US $141.27 for the two-part tariffs
case. Upper bounds are quite similar for the two supply models and range from
US $66 to US $2511. The very high mean upper bounds are for Quaker, for which
the model predicts very large values for some periods. However, the median upper
bound for this brand is US $30. Notice that with the exception of Quaker, lower
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bounds under RPM are lower than those under linear pricing. This suggest that, if
two-part tariffs with RPM is the true vertical conduct of this industry, linear tariffs
give a biased estimate of retail price adjustment costs.
Overall, DFF is willing to adjust the price of one of its products if it obtains
an extra profit of at least US $98.84. On the other hand, the retailer may pay at
most US $447 for adjusting the price of one product, on average. As pointed out by
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013), the magnitudes of these bounds do not give a lot of
information. To have an idea of their relative importance, I compute the share of the
sum of each lower and upper bounds of adjustment costs on retailer’s total revenue
for the period considered here (224 weeks). It corresponds to 6.5% and 10.14% in
the RPM case.
Table 3.7: Adjustment costs bounds for several supply models (averages across
products and markets, in US dollars)
Linear tariffs Two-part tariffs RPM
Producer Lower bounda Upper boundb Lower bounda Upper boundb
General Mills 79.13 247.13 26.23 247.28
Kellogg 156.95 218.66 141.27 219.10
Nabisco 18.22 66.74 18.21 67.13
Post 36.71 115.71 16.43 116.27
Quaker 91.84 2,508.12 297.90 2,511.28
All 109.34 446.07 98.84 446.70
Share on total revenuec 7.27% 10.12% 6.52% 10.14%
Notes: aBased on 3,746 observations.
bBased on 10,971 observations.
cComputed as the sum of lower (upper) bounds across all products and markets, divided by total revenue over
the 224 weeks.
3.6 Conclusion and future research
This paper aims at investigating the role played by the vertical structure of the
industry in the degree of retail price stickiness. To do that, I develop a structural
model of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in which three
possible vertical conducts can take place: linear pricing, simple two-part tariffs,
and two-part tariffs with resale price maintenance (RPM). To account for the fact
that retail prices are rigid, I include costs of repricing in the profit function of the
retailer. At each period, the retailer weighs benefits and costs of adjusting the price
of a product and makes and optimal decision. Using data on prices and sales of
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ready-to-eat breakfast cereals from a large supermarket chain in Chicago, I estimate
demand and retrieve margins and marginal costs under each supply specification.
With this in hand, I am able to quantify bounds of repricing costs, i.e. fixed costs
that prevent the retailer from adjusting the price of some products at each period
and that explain why observed price of RTE cereals remain at a given level for several
weeks.
An exploratory analysis of the data shows that cereal prices responses to changes
in input prices is very low. Surprisingly, retail prices do not always respond to
changes in wholesale prices, which makes plausible the hypothesis of manufacturers
using market power to maintain retail prices at a certain level. The estimation of the
structural models of demand and supply allows the computation of lower and upper
bounds of retail price adjustment costs. In a context of two-part tariffs with RPM,
average lower bounds are smaller than those obtained under alternative models of
supply. Results suggest that if manufacturers and retailers actually sign two-part
tariffs contracts with RPM, the specification of the supply side as linear pricing
results in biased adjustment costs. On the other hand, average upper bounds are
similar across.
A full assessment of the relative importance of price adjustment costs and other
sources of incomplete pass-through such as markup adjustment, and the role two-part
tariffs and RPM in it, requires counterfactual simulations. A future version of this
research work will include such an analysis. Finally, there is at least one interesting
avenue for future research and is related to the case in which the retailer has large
enough bargaining power so that she can impose restraints to manufacturers and
avoid costs shocks to be passed-through to retail prices. Bonnet and Dubois (2015)
provide conditions for identification of models of vertical relations with buyer power
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Résumé
Cette thèse est composée de trois essaies portant sur l’analyse empirique de la grande distribution et le
comportement d’achat des consommateurs. Le premier chapitre est dedié à l’étude des programmes de fidélité
des supermarchés et leur impact sur la demande de marques de distributeur (MDD). Souvent les supermarchés lient
les avantages fidélité à l’achat en marques de distributeurs, quelles sont les motivations des supermarchés à faire
cela? C’est la question que cet étude cherche à répondre d’un point de vue empirique. Je travail sur des donnés
extraites d’un panel représentatif des consommateurs concernant les achats des ménages français, et l’utilisation
d’une méthode structurelle d’estimation de demande. Les résultats sont conformes aux faits: les MDD sont des
produits moins préférés vis-à-vis les marques nationales (MN) de même qualité. Cependant, la carte fidélité a, en
effet, un impact positive sur le choix du consommateur: ceux qui portent une carte fidélité ont une probabilité
supérieur de choisir des MDD que ceux qui ne l’ont pas. Par ailleurs, l’impact d’un programme de fidélité sur la
demande des MDD est moins importants chez les détenteurs de plusieurs cartes.
Le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Daniel Herrera Araujo, vise à mesurer les coûts d’achat des consommateurs à
partir des données de panel concernant les achats des ménages en France. Quand l’analyse économique tient compte
des coûts d’achat, que rationalisent l’hétérogénéité observée en nombre des enseignes visitées par les consommateurs,
les conclusions de politique publique peuvent changer remarquablement. Nous identifions les coûts d’achat du
consommateur dans le cadre d’un modèle structurel de demande en plusieurs enseignes ainsi qu’en plusieurs produits,
qui lie le choix optimale du nombre de supermarchés à visiter (un seule ou plusieurs) aux coûts d’achat. Nous estimons
les paramètres du modèle et mesurons le coût d’achat total moyen en 18,7 e par enseigne visitée. Deux quantités y
sot compris: le coût fixe moyen, 1,53 e et le coût de transport moyen 17,1 e par visite.
Le troisième chapitre porte sur l’analyse empirique du rôle des tarifs binômes et la fixation du prix de vente
(RPM, d’après l’expression anglo-saxonne Resale Price Maintenance) dans la stabilité des prix de vente. Il est
largement reconnu dans la littérature économique que la transmission incomplète des chocs de coûts aux prix de
vente est expliquée par l’ajustement des marges ainsi que les coûts d’ajustement des prix. Les relations entre
fournisseurs et distributeurs et le RPM peuvent renforcer la rigidité des prix. Je présente un modèle structurel de
relations verticales dont des tarifs binômes peuvent être adoptées ainsi que le RPM. Ce modèle tient compte de la
rigidité des prix de vente à travers des coûts fixes d’ajustement des prix qui sont ajoutés au profit du détaillant. En
utilisant des données concernant les ventes de marques de céréales pour le petit déjeuner dans une grande châıne
des supermarchés au Chicago, j’estime la demande, récupère les marges et calcule les limites supérieure et inférieure
de l’intervalle que contienne les vrais coûts d’ajustement. Les résultats obtenus montrent que ces coûts représentent
en moyenne entre 1.6% et 3% des revenus totales du distributeur par an.
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the empirical analysis of grocery retailing and consumer shopping
behavior. The first chapter focuses on supermarket loyalty programs and their impact on the demand for private
labels. Supermarkets often link loyalty rewards to private label purchases, What are supermarkets’ motivations to
do this? This empirically examines this link using scanner data on grocery purchases of French households and
structural methods of demand estimation. Results are consistent with the industry lore: private labels are less
valued products relative to quality-equivalent national brands. However, members of loyalty programs have a larger
valuation of private labels than non-members. Moreover, the more prone to subscribe to LPs a customer is, the
larger her sensitivity to a price increase and the weaker the expected effects on the demand for private labels.
The second chapter, joint with Daniel Herrera Araujo, is inspired by a number of theory papers showing that
when shopping costs, that rationalize the observed heterogeneity in consumer shopping patterns, are introduced in
economic analysis, policy conclusions can change dramatically. We structurally identify consumer shopping costs
using scanner data on grocery purchases of French households. We present a model of demand for multiple stores
and products consisting of an optimal stopping problem in terms of individual shopping costs. This rule determines
whether to visit one or multiple stores at a shopping period. We then estimate the parameters of the model and
recover the distribution of shopping costs. We quantify the total shopping cost in 18.7 e per store sourced on
average. This cost has two components, namely, the mean fixed shopping cost, 1.53 e and mean total transport cost
of 17.1 e per trip.
The third chapter empirically examines the role of nonlinear contracts between manufacturers and retail stores,
and Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) on nominal price stability. According to the literature the incomplete
transmission of costs shocks into retail prices is explained by the existence of markup adjustment and price adjustment
costs. The vertical conduct of the industry and the use of RPM can introduce further price stickiness or reinforce
it. I present a structural model of vertical relations allowing for two-part tariffs and RPM, and accounting explicitly
for retail price rigidity by including fixed costs of price adjustment in retailer’s profit function. Using micro data
on sales of breakfast cereals from a large supermarket chain in Chicago, I estimate demand, retrieve margins, and
compute bounds for retail price adjustment costs. I find that these costs lie between 1.6% and 3% of its total revenue
a year, on average.
